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Commerce Clause

In a significant case involving the commerce clause, Japan Line,
Ltd v. County ofLosAngelesa the Supreme Court had its first opportu-

nity to consider the validity of an apportioned state tax imposed upon
international commerce. Using as a starting point the flexible test for
determining the validity of a state tax on interstate commerce adopted
in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,' the Court added two addi-

tional considerations to the four utilized in Brady where international
commerce is involved. The Court thus continued the trend away from
a rigid, formalized approach to state taxation on commerce evidenced
in cases prior to Brady. Yet, the result in the case, holding the California ad valorem property tax in question unconstitutional, demonstrated
that close scrutiny is still required of any state tax which affects interstate or international commerce.
Japan Line, Ltd v. County of Los Angeles*
In Japan Line, Ltd v. County of Los Angeles' the Supreme Court

addressed the problem of whether instrumentalities of commerce that
are owned, based, and registered abroad, and used exclusively in international commerce may be the subject of apportioned ad valorem
property taxation by a state. The California Supreme Court had unanimously determined that neither the "home-port" doctrine,2 the commerce clause, nor United States treaties with Japan prevented
imposition of such a tax.3 In reversing, the United States Supreme
Court held that California's tax resulted in a multiple tax burden, precluded national uniformity in the area of foreign commerce and was
therefore unconstitutional' under the commerce clause of the United
States Constitution.
a. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
b. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
* Commentary by Jennifer Bremer, member, third-year class.
1. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
2. See notes 17-19 and accompanying text infra.
3. 20 Cal. 3d 180, 571 P.2d 254, 141 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1977) (opinion by Manuel, J.,
expressing the unanimous view of the court).
4. 441 U.S. at 454.
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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The Lower Court Decisions
The Japan Line case arose from California's attempt to impose a
nondiscriminatory, apportioned ad valorem tax upon cargo containers
owned by six Japanese shipping companies. 6 The taxpayers' businesses
consisted of hiring out vessels and large cargo containers for the transportation of cargo in international commerce. Each company was incorporated under the laws of Japan and had both its principle place of
business and commercial domicile there. Similarly, the vessels and
containers owned by the taxpayers had their home ports in Japan-the
ships were registered there and the containers were subject to Japanese
property taxes. 7
During the taxable years 1970, 1971 and 1972, the containers were
in constant international transit except when awaiting loading, unloading or repairs.' In the course of that transit, they frequently passed
through California but were never used in interstate or intrastate commerce except as part of an international journey. While no container
remained in California permanently, some were present at any given
time, generally for a stay of less than three weeks. 9
California levied taxes of more than $550,000 on the assessed
value of the containers under Revenue and Taxation Code sections 117
and 2192.10 The code made property present in California on March 1
of any year subject to the ad valorem property tax. After paying the
taxes under protest, the shipping companies sought and received a refund in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County.1 The court of appeal reversed. 2 The Supreme Court of California granted a hearing
and, adopting the opinion of the court of appeal, affirmed the reversal
of the trial court.13
On appeal to the California Supreme Court the taxpayers unsuccessfully challenged the appellate court's holding on a variety of
6. 441 U.S. at 436-37. The facts were presented to the California Court of Appeal on
an agreed statement. 20 Cal. 3d at 183, 571 P.2d at 256, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 907. This summary of facts is taken entirely from that stipulation.
7. 441 U.S. at 436-37.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. CAL. Rnv. & TAX. CODE (West Supp. 1978).
11. The opinion of the Superior Court is not officially reported.
12. 132 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1976).
13. 20 Cal. 3d 180, 571 P.2d 254, 141 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1977). The written opinion reversing the trial court was actually authored by Justice Cobey of the Court of Appeal, Second
Appellate District, Division Three (Allport, Acting P.J., and Potter, J., concurring). It was
adopted with various deletions and additions by Justice Manuel as the opinion of the
Supreme Court. 20 Cal. 3d at 182, 571 P.2d at 255, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
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grounds. They first asserted that the case of Sea-LandService, Inc. v.
County of Alameda,14 relied upon by the court of appeal, did not fully
dispose of the issues raised by Japan Line. Sea-Land, decided by the
California Supreme Court after the trial court rendered its judgment in
Japan Line, had held that California could constitutionally tax domestically owned cargo containers used primarily in foreign commerce by
means of the statutory scheme challenged in Japan Line.15 Unlike the
taxpayers in Japan Line, however, the taxpayer-shipping company in
Sea-Land was incorporated and commercially domiciled within the
United States and had conceded that its containers were subject to local
taxation. Its sole argument against taxation had been that the taxes
6
levied by California could be imposed only at the ships' home port.'
The taxpayers in JapanLine asserted that their case required a different
result because the containers were foreign-owned and used exclusively
in foreign commerce. They maintained further that the home-port doctrine, which renders personal property fully taxable at the domicile of
its owner, 7 precluded apportionment as a method of taxing foreignowned instrumentalities of international commerce.s The California
Supreme Court tersely rejected this argument, stating that "in SeaLand [this court] specifically addressed this very contention, namely
that the home-port doctrine retained vitality with respect to foreign
commerce as distinguished from interstate commerce . . and clearly
rejected it."' 9
Similarly, the California Supreme Court dismissed the taxpayers'
arguments that the tax violated United States treaty obligations with
Japan2" and that it amounted to indirect tonnage duties forbidden by
the United States Constitution.2 ' The court concluded that the treaty
relied upon by the taxpayers merely required nondiscriminatory taxation of citizens and non-citizens-a requirement the court deemed was
met in Japan Line.2 2 The court further concluded that the constitutional prohibition against tonnage duties was inapplicable because the
California tax was occasioned by the containers' continuous presence
14. 12 Cal. 3d 772, 528 P.2d 56, 117 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1974).
15. 12 Cal. 3d at 775; 528 P.2d at 58, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 450.
16. 12 Cal. 3d at 781, 786, 528 P.2d at 62, 65, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 454, 457.
17. See Hays v. Pacific Mail S. S. Co., 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596 (1854). See also notes 2834 and accompanying text infra.
18. 20 Cal. 3d at 183-86, 571 P.2d at 256-58, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 907-09.
19. 20 Cal. 3d at 185, 571 P.2d at 257, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 908 (citation omitted).
20. [1953] 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863.
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.
3 provides: "No State shall, without the Consent of
Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage. .. "
22. 20 Cal. 3d at 189, 571 P.2d at 260, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 911.
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within the state, not by the movement of the containers.23
The taxpayers' remaining constitutional argument, that the tax at
issue resulted in a multiple tax burden because the containers were subjected to Japanese as well as California property taxes, was also rejected by the court. In disposing of this question, the California
Supreme Court stated that "the threat of double taxation from foreign
taxing authorities has no role in commerce clause considerations of
multiple burdens, since burdens. . . [imposed by foreign states] are not
attributable to discrimination by the taxing state [but are] matters for
international agreement."'24
The United States Supreme Court Decision
.The Supreme Court reversed the California holding.25 Writing for
an eight-member majority,2 6 Justice Blackmun framed the issue
presented by Japan Line as follows: "This case presents the question
whether a State, consistently with the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, may impose a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax on
foreign-owned instrumentalities (cargo containers) of international
commerce."27 After briefly stating the facts and history of the case,
Justice Blackmun proceeded to examine the California decision in light
of two considerations: the home-port doctrine and the commerce
clause.
The Court first considered Japan Line's contention that the homeport doctrine provided the proper rule for taxation of the ships and
containers."z That doctrine, described by the Court as "a corollary of
the medieval maxim mobilia sequunturpersonam" results "in personal
property being taxable in full at the domicile of the owner."2 9 Although the doctrine has now been replaced by the rule of fair apportionment among the states as a rule for taxation of moving
equipment,30 Justice Blackmun noted that "[i]n discarding the 'homeport' theory" the Court had consistently "distinguished the case of
23. 20 Cal. 3d at 186-87, 571 P.2d at 258, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 909.
24. 20 Cal. 3d at 185, 571 P.2d at 257, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 908 (citation omitted).
25. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
26. Justice Rehnquist, the lone dissenter, filed a dissenting statement which read as follows: "Substantially for the reasons set forth by Justice Manuel in his opinion for the unanimous Supreme Court of California, Mr. Justice Rehnquist is of the opinion that the
judgment of that court should be affirmed." Id. at 457.
27. Id. at 435-36.
28. Id. at 441-44.
29. Id. at 442.
30. See, e.g., Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equalization and Assessment, 347 U.S. 590 (1954).
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ocean going vessels."'" In doing so, Justice Blackmun admitted that
the taxpayers' argument favoring application of the doctrine had an
"inner logic,"3 2 but he refused to base the Court's holding on that
ground. Justice Blackmun found this refusal necessary in view of the
fact that the doctrine could "claim no unequivocal constitutional
source" and was based, instead, on "common-law jurisdiction to tax."33
He concluded therefore that "[tihe question. . .[in JapanLine was] a
much more narrow one, that is, whether instrumentalities of commerce
that are owned, based and registered abroad and that are used exclusively in international commerce, may be subjected to apportioned ad
valorem property taxation by a state."34
The United States Supreme Court's holding reversing the California courts was based squarely on the commerce clause. 35 Accordingly,
the Court initially considered several factors appropriate to commerce
clause analysis. At the outset, Justice Blackmun noted that instrumentalities of interstate commerce were required to bear a fair portion of
state tax burdens. He then considered the validity of Los Angeles
County's contention that the tax at issue did not impose an impermissible burden on commerce under the reasoning of Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. v. Brady.3 6 In Complete Auto the Court held that a tax such as the
one imposed in Japan Line would be "sustained . . .against Commerce Clause challenge when the tax is applied to an activity with a
substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not
discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the
services provided by the State."' 37 Los Angeles County asserted that all
four of these requisites were present in JapanLine: (1) the containers'
continuous presence within the state provided a "substantial nexus"
with California; (2) the tax was "fairly apportioned" because it was
based on the containers' average presence within the state; (3)the tax
was nondiscriminatory because it applied equally to all personal property in California; and (4) it was "fairly related to services provided" by
California such as police and fire protection. The Supreme Court
agreed in part with this contention. The Complete Auto requirements
would indeed be met if the containers were instrumentalities of inter31. 441 U.S. at 442.
32. Id. at 443.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 444.
35. "The Congress shall have Power. . .To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
36. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
37. Id. at 279.
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state commerce.3 ' The Court, however, rejected the notion that foreign
and interstate commerce were subject to the same commerce clause
considerations as interstate commerce alone. Justice Blackmun explained why: "When a State seeks to tax the instrumentalities of foreign commerce, two additional considerations, beyond those articulated in Complete Auto, come into play." 39 Those considerations are
the increased risk of multiple taxation and the need for federal uniformity in the area of foreign commerce. 40 California's tax failed to
meet both of these requirements and was therefore unconstitutional.
Justice Blackmun gave the following reasons for invalidating California's tax. By requiring the apportionment of state taxes imposed on
interstate commerce, the Supreme Court prevents multiple taxation because no jurisdiction may tax the property in full. This safeguard is not
present, however, in the realm of foreign commerce. In that area, the
Supreme Court "is powerless to correct malapportionment of taxes imposed from abroad in foreign commerce."'4 1 California's tax on international commerce not only created a substantial risk of multiple
taxation, it produced it in fact.4' In giving this rationale, the Court
rejected Los Angeles County's reliance on the case of Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair,4 3 for the proposition that the presence of multiple
taxation did not provide sufficient grounds for invalidating the tax. It
did so by distinguishing Moorman. In Moorman the Court had sustained Iowa's use of a one-factor formula for the apportionment of corporate income, despite the very real threat of multiple taxation owing
to other states' use of three-factor formulae.' This, however, had no
bearing on the situation presented in JapanLine, according to Justice
Blackmun, because: (1) the presence of multiple taxation in Moorman
was "speculative," while in JapanLine it was proven to exist; (2) Moorman involved "mathematical imprecision in apportionment" whereas
Japan Line involved a complete lack of apportionment; and (3) Moorman dealt with interstate rather than international commerce. 4 5
38. 441 U.S. at 445.
39. Id. at 446.
40. Id. at 446-48.
41. Id. at 454.
42. Id. at 452.
43. 437 U.S. 267 (1978) (opinion by Stevens, J.; Brennan, Blackmun and Powell, JJ.,
dissenting).
44. "The only conceivable constitutional basis for invalidating the Iowa statute would
be that the Commerce Clause prohibits any overlap in the computation of taxable income by
the States. If the Constitution were read to mandate such precision in interstate taxation, the
consequences would extend far beyond this particular case." Id. at 278.
45. 441 U.S. at 455.

322

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 7:315

Turning to the question of federal uniformity, Justice Blackmun
concluded that the tax sought to be imposed in Japan Line prevented
the United States from "speaking with one voice" as it should in the
regulation of foreign trade.4 6 Because American-owned cargo containers were not taxed in Japan, the Court expressed concern about the
international repercussions possibly attendant to California's tax.4 7 As
Justice Blackmun put it, "[t]he risk of retaliation by Japan, under these
circumstances, is acute, and48such retaliation of necessity would be felt
by the Nation as a whole.
Analysis
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in the case of CompleteAuto
Transit,Inc. v. Brady,4 9 state taxation of interstate commerce had traditionally been subject to commerce clause analysis in the form of a series of rigid and formalized rules. In general, these rules prohibited
states from taxing the privilege of doing business exclusively in interstate commerce, ° from taxing goods moving in interstate transit" and
from taxing interstate sales. 2 Complete Auto, decided in 1977, changed
this by overruling the line of decisions which had held "that a state tax
on the 'privilege of doing business' is per se unconstitutional when it is
applied to interstate commerce. ' 53 In Complete Auto, the Court determined that such a tax would be sustained under the commerce clause if
the taxpayer's business had a substantial nexus with the taxing state
and the tax itself was fairly apportioned, nondiscriminatory, and fairly
related to services provided by the state.54 This standard for determining the validity of taxes in interstate commerce was repeated in Department of Revenue of Washington v. Association of Washington
Stevedoring Cos.,5 wherein the Court sustained a state tax imposed
upon the full receipts received from interstate stevedoring because the
46. Id. at 451.
47. The Court was further concerned about retaliation by other nations: "Retaliation by
some nations could be automatic. West Germany's wealth tax statute, for example, provides
an exemption for foreign-owned instrumentalities of commerce, but only if the owner's
country grants a reciprocal exemption for German-owned instrumentalities." Id. at 453 n.18
(citation omitted).
48. Id. at 453 (footnote omitted).
49. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
50. See Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
51. See Kelley v. Rhoads, 188 U.S. 1 (1903).
52. See Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887).
53. 430 U.S. at 289 (Blackmun, J., expressing the unanimous opinion of the Court).
54. Id. at 287.
55. 435 U.S. 734 (1978).
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tax had been fairly apportioned. All of the taxable stevedoring occurred within the State of Washington. The standards articulated in
Complete Auto and Washington Stevedoring were calculated to ensure
that multiple taxation could not occur when the same business was
taxed by more than one state. 6 Those cases, however, were concerned
with interstate commerce and consequently their holdings did not take
into account the peculiar problems posed by a tax on a foreign taxpayer
engaged in international commerce.
In JapanLine, the Court was confronted for the first time with the
issue of the validity of an apportioned state tax imposed upon international commerce. Justice Blackmun's response was to conclude that all
of the Complete Auto requirements-as well as two others-apply to
international commerce. The first additional requirement is that the
tax on international commerce not substantially increase the risk of
multiple taxation. The Court held that a tax on foreign commerce will
be unconstitutional if it produces multiple taxation in fact.57 Whether
the mere possibility of multiple taxation will by itself invalidate a tax
still remains unclear. The Court expressly refused to decide the issue. 8
Indeed, the Court did not even intimate how it would evaluate such a
factor.5 9
The second additional requirement imposed by the Court is that a
tax on instrumentalities of international commerce must not obstruct
the uniformity of national policy in an area where federal uniformity is
essential.6 0 The Court indicated several ways in which a tax might
frustrate the need for uniformity. It might encourage international disputes over formulae or retaliation from foreign nations affected by the
taxes, thereby
tax, or it might encourage other states to impose similar
61
unfairly multiplying taxation of interstate commerce.
In the future a state will not, consistent with the commerce clause,
be able to impose apportioned ad valorem property taxes on foreignowned instrumentalities of international commerce unless six standards
are met. Four of these are applicable to interstate as well as foreign
56. See also Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equalization and Assessment, 347 U.S. 590 (1954).
57. 441 U.S. at 453-54.
58. Id. at 452 n.17.
59. "Because California's tax in this case creates multiple taxation in fact, we have no
occasion here to decide under what circumstances the mere risk of multiple taxation would
invalidate a state tax, or whether this risk would be evaluated differently in foreign, as opposed to interstate, commerce." Id. (emphasis omitted).
60. Id. at 448.
61. Id. at 450-51.
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commerce, while two apply to foreign commerce alone. First, the taxed
business must have a substantial nexus with the taxing state.6 2 Second,
the tax must be fairly apportioned to prevent a state from taxing property or income which is properly attributable to activities conducted in
another jurisdiction.63 Third, the tax must not discriminate against interstate commerce.64 Fourth, the tax must be fairly related to services
provided by the taxing state.65 With the advent of Japan Line, two
additional requirements have been added in the area of foreign commerce: to be sustainable under the commerce clause, a state tax may
not in fact result in multiple taxation 66 and may not prevent national
uniformity in foreign commerce.67

II. Speech or Debate Clause
During the 1978-79 Term, the Court had a relatively rare opportunity to consider a case involving the speech or debate clause. Hutchinson v. Proxmirea was an action brought by the recipient of a
government grant against a member of Congress for allegedly defamatory statements made in press releases and newsletters. In holding that
the statements were not privileged, the Court refused to extend the
scope of speech or debate clause protection beyond the "legitimate legislative activity" standard established in Kibourn v. Thompsonb and re-

cently reaffirmed in Gravel v. United States.c It thus appears that the
Court would hold only those internal communications essential to the
deliberations of Congress protected by the speech or debate clause.
62. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 441 U.S. at 451. Whether the mere risk of multiple taxation will invalidate a tax is
uncertain. See notes 58 & 59 and accompanying text supra.
67. 441 U.S. at 451.
a. 99 S. Ct. 2675 (1979).
b. 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
c. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
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Hutchinson v. Proxmire*

In Hutchinson v. Proxmire,I the Supreme Court was called upon to
decide whether the speech or debate clause of the Constitution 2 protects members of Congress against suits for allegedly defamatory statements made in press releases and newsletters. The Court also
addressed a related First Amendment issue involving the appropriate
standard of proof required for petitioner Hutchinson to establish his
defamation allegations: that is, whether Hutchinson was a public
figure or a public official thereby invoking the standard of actual malice.3
4
The facts underlying the Hutchinson litigation are uncomplicated.
In April, 1975, respondent William Proxmire, a United States Senator
from Wisconsin, awarded his "Golden Fleece of the Month Award" to
the National Science Foundation, the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) and the Office of Naval Research. The award,
which is designed to publicize the most egregious examples of wasteful
government spending, was given to these agencies for their joint funding of research done by a Professor Hutchinson of Western Michigan
University. The agencies spent over half a million dollars over a seven
year period to assist Professor Hutchinson. 5 Hutchinson's research involved observations of primates' behavioral reactions when exposed to
aggravating stimuli. The research sought to measure aggression. Both
NASA and the Navy felt that Hutchinson's work would be useful to
them in resolving problems of aggression associated with confining
humans in close quarters for extended periods of time in space and
under water. Reports of Hutchinson's research were published in various scientific journals.
The Golden Fleece Award in question was prepared by Senator
Proxmire's legislative assistant, Morton Schwartz, who discovered and
investigated the government's subsidy of Hutchinson's research. As a
result, Schwartz helped write a satirical speech for Senator Proxmire
* Commentary by Malcolm Kushner, member, third-year class.
1. 99 S. Ct. 2675 (1979).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. The speech or debate clause states: "[F]or any Speech
or Debate in either House, [legislators] shall not be questioned in any other Place."
3. 99 S. Ct. at 2687. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the
Court held that the standard of proof required in a defamation action brought by a public
official is actual malice; that is, actual knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth.
Under Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), this standard of proof was extended to actions by public figures.
4. The summary of the facts of this case is taken from the Supreme Court opinion. 99
S. Ct. at 2677-79.
5. Id at 2678.
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which characterized Hutchinson's research as a waste of the taxpayers'
money.6 The speech was incorporated into a press release and sent to
members of the news media. 7 Prior to release of the speech, Hutchinson was informed of its content. He objected to it as inaccurate and
incomplete. Schwartz disagreed and it was published. Following the
announcement of the award, Schwartz, acting on behalf of Senator
Proxmire, contacted a number of the federal agencies that supported
Hutchinson's research to discuss the merits of their continued funding
of Hutchinson's work.
In May, 1975, Senator Proxmire repeated his criticism in a newsletter sent to 100,000 people including many nonconstituents. Later in
that year, Senator Proxmire referred to Hutchinson's research during a
television interview but did not mention Professor Hutchinson by
name. A final reference to the research was made in a February, 1976
newsletter summarizing the reasons why certain agencies had been recipients of the Golden Fleece Awards of 1975. The newsletter did not
refer to Hutchinson by name. 9
The Lower Court Decisions
On April 16, 1976, Hutchinson instituted a defamation action in
federal court,' 0 alleging that defendants Senator William Proxmire and
Morton Schwartz had damaged his professional standing by publicizing the Golden Fleece Award. The defendants responded to this contention by asserting the congressional privilege of immunity to suit
found in the speech or debate clause of the Constitution. They contended that the privilege extended to press releases and newsletters circulated by members of Congress. The district court granted summary
judgment for respondents, holding that the speech or debate clause afforded absolute immunity to the Senator and his staff for reporting and
publicizing the funding of Hutchinson's research in a Senate speech
and in a press release. According to the court, the press release fell
within the "informing function" of Congress." In the court's view it
was not distinguishable from a television or radio broadcast of a speech
6. Id
7. Id
8. Id at 2679.
9. Id
10. 431 F. Supp. 1311 (1977).
11. Id at 1324-25. The congressional "informing function" refers to (1) Congress' ability to inform itself through investigatory activities, and (2) Congress' duty to inform the
public about its activities.
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from the Senate floor. 12 Hence it was protected by the immunity conferred by the speech or debate clause.
Turning to the First Amendment, the district court brought the
newsletters and interviews within the boundaries of protected speech.' 3

It held Hutchinson to be a public figure for purposes of the suit and

thereby required him to meet the standard of actual malice. 1" Such a

holding was made necessary by Hutchinson's "long involvement with
publicly funded research, his active solidification of federal and state

grants, the local press coverage of his research, and the public interest
in the expenditure of public funds on the precise activities in which he

voluntarily participated."' 5 The district court held that neither respondents' failure to investigate nor their failure to edit properly was sufficient to establish actual malice. Therefore no genuine issue of material
fact was present 16 and no defamation action could lie.

The court of appeals affirmed' 7 but its rationale differed from that
of the district court. The court of appeals held that the speech or debate clause protected the statements made both in the press release and
the newsletters but not the follow-up telephone calls to the agencies
funding Hutchinson."8 The follow-up calls and the interviews were
held protected under the First Amendment.1 9 In so holding, the court
of appeals agreed with the district court that Hutchinson was a public

figure and that no actual malice had been shown. 0

12. Id at 1325. See also 39 U.S.C. § 3210 (1970). Under the franking statute, congressmen are authorized to use the mails free of charge for certain types of communications,
including newsletters and press releases. The franking statute affects mailed materials
"which may deal with such matters as the impact of laws and decisions on State and local
governments and individual citizens; reports on public and official actions taken by members of Congress; and discussions of proposed or pending legislation or government actions
and the positions of Members of Congress on and arguments for or against, such matters."
39 U.S.C. § 3210(3)(B) (1970). Although the district court mentioned this privilege, it did
not rest its conclusion on the statute.
13. 431 F. Supp. at 1325-33.
14. Id. at 1327.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1333.
17. 579 F. 2d 1027 (1978).
18. Id. at 1032-34. The court of appeals stated: "The district court did not specifically
address the Speech or Debate status of the follow-up phone calls. It appears, however, that
the court below viewed these actions as merely a part of the total investigation and therefore
abolutely privileged. In light of the language in Gravel, we must disagree." Id. at 1032 n.9
(citation omitted).
19. Id. at 1034.
20. Id.
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The United States Supreme Court Decision
The United States Supreme Court reversed both the district court
and the court of appeals.2 ' Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, determined that the speech or debate clause does not protect the
communication of information by individual congressmen through
press releases and newsletters.2 2 The Court reviewed the history of the
case law interpreting the clause and found no intent to create an absolute privilege from liability or suit for defamatory statements made
outside congressional chambers.23 The Court examined the scope of
protection afforded by the clause against suits inhibiting the freedom of
congressional deliberations and found neither Senator Proxmire's
newsletter nor his press release essential to those deliberations.2 4 The
Chief Justice distinguished published congressional committee reports,
held protected under the speech or debate clause in Doe v. McMillan,'
from newsletters and press releases.2 6 The latter, wrote the Court, were
not part of the legislative function or process but were primarily means
of informing those outside the congressional forum and represented
only the views and will of a single member.2 7
In the next section of the majority opinion, the Court examined
the reasons advanced by the district court and court of appeals in support of their finding that Hutchinson was a public figure.28 The Chief
Justice noted that the lower courts' conclusions were based on two factors: "[F]irst, Hutchinson's successful application for federal funds and
the reports in local newspapers of the federal grants; second, Hutchinson's access to the media, as demonstrated by the fact that some newspapers and wire services reported his response to the announcement of
the Golden Fleece Award."2 9 The Court rejected these facts as a basis
for holding Hutchinson to be a public figure3" and held that those
charged with alleged defamation could not by their own conduct make
the claimant into a public figure, thereby creating their own defense. 3 '
The Court found the general concern about public expenditures insuffi21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

99 S.Ct. 2675 (1979).
Id. at 2686-87.
Id. at 2684-86.
Id. at 2686.
412 U.S. 306 (1973).
99 S.Ct. at 2687.
Id.
Id. at 2687-88.
Id. at 2688.
Id.
Id.
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cient to convert Hutchinson into a public figure since he had never as-

sumed any role of public prominence in that broad area of public
concern. 32 The majority opinion concluded by noting that Hutchinson

did not have the regular and continuing access to the media that is
characteristic of one who is a public figure.33
In an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice
Stewart joined in all but one footnote of the majority opinion.3 4 In
doing so he asked whether the constitutional protection afforded by the

speech or debate clause to a communication from a congressman or a
member of his staff to a federal agency should depend on whether the

communication was defamatory.I He felt it should not.36 The majority thought otherwise.3 7 Justice Stewart argued that telephone calls to

federal agencies were a routine and essential part of the congressional
oversight function and therefore should be protected by the speech or
debate clause.38

Justice Brennan wrote a separate dissent in which he disagreed
with the Court's conclusion that Senator Proxmire's newsletters and
press release fell outside the protection of the speech or debate clause.39

In his view, any form of public criticism by congressmen of unnecessary government spending was a legislative act entitled to speech or

debate clause immunity.4" Justice Brennan based his opinion on reasons expressed in his dissent in Gravel v. United States.4
In Gravel, Justice Brennan had argued that "speech or debate" en32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 2688-89 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stewart disagreed with footnote 10 of the majority opinion.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2689.
37. Id. at 2681 n.10. The question was raised by the majority in its discussion of the
follow-up calls made by Schwartz to governmental agencies. The Chief Justice concluded
that an attempt to influence the behavior of executive agencies which involved libelous comments were not protected by the speech or debate clause.
38. Id. at 2689.
39. Id. at 2689 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
40. Id.
41. 408 U.S. 606, 648 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Gravel, the government
sought to subpoena a Senator's aide and compel him to appear before a grand jury investigating the release and republication of the Pentagon Papers. Id at 608. The Senator had
read extensively from the papers during a subcommittee meeting before inserting the entire
47-volume study into the Congressional Record and arranging for its republication by a
private printer. Id at 609. The Supreme Court, in a six to three decision, held that the
speech or debate clause protected the Senator and his aide with respect to events involving
preparation for and conduct of the subcommittee meeting but that his immunity did not
extend to the Senator's arrangements for private republication of the papers. Id at 622.
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compassed more than acts necessary to the internal deliberations of
Congress. The contrary interpretation given by the majority in Gravel
represented a "far too narrow view of the legislative function."4 2 He
argued that the legislator's duty to inform the public about governmental matters lay at the heart of the democratic system.4 3 In his view, the
ongoing crisis of confidence in American government made the "informing function" not merely an "ordinary" legislative task, but an essential one. The preservation of our democratic institutions depended
on its viability.'
Analysis
Consideration of the questions raised and resolved in Hutchinson
can best be accomplished by a two-part analysis. First, the reasoning
underlying the majority's rejection of Senator Proxmire's defenses will
be examined. Second, this commentary will address the question of
whether the Court's judgment is consistent with its prior decisions interpreting the speech or debate clause and determining the scope of the
protection afforded speech by that clause and by the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court has passed directly on the speech or debate
clause only a few times in our nation's history. 5 A literal reading of
the clause would limit its protection to utterances made solely within
the confines of either congressional house, but the Supreme Court has
never given the clause such a literal interpretation.4 6 In Kilbourn v.
Thompson,4 7 the first case in which the Supreme Court dealt with a
challenge to the immunity granted by the clause, the Court held that
the act of voting fell within the ambit of the privilege. Thus the Court
created a "legitimate legislative activity" standard for invoking speech
or debate clause immunity. It extended the clause to "things generally
done in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to the
42. Id at 649 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
43. Id In support of his "informing function" argument, Justice Brennan cited congressional financial support for communications between legislators and the public, widely publicized congressional hearings and historical interpretation of the speech or debate clause.
Id at 650.
44. Id at 652.
45. United States v. Helstoski, 99 S.Ct. 2432 (1979); Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973); Gravel v. United
States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972); Dombrowski v.
Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966); Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
46. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 99 S.Ct. 2675, 2683 (1979).
47. 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
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business before it."
The "legitimate legislative activity" standard has remained in effect since its inception in Kilbourn. A recent restatement of this standard was made in Gravel v. UnitedStates49 where the Court stated that
matters other than speech and debate are protected only if they are "an
integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which
Members participate in committee and House proceedings." 5 0 The issue in a speech or debate clause case thus becomes a question of
whether or not to classify a legislator's disputed communicative acts as
essential to the deliberative process.
In deciding this question with respect to Senator Proxmire's press
release and newsletters, Chief Justice Burger reviewed the historical
purpose of speech or debate clause immunity. As part of that review,
he cited UnitedStates v. Brewster,5' a case in which the history of the
clause was traced back to its English roots. In Brewster, the Court emphasized that the clause must be interpreted in light of the American
constitutional system of government rather than the English parliamentary scheme. 2 Thus, the Brewster Court held that the purpose of the
speech or debate clause was "to preserve legislative independence, not
supremacy."5 3 It further held that speech or debate clause immunities
were not "for the personal or private benefit of Members of Congress,
but to protect the integrity of the legislative process by insuring the
independence of individual legislators." 5 4 The Chief Justice found the
clause similarly interpreted in the writings of Thomas Jefferson and
James Wilson, both of whom emphasized the limited nature of the immunity bestowed upon legislators.5 As a result, the Chief Justice con48. Id at 204.
49. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
50. Id at 625.
51. 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
52. Id at 508.
53. Id
54. Id at 507.
55. 99 S. Ct. at 2683. Thomas Jefferson wrote: "[The privilege] is restrained to things
done in the House in a Parliamentary Course,. . . For [the Member] is not to have privilege
contra moremparliamentarium,to exceed the bounds and limits of his place and duty." T.
JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE 20 (1854), reprintedin THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 704 (S. Padover ed. 1943). In commenting upon the idea that Parliament's
privileges were preserved by keeping them indefinite, James Wilson, a draftsman of the
Constitution and a Supreme Court Justice, wrote: "Very different is the case with regard to
the legislature of the United States. . . . The great maxims, upon which our law of parliament is founded, are defined and ascertained in our constitutions. The arcana of privilege,
and the arcana of prerogative, are equally unknown to our system ofjurisprudence." 2 THE
WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 35 (J. Andrews ed. 1896).
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cluded that the historical interpretation of the clause did not justify
extending immunity to protect press releases and newsletters. 6
In order to bolster this conclusion the Chief Justice quoted the
Commentaries of Justice Story: "[A]lthough a speech delivered in the

house of commons is privileged, and the member cannot be questioned
respecting it elsewhere; yet, !f he publishes his speech, and it contains
libellous matter, he is liable to an action andprosecution therefore, as in

common cases of libel."57 The same principles were said by Justice
Story to be applicable to the privilege of debate and speech in Congress.58 The Chief Justice then applied this doctrine to Senator
Proxmire's press release and newsletters5 9 and asserted that such com60
munications were not "essential to the deliberations of the Senate."

While acknowledging that a legislator's published statements may bear
some relationship to the legislative and deliberative process by influ56. 99 S. Ct. at 2684. In his review of the historical purpose of the clause, the Chief
Justice omitted the purpose of alleviating Congressmen from the burden of litigation:
"[Liegislators engaged 'in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity.' . . . should be protected not only from the consequences of the litigation's results but also from the burden of
defending themselves." Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85 (1967). The purpose underlying the clause was reiterated by the Court in Eastland v. United States Servicemen's
Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975). There the Court stated: "[A] private civil action, whether for an
injunction or damages, creates a distraction and forces Members to divert their time, energy,
and attention from their legislative tasks to defend the litigation. Private civil actions also
may be used to delay and disrupt the legislative function." Id at 503. Although this purpose of the clause is mentioned in the majority opinion, it is not addressed in the section of
the opinion reviewing the purpose of the clause.
57. 99 S. Ct. at 2684 (quoting J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 863
at 329 (1833) (emphasis added)).
58. Id Justice Story continued by writing: "No man ought to have a right to defame
others under colour of a performance of the duties of his office. And if he does so in the
actual discharge of his duties in congress, thatfurnishes no reason, KhI he should be enabled
through the medium of the press to destroy the reputation, andinvade the repose of other citizens. It is neither within the scope of his duty, nor in furtherance of public rights, or public
policy." Id at 2684-85 (Emphasis added).
59. Id at 2685. After articulating Justice Story's opinion that the English doctrine denying immunity for republication was applicable to Congress, the Chief Justice cited Gravel
v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972), and Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973), for the
proposition that the English doctrine had been accepted in the United States. The citation to
Doe is curious. The Chief Justice dissented in that case, joined by Justices Blackmun and
Rehnquist. The Chief Justice had argued in Doe that the speech or debate clause extended
to protect the publication of any committee report authorized by Congress which had a valid
legislative purpose. It is difficult to reconcile this position with the one he takes in the instant case which would deny immunity to a press release summarizing a congressional report. The Chief Justice's observation in Hutchinson that the committee report in Doe
represents a collective legislative view while Senator Proxmire's press release is the view of a
single legislator outside the congressional forum may indicate the basis of his reasoning. It
does not explain, however, why the two situations should be treated differently.
60. 99 S. Ct. at 2686.
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encing other votes in Congress, the Chief Justice cited UnitedStates v.
Brewster6 as precluding such a wide grant of immunity.62 According
to the Chief Justice, the issue was apparently well settled by the Brewster decision.6 3
Senator Proxmire's argument that press releases and newsletters
were privileged as part of the informing function of Congress was also

rejected in the majority's opinion. 64 The Chief Justice observed that
"informing" may be used in two senses: first, Congress informs itself
collectively through hearings of its committees, and second, legislators
inform the public, through various means, about their activities. He

held that the latter form of "informing" is not part of the legislative
function or deliberative process. In so holding, the Chief Justice examined the writings of Woodrow Wilson cited in Senator Proxmire's

brief.6 6 The Chief Justice interpreted Wilson's reference to the informing function of Congress as limited to the narrower sense of "informing" by which Congress informs itself through committee hearings.6 7

He explained that Wilson referred only to the ability of Congress to
acquaint itself with acts of the executive branch and that a distinction

between the informing function and the legislative function was clearly
implied.6 8 Accordingly, he inferred the distinction to dismiss Senator
Proxmire's arguments.

In his brief dissent Justice Brennan rejected the majority's restricted view of the legislative function for reasons expressed in his dis61. 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
62. 99 S. Ct. at 2686.
63. Id The Brewster Court noted that in United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966),
the Court distinguished between acts "related to the due functioning of the legislative process" and acts "constituting legislative process entitled to Speech or Debate Clause protection." The Brewster Court explained that newsletters and press releases were not entitled to
immunity merely because they were related to the legislative process, but that "only acts
generally done in the course of the process of enacting legislation were protected." 408 U.S.
at 514.
64. 99 S. Ct. at 2687.
65. Id at 2686-87.
66. Id at 2687. Woodrow Wilson wrote: "Unless Congress have and use every means
of acquainting itself with the acts and the disposition of the administrative agents of the
government, the country must be helpless to learn how it is being served; and unless Congress both scrutinize these things and sift them by every form of discussion, the country must
remain in embarrassing, crippling ignorance of the very affairs which it is most important
that it should understand and direct. The informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function. . . . [Tihe only really self-governing people is that
people which discusses and interrogates its administration." W. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL
GOVERNMENT 303 (1885).

67. 99 S. Ct. at 2687.
68. Id
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sent in Gravel.6 9 Since the Gravel case forms the pivotal basis for
Justice Brennan's rebuttal to the majority, his reliance on it demands
some exposition. In Gravel, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, had argued that the speech or debate clause encompassed more than "acts necessary to the internal deliberations of
Congress concerning proposed legislation."7 This led him to conclude
in Hutchinson that the informing function-the congressman's duty to
inform the public-is central to the role of the legislator and therefore
worthy of speech or debate clause protection.7 ' How he relies on
Gravel in so concluding is not, however, immediately apparent.
In his Gravel dissent, Justice Brennan did not distinguish between
the two senses of "informing" as did the majority in the instant case.
Although it is clear that he now wants to include the second sense of
"informing" within the definition of legislative function, much of the
authority he cites from Gravel actually refers to the first sense of the
word. In transferring his Gravel dissent to the instant case, Justice
Brennan loses much of the support for his reasoning. 72 A second argument offered in Gravel and ostensibly adopted in Hutchinson seems
equally inadequate. Justice Brennan cites the congressional franking
privilege and the crisis of confidence in the American system of government as support for his view that a legislator's communications with
73 Althe public should receive speech or debate clause immunity.
though logically sound, neither of these arguments is persuasive. The
crisis in confidence demonstrates the vital need for a free flow of information between Congress and its constituents. The franking privilege
shows congressional intent to foster such communication. The accomplishment of this goal does not require that such communications include defamatory material. Stronger, though unpersuasive, arguments
69. Id at 2689 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
70. 408 U.S. at 649 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71. 99 S. Ct. at 2689 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
72. Justice Brennan's wholesale adoption of his dissent in Gravel contradicts his position in Hutchinson in other ways as well. He cites a Woodrow Wilson passage about the
informing function to support inclusion of a legislator's communications with the public as
part of the legislative function. 408 U.S. at 650-51 (quoting W. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL
GOVERNMENT 303 (1885)). It is the identical passage which gives rise to the majority's distinction between the two senses of informing in the instant case and which the Chief Justice
construes to refer only to Congress' ability to inform itself. Similarly, Justice Brennan's
references to Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) and COMMITrEE OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION, THE REORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS 14 (1945), support an interpretation of the informing function as Congress' ability to inform itself.
73. 408 U.S. at 650 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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for granting immunity to such communications are found in Justice
Brennan's historical analysis of the speech or debate clause.
In his Gravel dissent, Justice Brennan cited an essay by Thomas
Jefferson, who, joined by James Madison, argued that communications
between representatives and constituents "should be free from the cognizance or coercion of the co-ordinate branches, judiciary and executive. . . ,,74 On the basis of this essay and similar writings by James
Wilson, 75 a member of the committee that drafted the speech or debate
clause, Justice Brennan found "substantial evidence that the Framers
intended the speech or debate clause to cover all communications from
a Congressman to his constituents, ' 76 including those made by Senator
Proxmire.
This interpretation of the speech or debate clause was possibly relevant in Gravel where the allegedly defamatory communication was
made about certain executive officials. In Hutchinson, however, the
communication in dispute was made about a private citizen. This fact
certainly seems to make a critical difference.
In his Gravel dissent, Justice Brennan had viewed the speech or
debate clause immunity as part of the more fundamental issue of separation of powers. He had thus argued for a vigilant maintenance of
that separation. In Gravel he wrote:
The dialogue between Congress and people has been recognized,
from the days of our founding, as one of the necessary elements
of a representative system. We should not retreat from that view
merely because, in the course of that dialogue, information may
be revealed that is embarrassingto other branches of government
or violates their notions of necessary secrecy. A Member of Congress who exceeds the bounds of propriety in performing this official task may be called to answer by other members of his
chamber. We do violence to the fundamental concepts of privilege, however, when we subject the same conduct to judicial scrutiny at the instance of the executive.7 7
74. Id at 654 (quoting 8 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 322-27 (Ford ed. 1904)).
75. "[Congressmen] 'should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and. . . should be protected from the resentment of everyone, however powerful, to whom the exercise of that
liberty may occasion offense' . . . . 'That the conduct and proceedings of representatives
should be as open as possible to the inspection of those whom they represent, seems to be, in
republican government, a maxim, of whose truth or importance the smallest doubt cannot be
entertained. That, by a necessary consequence, every measure, which will facilitate or secure this open communication of the exercise of a delegated power, should be adopted and
patronized by the constitution and laws of every free state, seems to be another maxim,
which is the unavoidable result of the former." Id at 655-56 (quoting 1 WORKS OF JAMES
WILSON 421-22 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967)).
76. Id at 652.
77. Id at 661-62 (emphasis added).
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Justice Brennan's argument is undoubtedly persuasive if the information publicly disseminated concerns the activity of executive personnel. But where, as in this case, the challenge to the republication of
embarrassing information is brought by a private citizen the argument
seems misdirected. Criticism of the government is admittedly a cherished American right. There is no right to engage in unrestricted criticism of private individuals, however, and actions for defamation still
lie. Justice Brennan acknowledged as much.7" The fact that the government pays for a private person's academic research does not seem,
on the face of it at least, reason enough to abrogate a citizen's traditional right to vindicate his reputation.
By adopting his Gravel dissent in toto; Justice Brennan makes no
attempt to weigh and balance Professor Hutchinson's right to a good
name against the need for a free flow of congressional communication
with the public. To the extent the majority did in fact attempt such a
balancing analysis its viewpoint seems more intellectually attractive.
In determining the standard of proof applicable to Professor
Hutchinson's cause of action for defamation, the majority had to
determine first whether Hutchinson was a public figure, a task which
has been described as "trying to nail a jellyfish to the wall."7 9 The
Chief Justice devoted a brief section of the majority opinion to this
task. In reaching the conclusion that Hutchinson was not a public
figure,8" the Chief Justice applied the general definition of a public
figure announced in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.:81
For the most part those who attain this status [of a public figure]
have assumed roles of special prominence in the affairs of society.
Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence
that they are deemed public figures for all purposes. Most commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to
the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues
8 2 involved. In either event, they
invite attention and comment.
As a result, the Chief Justice dismissed both the argument that
Hutchinson was a public figure for all purposes 3 and the lower courts'
78. "Different considerations may apply, of course, where the republication is attacked,
not by the Executive, but by private persons seeking judicial redress for an alleged invasion
of their constitutional rights." Id at 662 n.2.
79. Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D. Ga. 1976).
80. 99 S.Ct. at 2688.
81. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
82. Id at 345.
83. 99 S.Ct. at 2688.
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84
holding that Hutchinson was a public figure in this case.
In so doing, the Chief Justice observed that Hutchinson's writings
reached only a small audience of professionals interested in behavioral
research and that his public profile and activities were similar to those
of numerous other members of his profession.85 Consequently, Hutchinson was not viewed by the Chief Justice as one who had "thrust himself or his views into public controversy to influence others."8 6 The
majority rejected the argument that the general concern about public
87
expenditures was sufficient to convert Hutchinson into a public figure.
They reasoned that under such a holding, anyone who received or
benefitted from public grants for research would be a public figure, no
doubt an undesirable outcome.8 8 Therefore, inasmuch as Professor
Hutchinson had never assumed any role of public prominence on a
broad issue of public concern about public expenditures, had not invited public attention and comment on his grants, 89 nor had continuing
access to the media, 90 the majority concluded that the actual malice
standard of proof was not applicable. Hutchinson was not a public
figure.9 '
In his dissent, Justice Brennan did not address the First Amendment issue. He did, however, affirm that portion of the decision below
which held that Hutchinson was a public figure for purposes of the
instant suit and that the actual malice standard applied. 92
It is interesting to observe that neither Justice Brennan nor the majority discussed whether Professor Hutchinson was a public official
rather than a public figure. Both the court of appeals and the district
court had held Hutchinson to be a public figure because of his active
solicitation of public funds and his access to the media. But the district
court had also held him to be a public official owing to his status as
director of research at a state mental hospital.93 Under New York

84. Id
85. Id
86. Id The Chief Justice did not consider the general concern about public expenditures to be in controversy.
87. Id
88. Id The Court cited Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) for the proposition
that the "use of such subject-matter classifications to determine the extent of constitutional
protection afforded defamatory falsehoods may too often result in an improper balance between the competing interests in this area." Id at 456.
89. 99 S. Ct. at 2688.
90. Id
91. Id
92. Id at 2689 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
93. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 431 F. Supp. 1311, 1327 (W.D. Wis. 1977).
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Times, Inc. v. Sullivan,9 4 the actual malice standard of proof is required
in defamation actions against public figures and againstpublic officials.95 The Supreme Court has never clearly defined the limits of the
public official category or whether it is different from the public figure
category. In Hutchinson v. Proxmire, the Court missed yet another opportunity to do so.

III.

Freedom of Expression and the Media

Some of the most emotional and controversial cases decided by the
Supreme Court in recent years have involved the First Amendment
freedoms of expression; the 1978-79 Term was no exception. The
Court decided three First Amendment cases of note, all of which involved the news media, and all of which were at least tangentially related to judicial proceedings. The predictable outcome was that the
Court continued to balance the highly significant rights protected by
the First Amendment against other important societal values.
In Gannett Co. v. DePasqualeawhere the Court upheld the exclusion of the press and public from a pretrial suppression hearing, the
First Amendment rights of the press and public were found to have
been adequately protected by the trial judge's weighing those rights
against the criminal defendant's right to a fair trial. In Smith v. Daily
MailPublishingCo.,b the Court was confronted with similar conflicting
values: the right of the press to publish truthful information lawfully
obtained and the state's interest in protecting the anonymity of juvenile
offenders. Based on earlier cases, the Court found the balance in this
situation dipped decidedly in favor of the press, and concluded that,
because the state's interest was not of the "highest order," a state statute
punishing the publication of a juvenile offender's name without the
permission of the juvenile court was invalid. Finally, in Herbert v.
Lando,c the Court encountered a situation where the balance between
conflicting values had already been struck. In New York Times v. Sullivan,' the Court weighed the rights of free speech and free press under
94. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
95. See note 3 supra.
a.
b.
c.
d.

99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979).
99 S.Ct. 2667 (1979).
441 U.S. 153 (1979).
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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the First Amendment against the individual's reputational interest, and
determined that a public official must show "actual malice" to recover
for defamation. By holding in Herbertthat a public figure plaintiff in a
libel action could compel a media defendant to answer pretrial discovery questions designed to establish "actual malice," the Court sought to
preserve the compromise reached fifteen years earlier in New York
Times.
When Gannett and Herbert were announced, a number of members of the news media decried those decisions as further instances of
the Burger Court's attack on editorial autonomy. It appears, however,
that these cases may be better viewed as the Court's attempt to strike
some compromise between interests protected by the First Amendment
and other important individual rights. Although the press will at times
favor the result in a particular case and at times not, it is likely that the
Court will continue to place First Amendment interests on a balancing
scale of competing values.
Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale*
The petitioner, Gannett Company, Inc.,I publishes two newspapers in Rochester, New York. The two newspapers were covering an
investigation arising out of the disappearance of a local resident,
Wayne Clapp. Two men and a woman had been arrested in Michigan
in connection with the disappearance. The Gannett Company newspapers published accounts of the investigation, the arrests and police theories concerning the apparent crime. The two men were brought to
Seneca County, New York and charged with second-degree murder.
The woman was charged with grand larceny. The defendants moved to
suppress certain statements that they had made to the police, asserting
that they had been made involuntarily. They also moved to suppress
physical evidence seized as a result of the allegedly involuntary statements. The motions to suppress were made to Judge DePasquale. At
the suppression hearing, the defense attorneys argued that the continuing buildup of publicity in the local papers was jeopardizing the defendants' ability to receive a fair trial. They requested that the press
and public be excluded from the hearing. The motion was not opposed
by the district attorney. A reporter employed by petitioner was present
in the courtroom, but made no objection to the closure motion. Accordingly, the motion was granted.
* Commentary by Jonathan Howden, member, third-year class.
1. Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979).
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The next day, the reporter wrote a letter to Judge DePasquale
claiming "a right to cover [the] hearing"2 and requesting access to the
transcript. The judge responded that the hearing was over and reserved decision on any release of the transcript.
The petitioner then moved to set aside the exclusionary order.
The judge granted a hearing on this motion and allowed the parties to
file briefs. At the hearing, the judge found that the press did have a
constitutional right of access to the pretrial proceedings and held that
this right had to be balanced against the defendants' constitutional
right to a fair trial. Finding that an open suppression hearing presented
a reasonable probability of prejudice to the defendants, Judge DePasquale ruled that the defendants' right to a fair trial outweighed the interest of the press and public. The judge therefore refused to vacate the
exclusion order or grant immediate access to the transcript.
The Lower Court Decisions
The following day, the petitioner initiated a proceeding in the nature of prohibition mandamus challenging the closure order on First,
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds. The intermediate appellate court held that Judge DePasquale's exclusion order infringed upon
the public's interest in open judicial proceedings and also constituted
an unlawful prior restraint. Thus, the court vacated the order of the
trial court.'
The New York Court of Appeals held that the case was technically
moot but, because of the great importance of the issues presented, retained jurisdiction in order to reach the merits.' The court held that
where prosecutorial or judicial accountability was not at stake and the
chief public interest was one of active curiosity in a "notorious local
happening," closure was proper because any First Amendment interests were protected by the availability of a transcript edited to exclude
inadmissable matters.' The court also asserted that even though criminal trials are presumptively open to the public, the right to demand a
public trial belongs to the defendant and not to the general public.
Consequently, the court upheld the exclusion of the press and the public from the pretrial proceeding. 6 Citing "the significance of the consti2. Id at 2903. In its opinion, the Court quoted from the letter sent by the reporter to
Judge DePasquale.
3. Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 55 A.D.2d 107, 389 N.Y.S.2d 719 (1976).
4. Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 372 N.E.2d 544, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756
(1977).
5. Id at 381, 372 N.E.2d at 550-51, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 763.
6. Id
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tutional issues involved" in the case, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari.'
The United States Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Stewart, first
addressed the issue of mootness. Relying on Nebraska PressAssociation v. Stuart,8 the Court stated that its jurisdiction was not defeated
"simply because the order attacked has expired, if the underlying dispute between the parties is one 'capable of repetition, yet evading review' . . . ."I The Court held that the controversy was not moot
because the challenged action was by its nature too short-lived to be
fully litigated or reviewed on appeal and there was a reasonable
probability that the complaining party would be subjected to the same
action again.
Turning to the merits, Justice Stewart prefaced his analysis of the
case by noting the importance of securing a fair trial for defendants in
criminal trials. He emphasized that "a trial judge has an affirmative
constitutional duty to minimize the effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity." 10 Justice Stewart pointed out that publicity concerning pretrial
suppression hearings poses special risks of unfairness and that closure
of such hearings "is often one of the most effective methods that a trial
judge can employ to attempt to insure that the fairness of a trial will
not be jeopardized by the dissemination of such information throughout the community before the trial itself has even begun.""'
Addressing the terms of the Sixth Amendment, 2 Justice Stewart
began by stating that "[t]he Constitution nowhere mentions any right of
access to a criminal trial on the part of the public; its guarantee, like the
others enumerated, is personal to the accused."' 3 He cited In re Oliver14 and Estes v. Texas"5 as support for this conclusion. In Oliver, the
Court held that the secrecy of a criminal contempt trial violated the
7. 99 S. Ct. at 2904.
8. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
9. 99 S. Ct. at 2904 (quoting Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546 (1976)
(quoting Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 219 U.S. 498, 515

(1911)).
10. 99 S. Ct. at 2904. See generally Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
11. 99 S. Ct. at 2905.
12. The Sixth Amendment right to a public criminal trial was made applicable to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment in In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
13. 99 S. Ct. at 2905 (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 846 (1975) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
14. 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
15. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
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accused's right to a public trial. Conversely, in Estes, the Court held
that a defendant was deprived of his right to due process of law by the
televising and broadcasting of his trial. Justice Stewart asserted that
"both the Oliver and Estes cases recognized that the constitutional
guarantee of a public trial is for the benefit of the defendant. There is
not the slightest suggestion in either case that there is a correlative right
in members of the public to insist upon a public trial."16 Stewart recognized that there exists a strong societal interest in public trials. However, he claimed that this interest did not amount to the creation of a
constitutional public right."' Rather, it was his view that "our adversary system of criminal justice is premised upon the proposition that
the public interest is fully protected by the participants in the litigation." 8
Justice Stewart then turned to the petitioner's contention that the
history of the public trial guarantee implicates a public right of access
to judicial proceedings. His analysis followed two distinct lines. First,
he acknowledged that a common law right of access did vest in the
public and was in fact incorporated in some early state constitutions.
No such explicit right was written into the Sixth Amendment, however.
Moreover, even if the Framers intended that "the Sixth Amendment
permits and even presumes open trials as a norm. . . [t]he issue here is
whether the Constitution requiresthat a pretrial proceeding such as this
one be opened to the public, even though the participants in the litigation agree that it should be closed to protect the defendant's right to a
fair trial."' 9
Second, Justice Stewart distinguished a pretrial proceeding from
the actual trial. He felt that even if the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments could properly be viewed as embodying the common law right of
the public to attend criminal trials, it would not necessarily follow that
the same right would exist with regard to pretrial proceedings. Turning
again to common law history, he found that such proceedings, in contrast to criminal trials, were often closed to the public. This practice
16. 99 S. Ct. at 2906. Li a footnote to this statement, Justice Stewart cited numerous
authorities supporting this view. The most prominent was an article written by Justice Powell while he was president of the American Bar Association. Powell, The Right to a Fair
Trial,51 A.B.A. J. 534, 538 (1965).
17. 99 S. Ct. at 2907.
18. Id at 2908. In a footnote, Stewart cited Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88
(1935), for the proposition that the prosecutor is the representative of the people and this
position "surely encompasses a duty to protect the societal interest in an open trial." 99 S.
Ct. at 2908, n.12.
19. 99 S. Ct. at 2908 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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was carried over to the United States, and is still followed in a number
of states.20 Stewart concluded that "members of the public have no
constitutional right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to
attend criminal trials. 2 1
Finally, Stewart considered petitioner's First Amendment claims.
He refused to break new ground by finding any First and Fourteenth
Amendment right to attend trials. Rather, "assuming, arguendo, that
the First and Fourteenth Amendments may guarantee such access in
some situations," he found that "this putative right was given all appro22
priate deference by the state nisiprius court in the present case."
Thus, the majority gave its approval to the manner in which the trial
court had handled the exclusionary proceeding. Judge DePasquale
had provided petitioner's counsel with an opportunity to voice his objections to the-pretrial proceedings. Further, the judge decided to exclude the press and public only after balancing the petitioner's
constitutional rights against the defendants' right to a fair trial. Concluding that an open hearing and immediate access to a transcript
would pose a "reasonable probability of prejudice to these defendants,"'2 3 the judge had closed the pretrial hearings. Justice Stewart
noted that any denial of access was only temporary since once the danger of prejudice had passed, a transcript of the hearing was made available. Based on these facts, then, the Court held that any First and
Fourteenth Amendment right of the petitioner to attend criminal trials
was not violated.24
In summary, the majority rejected the notion that "the Constitution. . . gave the petitioner an affirmative right of access to this pretrial proceeding, even though all the participants in the litigation
agreed that it should be closed to protect the fair trial rights of the
defendants."2 5 The Constitution, in their view, "provides no such
20. Id. at 2909-11. At least eight states presently follow the original Field Code provision permitting the closure of pretrial hearings to the public. Id at 2911 n.23.
21. Id at 2911.
22. Id at 2912. Petitioner asked the Court to narrow its holdings in Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817 (1974), Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974), and Houchins v.
KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978), and recognize "a First and Fourteenth Amendment right to
attend criminal trials." 99 S. Ct. at 2912. In the prior cases, the Court had denied the press
and public any constitutionally protected right of access to prisons beyond that offered by
the prison authorities. The petitioner in Gannett took the position that these earlier cases
were distinguishable because court rooms, unlike prisons, have traditionally been open to
the public. The Court found it unnecessary to consider this argument. Id at 2912 n.24.
23. 99 S. Ct. at 2912 (quoting Judge DePasquale).
24. Id
25. Id at 2913.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[V/ol. 7:315

right. 26
Three members of the majority wrote separate opinions, each emphasizing a different aspect of the majority opinion.2 7 Chief Justice
Burger attached particular importance to the nature of the proceeding
in question. While not recognizing a constitutional right of public access to criminal trials, Burger nonetheless acknowledged the strong
common law tradition that "trials generally be public."2 " He contrasted this tradition with the common law treatment of pretrial proceedings. He found that the public did not enjoy a similar right of
access to these proceedings. Since the Framers were aware of pretrial
practice and procedure, their silence on the matter was of special significance. 29 Finally, the Chief Justice observed that during the last forty
years, "pretrial processes have been enormously expanded," yet proceedings such as depositions and interrogatories have not been considered as other than "wholly private to the litigants."30 He concluded
that "the essence 3of all this is that by definition 'pretrial proceedings'
are exactly that." '
Justice Powell, in his concurrence, reached the First Amendment
issue which the rest of the Court reserved. Specifically, he asserted that
"petitioner's reporter had an interest protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments in being present at the pretrial suppression hearing."32 This protection is not based on any special constitutional status
of the press, but exists because the press acts as an agent for the public
at large in providing the information necessary to intelligent public
decisionmaking.33 Justice Powell would balance the public's need for
information against the defendant's right to a fair trial rather than
place one interest above the other;34 where a defendant moves for exclusion of the press and public, they must be given an opportunity to be
heard. Justice Powell stated, however, that "this opportunity extends
no farther than the persons present at the time the motion for closure is
made, for the alternative would require substantial delays in trial and
26. Id
27. Chief Justice Burger, Justice Powell and Justice Rehnquist joined the majority opinion along with Justices Stevens and Stewart. The first three, however, also concurred
spearately.
28. 99 S.Ct. at 2913 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
29. Id at 2914.
30. Id
31. Id
32. Id (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
33. Id at 2914-15. Justice Powell had advanced this idea earlier in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
34. 99 S.Ct. at 2915-16.
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pretrial proceedings while notice was given to the public."3 5 Moreover,
at the hearing the defendant must make "some showing that the fairness of the trial likely will be prejudiced" 36 by public proceedings. If
the state also supports closure, it must make a similar showing as to the
potential for unfairness or likelihood of disclosure of confidential
materials. Interested members of the press and public must show that
there are alternative procedures available which will protect the interests of the defendant and the state. 37 Justice Powell concluded by enprocedure
dorsing the approach taken by the trial court, stating that the
38
"fully comported with that required by the Constitution.
In the final separate concurrence, Justice Rehnquist emphasized
that the Court was holding, "without qualification, that 'members of
the public have no constitutional right under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to attend criminal trials.' "-3 In marked contrast to the
Court's apparent reservation of the issue, Rehnquist thought it well established that the press and public have no right of access to judicial or
governmental proceedings. He considered unnecessary the procedures
employed by the trial court and those advanced by Justice Powell to
protect First Amendment interests: "The lower courts are under no
constitutional constraint either to accept or reject those procedures.
They remain, in the best tradition of our federal system, free to determine for themselves the question whether to open or close the proceeding.,, 4 0 Thus, Justice Rehnquist would vest trial court judges with full
discretion to determine whether a judicial proceeding should be closed
upon the request of the parties involved. They may do as they please
so long as the defendant requests that the proceedings be closed. While
he hoped judges would decide the question "by accommodating competing interests in a judicious manner," 4 1 he also emphasized that the
First Amendment is not "some sort of constitutional 'sunshine law' that
requires notice, an opportunity to be heard and substantial reasons
35. 99 S. Ct. at 2916 (Powell, J., concurring).
36. Id
37. Justice Powell performed a similar balancing of competing interests in his concurring opinion in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 709-10 (1972).
38. 99 S.Ct. at 2917.
39. Id (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (quoting from the majority opinion, id at 2912).
40. Id at 2918-19 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). Justice Rehnquist
cited numerous cases that, he maintained, repudiate the view that the press or public have a
right of access to judicial or other governmental proceedings. See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner
Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S.
843, 850 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665, 684-85 (1972).
41. 99 S. Ct. at 2919 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[-Vol. 7:315

before a governmental proceeding may be closed to the public and
42
press."

Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennen, Marshall and
White, concurred in part and dissented in part.43 The only portion of
the majority's opinion with which Blackmun concurred was that dealing with the issue of mootness. 4 Aside from that issue, Justice Blackmun was in complete disagreement with the majority. In his view, even
the Court's phrasing of the issue, and its description of the facts of the
case, were unacceptable.
Criticizing the majority's surrender "to the temptation to overstate
and overcolor" the pretrial setting, Justice Blackmun began by restating the facts, placing emphasis on the "placid, routine, and innocuous
nature" of the articles concerning the murder investigation.45 He also
reviewed excerpts of the transcript of the initial suppression hearing,
including the motion for closure,4 6 and concluded that the Court's "colorful allusions to what it assumed took place when the motions were
presented" were probably due to comments in the majority opinion of
the New York Court of Appeals. 47
Turning to the issues, Justice Blackmun did not share Justice Powell's concern with the First Amendment, stating that "this Court heretofore has not found and does not today find, any First Amendment right
of access to judicial or other governmental proceedings." 4 Rather, in
his view, any right of access had to emanate from the public trial provision of the Sixth Amendment.
Justice Blackmun began his analysis of the Sixth Amendment by
conceding that, by its literal terms, the Amendment secures the right to
a public trial only to the accused. However, he then reviewed several
cases in which the Court had gone well beyond the literal terms of the
42. Id at 2918.
43. Id at 2919.
44. Id
45. Id
46. In Blackmun's view, the closure motion was only briefly argued to defense counsel
and constitutional implications were discussed even less. The prosecution did not wish to be
heard on the question and was content to leave the entire matter up to the defense. Justice
Blackmun criticized the Court for characterizing the decision to close the suppression hearings as "an agreement by the accused, the prosecutor, and the trial judge to have closure 'in
order to assure a fair trial. . . ."' Id at 2920 (quoting from the majority opinion, id at
2901). He also questioned the Court's description of the hearing "as one where. . . 'defense
attorneys argued that the unabated buildup of adverse publicity had jeopardized the ability
of the defendants to receive a fair trial."' Id (quoting from the majority opinion, id at
2903).
47. Id at 2921.
48. Id at 2922.
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Amendment in order to properly define the nature of its guarantees. 9
He noted that societal interests, common law practices and the structure and history of the constitutional text were all important factors in
the definition. 0
Justice Blackmun briefly traced the English common law surrounding public trials and found "strong evidence that the public trial
• . . widely was perceived as serving important social interests, relating
to the integrity of the trial process, that exist apart from, and conceivably in opposition to the interests of the individual defendant."5 In
fact, Justice Blackmun determined that the public interest was strong
enough to preclude a defendant from being able to compel a private
proceeding. 2 This strong public interest was carried over to the American colonies and was reflected in early colonial charters and declarations of rights. Justice Blackmun claimed that the terms of the Sixth
Amendment, when compared with the language of those other contemporary documents, demonstrate only a minor difference in draftsmanship and not a conscious intent to create a right to compel a private
proceeding. 3 Thus, in his view, there is no evidence in the development of the public trial that the Sixth Amendment allows a defendant
to compel a private trial. 4
Justice Blackmun reasoned that since a defendant has no absolute
right to compel private proceedings, such a request should be granted
only when the defendant's interest in securing a fair trial clearly outweighs the public interest in open proceedings. The public interest is a
strong one, however, and not easily overcome. Public trials may protect against purjured testimony, insure the impartiality of the court, allow public scrutiny of the administration of criminal justice, preserve
confidence in the judicial system and, most relevant to the present case,
allow the public to "scrutinize the performance of police and prosecutors in the conduct of public judicial business."5 5 The latter function
acts as a check on governmental misconduct, ineptitude and collusion
with defendants which might otherwise be successfully hidden from the
49. E.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965);
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); In re Oliver 333 U.S. 257 (1948). See also Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975).
50. 99 S. Ct. at 2925 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
51. Id at 2928.
52. Id at 2928-29.
53. Id at 2929.
54. Id at 2930.
55. Id See also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975).
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public eye. Therefore, according to Justice Blackmun, the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments prohibit courts from excluding the public
from trial proceedings without affording full and fair consideration to
the public interests involved.5 6
Before considering the circumstances under which a trial judge
could exclude the public, Justice Blackmun explained why, in his view,
certain pretrial proceedings, particularly suppression hearings, come
within the scope of the Sixth Amendment. First, suppression hearings
resemble and relate to the full trial in almost every respect. 57 Second,
the outcome of the hearing is often the decisive factor in the final disposition of the case.58 Third, the suppression hearing may be the only
judicial proceeding of any substantial importance in course of the prosecution, as most cases are disposed of prior to trial." Fourth, the pretrial proceeding often presents other issues of importance to the public,
especially those relating to police and prosecutorial conduct.6" Finally,
the decision to suppress evidence is often highly controversial; therefore, the record upon which it is based should be open to public scrutiny and evaluation. 6 Even conceding that there existed no common
law right of access to pretrial proceedings, the subsequent evolution of
such proceedings requires the extension of Sixth Amendment guarantees at least to suppression hearings, which have become "the close
equivalent of the trial on the merits."6 2
In Justice Blackmun's view, trials and suppression hearings should
be closed only after the court draws a careful balance between the competing Sixth Amendment rights of the defendant and of the public at
large. He delineated what he saw as the minimal procedure and allocation of burdens of proof required in this balancing process. The starting point is the presumption that the Sixth Amendment mandates that
trials and suppression hearings be conducted in open court.6 3 First, the
56. 99 S. Ct. at 2932-33 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, White and Marshall, JJ.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
57. Id at 2933.
58. Id
59. Id Justice Blackmun pointed out that in Seneca County in 1976, the year the case in
question was prosecuted, every felony prosecution was terminated without a trial on the
merits. He claimed that "[tihis statistic is characteristic of our state and federal criminal
Id at 2934 (footnote omitted).
justice systems as a whole.
60. Id
61. Id
62. Id The American Bar Association follows this position. See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS. No.

8-3.2 at 15 & n.l (Approved Draft 1978).
63. 99 S. Ct. at 2938 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, White and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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accused "should provide an adequate basis to support a finding that
there is a substantial probability that irreparable damage to his fair
trial right will result from conducting the proceeding in public."64 Second, the accused should show that there is "a substantial probability
that alternatives to closure will not protect adequately his right to a fair
trial."6 5 Third, the accused should show that there is a "substantial
probability that closure will be effective in protecting against the perceived harm."6 6 Only then can the presumption favoring a public trial
be overcome, and any resulting restrictions upon public access should
be narrowly drawn. Finally, any closure order, along with the appropriate findings of the trial court, should be included in the record
for subsequent review. 67 Procedures falling short of these standards
would, in Justice Blackmun's opinion, violate the Sixth Amendment
rights of the general public. Because the trial court record before the
Court failed to demonstrate that these minimum standards were met,
Justice Blackmun dissented from the Court's approval of Judge DePasquale's closure order.
Analysis
Except for Justice Powell, the major point of contention between
members of the Court was the scope of the Sixth Amendment's public
trial clause. The majority read it narrowly, holding that its sole purpose was to protect the defendant. The dissent claimed that the
Amendment has been read more broadly in other contexts and should
be so read in the instant case.
The decision is most notable, however, for the alternative holdings
present in the majority opinion, making it difficult to determine the
ultimate holding of the Court. Each of these alternative holdings was
emphasized by various members in separate concurring opinions.
Chief Justice Burger endorsed the view that the Sixth Amendment does
not apply to pretrial proceedings and preferred to limit the Court's
holding accordingly.68 Justice Powell would reach the merits of the
First Amendment claims that the majority only considered arguendo.
In Justice Powell's opinion, the trial court's determination was acceptable only because Judge DePasquale had given due deference to the
64. Id at 2937.
65. Id See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562-65 (1976); Sheppard
v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 354 n.1, 357-62 (1966).
66. 99 S.Ct. at 2937.
67. Id at 2939.
68. See text accompanying notes 27-31 supra.
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First Amendment concerns.6 9 Finally, Justice Rehnquist favored a
broad interpretation of the Court's decision: he would hold that the
public has no Sixth Amendment right to attend criminal trials.70
The four dissenters who joined Justice Blackmun's opinion were a
more cohesive group. These justices-Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall
and White-represent a solid core of the Court who would find a Sixth
Amendment public right to demand open trials and suppression hearings. Their strength, coupled with the narrow interpretations of Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Powell, raise serious doubts as to the actual
position of the Court as a whole. Any lower court seeking to apply the
proper constitutional standard in a pretrial or trial closure proceeding
would have difficulty in finding firm constitutional ground on which to
stand. In his concurrence, Justice Powell warned that
lower courts cannot assume after today's decision that they are
"free to determine for themselves the question whether to open or
close the proceeding" free from all constitutional restraint. For
although I disagree with my four dissenting Brethren concerning
the origin and the scope of the constitutional limitations on the
closing of pretrial proceedings, I agree with their conclusion that
there are limitations and that they require the
7 careful attention of
trial courts before closure can be ordered. '
The implication is that if faced with a situation in which the trial judge
did not follow the minimal procedure delineated by Justice Powell
before ordering closure, Powell would vote to reverse. Assuming the
four Gannet dissenters would adhere to their somewhat stricter standard, a majority of the Court would then stand opposed to closure.
Other important questions remain. For one, Chief Justice Burger's
concurrence emphasized the uncertainty surrounding closure of full trials.7 2 Additionally, in his majority opinion, Justice Stewart failed to
reach the merits of the petitioner's First Amendment claims, assuming,
69. See text accompanying notes 35-38 supra.
70. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
71. 99 S. Ct. at 2915 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist disputed Justice
Powell's contention, arguing that the dissenters in the instant case may adhere in subsequent
cases to the doctrine of stare decisis, rather than form an "odd quintuplet" by agreeing that
there are limitations on the closing of judicial proceedings which stem from two different
constitutional sources. Justice Rehnquist added that such a diverse, broadly-based holding
would have little practical impact. In light of the various alternative holdings presented in
the instant case, the latter criticism would seem of dubious merit.
72. However, in a case on appeal this term, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
No. 79-243 (Va. Sup. Ct., July 9, 1979), the Court will have an opportunity to consider this
question. At issue is a Virginia statute allowing a trial judge, at his discretion, to exclude
from a trial "any persons whose presence would impair the conduct of a fair trial, provided
that the right of the accused to a public trial should not be violated." VA. CODE § 19.2-266.
Relying on this statute, the judge in a capital murder case excluded the press and public
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arguendo, that if such rights did exist, they had been fully protected by
the trial court. It is uncertain what the Court will do when faced with a
procedure that does not comport with that followed by the trial court in
Gannett.
The Gannett opinion has provoked much controversy both because it was less than well received by the press73 and because the opinion is so difficult to interpret. Like so many of the Burger Court's
opinions, the combination of concurrences and dissents serves to cloud
and blunt the Court's holding. In this case, the resulting confusion has
produced conflicting applications of Gannett at the trial court level.7 4
To date, four Supreme Court justices have spoken out publicly concerning the proper interpretation of the case.7 5 As with the decision
itself, however, their comments have not been entirely consistent. The
1980 Term should provide an opportunity for the Court to clarify its
position7 6 and it will almost certainly do so.
When the Court does decide another trial closure case, any First
Amendment right of access argument will probably fail. As Justice
Stewart pointed out, the Court has rejected such claims of a right of
access for press and public in a number of recent cases.7 7 In Gannett,
only Justice Powell chose to rest his argument on First Amendment
grounds. Other members of the Court, recognizing that there is a public interest in attending judicial proceedings, looked to the Sixth
Amendment for protection of this interest rather than to the First. By
resting their arguments on Sixth Amendment grounds, Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Blackmun and White avoided the issue of freedom
of access to information under the First Amendment, an issue toward
which none is favorably disposed.78
As Justice Powell has pointed out, the majority opinion should be
interpreted narrowly until the Court has had an opportunity to clarify
its position.7 9 Until then, it remains to be seen whether courts will, as
Justice Rehnquist had hoped, "accommodate competing interests in a
from the courtroom. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the order, citing Gannett as authority.
73. See TIME, Sept. 17, 1979, at 82.
74. Id
75. Id These four are Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell and Stevens.
76. The Court will probably seize the opportunity in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, No. 79-243 (Va. Sup. Ct., July 9, 1979). See note 72 supra.
77. 99 S. Ct. at 2911-12. See also note 40 and accompanying text supra.
78. Nor, it would seem, is a majority of the Court. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438
U.S. 1 (1978); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817 (1974).
79. See note 71 and accompanying text supra.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 7:315

judicious manner."80

Smith v. Daily Mail PublishingCo.*
Since the 1975-76 Term, the United States Supreme Court has decided a number of cases involving the issue of the extent of a state's

power to restrict the publications of truthful information.' During the
last Term, the Court had yet another opportunity to consider this question. In Smith v. Daily MailPublishing Co.2 the Supreme Court determined whether a West Virginia statute which made it a misdemeanor

for a newspaper to publish the name of any youth charged as a juvenile
offender without the written permission of the juvenile court 3 violated
the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.4 The Court weighed the state's interest in protecting the anonymity of juvenile offenders against the newspaper's interest in publishing

lawfully obtained truthful information and declared the statute unconstitutional. In so holding, the Court indicated that whether a statute is

viewed as a prior restr aint or an attempt to punish publication after
the event, 6 the state must demonstrate the necessity of its action in order to sustain the validity of the statute.
80. 99 S. Ct. at 2929 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
Commentary by Harry Chamberlain, member, third-year class.
1. See notes 50-58 and accompanying text infra.
2. 99 S. Ct. 2667 (1979).
3. W. VA. CODE § 49-7-3 (1976). This section provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall
the name of any child, in connection with any proceedings under this chapter, be published
in any newspaper without a written order of the court." The penalty provision is contained
in West Virginia Code section 49-7-20: "A person who violates ..
a provision of this
chapter for which punishment has not been specifically provided, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be fined not less than ten nor more than one hundred
dollars, or confined in jail not less than five days nor more than six months, or both such fine
and imprisonment."
4. "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press.. . ." U.S. CONST., amend. I.
"[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ..
" U.S. CoNsT., amend. XIV. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931):
"It is no longer open to doubt that the liberty of the press, and of speech, is within the liberty
safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state
action." Id at 707.
5. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); New York Times Co.
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S.
415 (1971); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); see also notes 42-46 and accompanying
text infra.
6. See, e.g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
*
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The Lower Court Decisions
On February 9, 1978, a fifteen year old student was fatally shot at
a junior high school near Charleston, West Virginia.7 Respondents,
The Charleston Daily Mail and The Charleston Daily Gazette, learned
of the shooting by routine monitoring of the police band radio frequency. Upon arrival at the school, reporters for both newspapers discovered the name of the alleged assailant, a fourteen year old classmate
of the victim, by asking various witnesses, police and an assistant prosecuting attorney.
The Daily Mail published its article about the incident in its February 9 afternoon edition, omitting the name of the alleged attacker
because of the West Virginia statutory prohibition. The Daily Gazette,
on the other hand, published the juvenile's name and picture in its article that appeared in the February 10 morning edition. The juvenile's
name was also broadcast over at least three radio stations on February
9 and 10. As the information was already public knowledge, the Daily
Mail decided to publish the juvenile's name in its February 10 afternoon edition.
On March 1, both papers were indicted for violating the West Virginia statute.' The newspapers petitioned the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals for an original jurisdiction writ of prohibition to prevent the prosecuting attorney and circuit judges of Kanawha County
from taking any action on the indictment. The newspapers alleged that
the statute upon which the indictment was based violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and several
state constitutional provisions.
The West Virginia Supreme Court issued the writ,9 holding that
the statute operated as an unconstitutional prior restraint on freedom
of the press under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. 10 The West Virginia court did not decide the case on state constitutional grounds, stating: "[W]ith regard to the First Amendment it
would be difficult to find a more expansive interpretation of freedom of
the press than that developed by the Supreme Court of the United
2
States." I Relying on recent United States Supreme Court decisions,'
7. The summary of facts is taken from the United States Supreme Court's majority
opinion by Chief Justice Burger. 99 S.Ct. at 2669.
8. See note 3 supra.
9. State ex rel Daily Mail Pub. Co. v. Smith, 248 S.E.2d 269 (1978).
10. Id at 272.
11. Id at 270.
12. See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); Oklahoma
Pub. Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 7:315

West Virginia's highest court reasoned that the state's interest in protecting the identity of the juvenile offender 3 did not overcome the
"heavy presumption" against prior restraints.'
The United States Supreme Court Decision
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the West Virginia ruling.1 4 Chief Justice Burger, however, writing for six other members of
the Court,15 did not follow the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals' reasoning, for he did not view the application of the West Virginia statute as a prior restraint. The respondent newspapers based
their prior restraint argument on the West Virginia statute's requirement of court approval prior to publication of the juvenile's name. 6
The newspapers conceded that the statute was not a classic prior restraint, there being no prior injunction against publication. 7 They also
acknowledged that a statutory provision requiring prior approval by
the juvenile court judge was probably less oppressive to their free press
rights than was a total ban on publication of the juvenile's name.' 8 The
respondents claimed, however, that since the statutory requirement of
prior approval had the operation and effect of a licensing scheme, it
was the functional equivalent of a prior restraint."' They asserted that
the state's interest in protecting the identity of juvenile offenders was
insufficient to overcome the heavy presumption against the constitutionality of such a scheme.2"
Petitioners did not dispute whether the statutory provision was a
prior restraint. Rather, they argued that even if the statute had such an
469 (1975). For further discussion of these cases, see notes 50-58 and accompanying text

infra.
13. 248 S.E.2d at 271-72. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558 (1976);
Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (Burger, C.J.). "Any
prior restraint on expression comes to this Court with a 'heavy presumption' against its constitutional validity." Id
14. 99 S. Ct. 2667 (1979).
15. Justice Rehnquist filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
16. 99 S. Ct. at 2669. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
17. 99 S. Ct. at 2670. See also notes 42-46 and accompanying text infra. Chief Justice
Burger noted that the statute had deterred The Daily Mail from publishing the juvenile's
name for 24 hours. Id at 2669 n.1.
18. Id at 2670.
19. Id See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931). See also notes 42-46 and
accompanying text infra.
20. 99 S. Ct. at 2670. See Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419
(1971).
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effect, it was constitutionally defensible due to the state's interest in
preserving the anonymity of alleged juvenile delinquents.

The Supreme Court eschewed the prior restraint analysis that had
been the basis of the West Virginia court's holding below. Chief Justice Burger began his analysis by stating that whether the statute was
viewed as a prior restraint or as a penal sanction for publishing infor-

mation lawfully obtained was not dispositive "because even the latter
action requires the highest form of state interest to sustain its valid-

ity.""

While prior restraints had been accorded "the most exacting

scrutiny in previous cases," 2 the Chief Justice asserted that "even
when a state attempts to punish publication after the event it must nevertheless demonstrate its punitive action was necessary to further the

state interests asserted. 2 3
Chief Justice Burger further claimed that recent decisions of the
Court demonstrated that state action to punish the publication of truth-

ful information could seldom satisfy constitutional standards.2 4 In support of this proposition he cited three cases decided within the last three
Terms: Landmark Communications,Inc. v. Virginia,2 5 Cox Broadcast27
ing Corp. v. Cohn,2 6 and Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court.
Chief Justice Burger found none of these cases controlling under the

facts in Daily Mail,uI but he contended that "all suggest strongly that if
a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of
public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish

publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest
29
of the highest order.
The Court held that the interest advanced by the state of protecting the anonymity of the juvenile offender was insufficient to justify
21. 99 S. Ct. at 2670.
22. Id See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976); Organization for a
Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716
(1931). See also Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
23. 99 S. Ct. at 2670. See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829,
843 (1978). See also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975).
24. 99 S. Ct. at 2670.
25. 435 U.S. 829 (1978). For further discussion of the case, see notes 50-52 and accompanying text infra.
26. 420 U.S. 469 (1975). For further discussion of the case, see notes 53-55 and accompanying text infra.
27. 430 U.S. 308 (1977). For further discussion of the case, see notes 56-58 and accompanying text infra.
These were the cases upon which the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals also
relied in reaching its decision. 248 S.E.2d at 271-72.
28. 99 S. Ct. at 2671. See note 60 and accompanying text infra.
29. 99 S. Ct. at 2671.
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punishing the truthful publication of the alleged juvenile offender's
name lawfully obtained through routine newspaper reporting techniques.3" In finding that the state's interest was not of the "highest order," Chief Justice Burger pointed to the Court's decision in Davis v.
Alaska,3' where the state used similar arguments to justify preventing a
criminal defendant from impeaching a prosecution witness on the basis
of his juvenile record. Davis held that the state's policy of preserving
the anonymity of the juvenile offender was subordinate to the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.3 2 The majority in Daily
Mail found Davis persuasive authority in holding that the newspapers'
First Amendment rights must prevail over the same interest as that as33
serted by the state in Davis.
Although the Court determined that the state's interest was insufficient to justify the criminal penalty, its inquiry did not end there. The
majority also held the statute failed to satisfy two additional constitutional requirements. First, the West Virginia statute did not accomplish its stated purpose, as it did not "restrict the electronic media or
any form of publication, except 'newspapers,' from printing the names
of youths charged in a juvenile proceeding. ' 34 Chief Justice Burger
pointed out that at least three radio stations had broadcast the alleged
assailant's name prior to the Daily Mail's February 10 publication. 5 In
addition, the state had not demonstrated that criminal penalties were
necessary to protect the confidentiality of juvenile proceedings.3 6 As
the respondents pointed out, while all fifty states provided in some way
for confidentiality, only five, including West Virginia, imposed crimi37
nal penalties on nonparties for publication of the juvenile's identity.
Justice Rehnquist concurred only in the judgment of the Court. 8
He disagreed with the majority's holding that preserving the anonymity
39
of juvenile offenders was not a state interest of the "highest order."
Justice Rehnquist concurred because he agreed with the majority that
the West Virginia statute "'[did] not accomplish its stated purpose.' "40
30. Id
31. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
32. Id at 319.
33. 99 S. Ct. at 2671.
34. Id at 2671-72.
35. Id at 2672.
36. Id
37. Id The four other states were Colorado, Georgia, New Hampshire, and South Carolina. Id at 2672 n.2.
38. Id at 2672 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
39. Id at 2673-74.
40. Id at 2674.
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He was quick to add, however, that a "generally effective ban on publication that applied to all forms of mass communication, electronic and

print media alike, would be constitutional."4
Analysis
The original purpose of the speech and press clause of the First

42
Amendment was to prevent prior restraint on speech by government
similar to the English licensing system under which nothing could be
43

published without the prior approval of church or state authorities.
Such restraints on speech carry a heavy presumption of invalidity, plac-

ing a "heavy burden of showing justification" on any party seeking to
impose such restraints.' By contrast, the presumption against limits on
expression imposed by criminal penalties has been assumed to be less

heavy.45 This procedural preference for subsequent criminal and civil
sanctions over prior restraints is due to a social policy which favors
punishing those who abuse their rights to free speech after they break
the law over suppressing those rights beforehand. An injunction's effects are immediate and irreversible; thus, "if it can be said that a threat
'chills' speech, prior reof criminal or civil sanctions after publication
46
straint 'freezes' it at least for the time."
41. Id at 2675. Because the case was decided on the broader First and Fourteenth
Amendments issue, neither the West Virginia court nor the Supreme Court reached the issue
of whether the statute violated equal protection by applying only to newspapers and not to
other forms of journalistic expression. See 99 S. Ct. at 2672 n.4; 248 S.E.2d at 272 n.3.
Justice Rehnquist asserted that the failure of a state statute to achieve its stated purpose was
entitled to considerable weight in the balancing process used to resolve free expression issues
arising under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, but that a similar inquiry is illusory
when a statute is challenged on Fourteenth Amendment equal protection grounds. 99 S. Ct.
at 2674 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S.
762, 777 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
42. A prior restraint is "any governmental order which restricts or prohibits speech
prior to its publication." J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 744 (1978).
43. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 724 (1978); HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 42, at 741; Emerson, The Doctrine ofPriorRestraint,20 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 648, 650-51 (1955). See also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931)
(antidefamation statute unconstitutional). In his now-famous dictum in Near, Chief Justice
Hughes stated three possible exceptions to the prior restraint doctrine: (1) publication of
troop movements during wartime, (2) obscenity and (3) incitements to violent overthrow of
the government. Id at 716.
44. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (citing Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe,
402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).
45. See generaly J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 741-44 (1978).
46. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976). See also Nebraska Press
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Although the Supreme Court in Daily Mail purported not to decide whether the West Virginia statute was a prior restraint on publication or a subsequent punishment, Chief Justice Burger pointed out that
"First Amendment protection reaches beyond prior restraints"'4 7 and
framed the ultimate issue as whether a state has the power "to punish
the truthful publication of an alleged juvenile delinquent's name lawfully obtained ... .-"48 The rule applied by the Court was that even if
the statute were viewed as a penal sanction, such action requires "the
highest form of state interest to sustain its validity." 49 This rule had
been established the previous term in Landmark Communications,Inc.
v. Virginia.5 The Court concluded that the West Virginia statute could
not satisfy the constitutional standards defined in that case.5
In Landmark Communications the Court invalidated a Virginia
statute which made it a crime to divulge or publish information about
judges' disability or misconduct disclosed to a confidential judicial review commission authorized to hear such complaints. Addressing the
issue of whether the state's interest in protecting the reputation of
judges was sufficient to justify punishing third persons for divulging or
publishing truthful information, the Court concluded: "[T]he publication Virginia seeks to punish under its statute lies near the core of the
First Amendment, and the Commonwealth's interests advanced by the
imposition of criminal sanctions are insufficient to justify the actual
and potential encroachments on freedom of speech and of the press
which follow therefrom." 52
Chief Justice Burger also cited the Court's 1975 decision in Cox
BroadcastingCorp. v. Cohn 3 in support of this rule. In Cox Broadcasting Corp. the Court held that damages could not be recovered against a
newspaper for publishing the name of a rape victim. The suit was
based on a Georgia statute which imposed penal sanctions for publishing a rape victim's name. The purpose of the statute was to protect the
privacy right of the injured individual and her family. 4 The name of
Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 589 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558-59 (1975); A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY
OF CONSENT 61 (1975).
47. 99 S. Ct. at 2670.
48. Id at 2671 (emphasis added).
49. Id at 2670.
50. 435 U.S. 829 (1978). This case is discussed at length in Constitutional Review:
Supreme Court, October 1977 Term, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 19, 20-34 (1978).
51. 99 S. Ct. at 2670.
52. 435 U.S. at 838.
53. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
54. Id at 474-75.
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the victim had become public knowledge through official court records
during the prosecution of the rapist. The Supreme Court, per Justice
White, held the statute unconstitutional, reasoning that "[b]y placing
the information in the public domain on official court records, the State
must be presumed to have concluded that the public interest was
thereby being served. . . . States may not impose sanctions on the publication of truthful information contained in official court records. 5 5
The Court found "one classic prior restraint case," Oklahoma Pub7
lishing Co. v. District Court,5 6 "particularly relevant" to its inquiry.5
The 1977 case was factually similar to Daily Mail. There, an
Oklahoma court had enjoined the news media from publishing either
the name or a photograph of an eleven year old boy on trial for murder
in the juvenile court. The injunction was based on an Oklahoma statute requiring that juvenile proceedings be closed unless specifically ordered open by the juvenile court. The judge permitted reporters and
other members of the public to attend a pretrial hearing without such
an order and then tried to halt publication of the information obtained.
In reversing the injunctions, the Supreme Court held that once that
information was "publicly revealed" or "in the public domain," its dissemination could not be restrained by the state court.58
Chief Justice Burger claimed that Landmark Communications, Cox
Broadcasting Corp. and Oklahoma Publishing Co. indicated strongly
that if a newspaper published truthful information lawfully obtained it
'59
may not be punished, absent a "state interest of the highest order.
The Chief Justice submitted, however, that none of these decisions
were directly controlling in Daily Mail because they involved situations
where the government itself "provided or made possible press access to
the information,"6 whereas the reporters in Daily Mail "relied upon
routine newspaper reporting techniques . ... "I'
This distinction seems superfluous and adds little to the prior holdings discussed in Daily Mail. Each of those cases had involved at least
some investigative reporting, especially the publication of confidential
information in Landmark Communications. Notably, Daily Mail and
the three cases it relied on all involved restrictions on the publication of
information concerning a judicial proceeding. Perhaps the Court
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id at 495.
430 U.S. 308 (1977).
99 S. Ct. at 2671.
430 U.S. at 311 (citing Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 471 (1975).
99 S. Ct. at 2672.
Id at 2671.
Id
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meant to indicate, without so stating, that
the rules discussed in Daily
62
Mail would apply beyond this context.
Having determined the applicable standard, the Court decided

whether the state interest advanced was sufficient to justify the criminal
statute. The petitioners asserted that West Virginia's interest in the
confidentiality of the juvenile's name was the furtherance of rehabilitation because "the publication of the name may encourage further antisocial conduct and also may cause the juvenile to lose* future
employment or suffer other consequences for this single offense." 63 By
analogy to Davis v. Alaska,64 the Court summarily dismissed this inter-

est as inadequate to sustain the statute. The majority reasoned that the
First Amendment right asserted in Daily Mail was equivalent to the
Sixth Amendment right claimed in Davis. Therefore, the Court concluded, "the constitutional right must prevail over the State's interest in
protecting juveniles. 6 5

Justice Rehnquist disagreed with the majority's conclusion that
"punishing publication of the identity of a juvenile offender can never
serve an interest of the 'highest order .... , ,66 He agreed with the

petitioners' contention that "[w]ithout providing for punishment of
such unauthorized publications it will be virtually impossible for a
State to ensure the anonymity of its juvenile offenders."'6 7 Justice
Rehnquist concurred in the Court's judgment solely because the statute
62. "A free press cannot be made to rely solely upon the sufferance of government to
supply it with information." Id (citing Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11 (1978)
(plurality opinion); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)).
63. 99 S. Ct. at 2671.
64. 415 U.S. 308 (1974). See text accompanying notes 31-33 supra.
65. 99 S. Ct. at 2671. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976).
66. 99 S. Ct. at 2674 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Relnquist
began with the proposition that First Amendment rights are not absolute and must be carefully weighed against conflicting public interests. Id at 2672 (citing Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838, 843 (1978)); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539, 562 (1976); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 400 (1950)
(plurality opinion) (Congress may, under the National Labor Relations Act, withhold certain benefits from any labor organization the officers of which have not filed "non-Communist" affidavits with the NLRB)). He concluded that the state's interest in protecting the
anonymity of juvenile offenders far outweighed the statute's "minimal interference with
freedom of the press." 99 S. Ct. at 2673 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
67. Id at 2674. Justice Rehnquist noted some empirical support for petitioners' argument that confidentiality has a rehabilitative effect on juvenile delinquents. Id at 2673-74 &
n.1. See Howard, Grisso & Neems, Publicityand Juvenile Court Proceedings,11 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 203, 210 (1977). See also Geis, Publicity and Juvenile Court Proceedings,30
ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 101, 125-26 (1958). He also criticized the majority's reliance on Davis
v. Alaska, asserting that "the minimal interference with the freedom of the press caused by
the ban on publication of the youth's name can hardly be compared with the possible deprivation of liberty involved in Davis." 99 S. Ct. at 2674 n.2.
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failed to achieve its purpose in banning only newspapers from publishing the information: "It is difficult to take very seriously West Virginia's asserted need to preserve the anonymity of its youthful offenders
when it permits other, equally, if not more, effective means of mass

communication to distribute this information without fear of punishment.

68

Assuming the Court had found the state's interest to be of the

"highest order," it probably still would have held the West Virginia
statute invalid on the ground that other, less restrictive means were

available to protect the asserted interest. The majority noted that while
every state has asserted an interest in the confidentiality of juvenile

proceedings, all but a handful have found ways other than criminal
penalties to accomplish this purpose.69
In holding that the West Virginia criminal statute imposed an un-

constitutional prior restraint, the West Virginia court saw "little distinction" between it and the criminal contempt sanction involved in
OklahomaPublishing.7" By contrast, the United States Supreme Court

indicated that it may. be unnecessary to distinguish between prior restraint and subsequent punishment in deciding whether a particular
publication is entitled to First Amendment protection.7 The Supreme
Court's statement that "even when a state attempts to punish publication after the event" it must further substantial state interests, 72 how-

ever, implies that "the most exacting scrutiny" is still reserved for prior
restraints.73 This is consistent with the underlying reason for the histor-

ical distinction: prior restraints do not just "chill" speech, but have a
68. Id at 2674.
69. Id at 2672. See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 841
n. 12. See generally ConstitutionalReview- Supreme Court, October1977 Term, 6 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 19, 32-33 (1978).
The majority gave implied approval to the approach advocated by the National Council of Judges of voluntary cooperation between the juvenile court and the press in declining
to publish a juvenile's name. 99 S.Ct. at 2672 n.3.
The alternative means test has been argued successfully in prior restraint cases, even in
the face of substantial state and constitutional interests. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563-65 (1976) (pretrial publicity which threatened a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to fair trial did not justify enjoining the press from publishing confessions
made to police where alternative measures short of prior restraint would have protected
defendant's rights). Cf.Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975)
(municipal theater's denial of application to perform live stage show alleged to be obscene
held unconstitutional prior restraint absent procedural safeguards).
70. 248 S.E.2d at 272.
71. See 99 S.Ct. at 2670-71.
72. Id at 2670 (emphasis added).
73. See notes 22-23 and accompanying text supra.
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"freezing" effect on First Amendment rights.7 4 Thus, even if a state

interest was of the "highest order" and therefore sufficient to punish
truthful publication, that interest may still not justify a prior restraint.
The narrow Daily Mail holding provides little guidance for deter-

mining what state interests will permit either type of restraint on freedom of the press. The Court specifically declined to comment on

whether press access to confidential judicial proceedings could be prohibited.7 5 The Court further stated that there was no issue of privacy or
prejudicial pretrial publicity involved. 76 Another question unresolved

by Daily Mail is, assuming a justifiable state interest, may a newspaper-as distinguished from its individual editors and reporters-be
punished for publishing truthful information.77

In summary, Daily Mail and its precedent strongly indicate that
once truthful information reaches the press, it will be difficult for the
government to restrain or punish its publication.78 It remains to future

cases to determine what state interests of the "highest order" will justify
such restraints.
Herbert v. Lando*
The question before the Supreme Court in Herbert v. LandoI was

whether a public figure plaintiff in a libel action could compel a media
defendant to answer pretrial discovery questions designed to establish
74. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
75. 99 S. Ct. at 2672. See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829
(1978).
76. 99 S. Ct. at 2672. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
77. Compare Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 849 (1978)
(Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment) and New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713, 733-37 (1971) (White, J., concurring) with Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 99 S. Ct.
2667, 2672 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment). See generally, J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 748 (1978).
78. A recent case which illustrates this point is a federal court injunction of Progressive
Magazine's publication of an article entitled "The H Bomb Secret-How We Got It and
Why We're Telling It." The case became moot when Wisconsin's MadisonPress Connection
published an article containing similar information on how to build an H-bomb. The Justice Department, however, is reported to be considering whether anyone should be prosecuted for violation of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 2011, 2271-2274 (1970). See
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 10, 1979, at 24. If the information was in the public domain, as claimed
by the publishers, issues include whether the government's asserted interest in national security could justify the injunction or the threatened prosecution and whether alternative
means are available to protect this interest.
* Commentary by Robert Thorne, member, third-year class.
1. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
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actual malice as required by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.2 The
problem the Court faced was choosing between the interests of protect-

ing the editorial process against certain compulsory disclosure and ensuring a plaintiffs unfettered freedom to establish a cause of action
based upon actual malice. The Court held that the First Amendment
affords the media defendant no privilege against a public figure's pretrial inquiry regarding the editorial process where evidence material to
establishing actual malice is sought.3 Recognizing that New York

Times had already struck the proper balance between the First Amendment and the law of defamation,4 the Court believed that the editorial

process is sufficiently protected by such traditional limitations on discovery as the requirement of relevance.5 The decision in Herbert evi-

denced a desire to secure for plaintiffs in defamation actions an
effective tool with which to satisfy constitutional requirements for recovery.
While on active duty in Vietnam, Anthony Herbert formally
charged his superiors with covering up wartime atrocities.6 Following

his forced retirement and the official exoneration of his superiors, Herbert attracted widespread and sympathetic media coverage. In 1973,

CBS broadcast an episode of "60 Minutes" which included a segment
covering Herbert and his accusations. Barry Lando produced and ed-

ited the segment and later authored a related article that was published
in the Atlantic Monthly. Both the program and the article cast serious
doubt on Herbert's veracity. Herbert instituted a libel action against
CBS, Lando, the Atlantic Monthly and others7 in federal district court.8
In his complaint, Herbert alleged that the program and article falsely

and maliciously portrayed him as having fabricated the accusations
against his superiors to explain his relief from command.
2. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). Appellants, in their brief before the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, succinctly framed the issue before the court: "What effect should be
given to the First Amendment protection of the press with respect to its exercise of editorial
judgment in pretrial discovery in a libel case governed by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan?"
Brief for Appellants, quoted in Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 979 n.14 (2d Cir. 1977),
rev'd,441 U.S. 153 (1979).
3. 441 U.S. at 172.
4. See note 26 and accompanying text infra.
5. See note 43 infra.
6. This summary of the facts is taken from the opinion of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. 568 F.2d at 980-84.
7. Mike Wallace, who narrated the broadcast report, and the CBS correspondent for
the report were also named as defendants in the action.
8. 73 F.R.D. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd, 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 441 U.S.
153 (1979). Herbert alleged $44,775,000 in damages for injury to his reputation and to the
literary value of his recently published book, Soldier.
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Herbert conceded that because he was a public figure. The rule of
New York Times9 precluded recovery absent proof that the damaging
falsehood was published with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false. He proceeded to depose Lando
at length.' 0 Lando refused, however, to answer questions relating to his

beliefs, opinions, intent and conclusions in preparing his report, claiming that the First Amendment immunized him from such questions.'
The Lower Court Decisions
The district court granted Herbert's application for an order to
compel discovery. The court rejected Lando's First Amendment claim
on the ground that there was no authority for making more difficult the
task of determining whether a libelous statement was published with
actual malice. On defendants' motion, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit certified an interlocutory appeal of the district court's

ruling.
A divided panel reversed the district court.'" Displaying concern
for press autonomy, the court of appeals held that the First Amendment, as interpreted by New York Times, placed the journalist's mental
processes outside the scope of pretrial discovery. 3 Inquiries into the

journalist's thoughts, opinions and conclusions would "chill" the editorial process, warned the court, for "reporters and journalists would be
reluctant to express their doubts,"' 4preferring "the safe course of avoiding contention and controversy."'
The court suggested that a jury was capable of inferring malice
9. 376 U.S. at 279-80.
10. The deposition of Lando, which lasted over one year, filled 2903 transcript pages
and entailed 240 exhibits.
11. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit summarized the "'assertedly objectionable" questions as follows: "1. Lando's conclusions during his research and investigations
regarding people or leads to be pursued, or not to be pursued, in connection with the '60
Minutes' segment and the Atlantic Monthly article; 2. Lando's conclusions about facts imparted by interviewees and his state of mind with respect to the veracity of persons interviewed; 3. The basis for conclusions where Lando testified that he did reach a conclusion
concerning the veracity of persons, information or events; 4. Conversations between Lando
and Wallace about matter to be included or excluded from the broadcast publication; and
5. Lando's intentions as manifested by his decision to include or exclude certain material."
568 F.2d at 983.
12. 568 F.2d at 974.
13. The court added: "Selective inquiry into the reporter's thoughts can be far worse
than the discovery of all aspects of his mental process. In plumbing only particular facets of
the reporter's mind, the libel plaintiff is more likely to distort the nature of the editorial
process." Id at 984 n.23.
14. Id at 984. See note 25 infra.
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from the deponent's responses to permissible inquiries.' 5 In addition,
the court cited several cases dealing with First Amendment protection
of the editorial process, though none specifically addressed the discov-

erability or admissibility of state-of-mind evidence.

6

In view of the

protection afforded the editorial process by New York Times, the court
concluded that "[ilt makes little sense to afford protection with one
hand and take it away with the other."' 7
The United States Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals.' 8 Justice White, writing for the six-member majority, 19 rejected
the intermediate court's conclusion that New York Times and its progeny afforded the media defendant a privilege against pretrial inquiries

into the journalist's state of mind.2" Justice White viewed the case as a
request "to modify firmly established constitutional doctrine by placing
beyond the plaintiffs reach a range of direct evidence relevant to proving knowing or reckless falsehood by the publisher of an alleged libel,
elements that are critical to plaintiffs such as Herbert."'" Recognizing

the need to afford plaintiffs an opportunity to prove actual malice, the
Court refused to create an editorial privilege which would, in effect,

erect an "impenetrable barrier" to the use of evidence relating to a
journalist's state of mind. 22
Justice White observed that New York Times and CurtisPublishing
Co. v. Butts23 limited recovery in libel actions to instances where public

official or public figure plaintiffs could prove with "convincing clarity"
that a statement was made with knowledge of falsehood or reckless
15. Id
16. Among the more notable cases cited were Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,
418 U.S. 241 (1974) (newspaper need not accept editorial replies); Columbia Broadcasting
Sys. Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (broadcaster need not accept paid
political advertisements); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (right of press to gather
information); Baker v. F. & F. Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972) (reporter need not disclose
sources of article). Actually, the Supreme Court's decision in Branzburg was probably not
supportive authority. That case resulted in an intrusion into the editorial process.
17. 568 F.2d at 984.
18. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
19. Justice White's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun,
Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens. Justice Powell filed a concurring opinion. Justice Brennan
filed an opinion dissenting in part. Justices Stewart and Marshall filed dissenting opinions.
20. 441 U.S. at 169-70.
21. Id
22. Id at 170.
23. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Butts extended the rule of New York Times, which applied to
public official plaintiffs, to public figure plaintiffs.
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disregard for the truth.2 4 This substantial evidentiary burden, reflecting the conviction that self-censorship of the press is contrary to the
public interest,25 represents a judicial compromise between the First
Amendment and the law of defamation.26 New York Times and its

progency clearly developed an obstacle to recovery. Justice White
warned, however, that that obstacle must not become insurmountable.2 7 It was an inevitable result of those important defamation deci-

sions that "unless liability is to be completely foreclosed, the thoughts
and editorial processes of the alleged defamer would be open to examination."2 8 Justice White noted that even in the body of jurisprudence
preceding New York Times, when the alleged defamer's state of mind
was generally considered irrelevant for purposes of establishing liabil-

ity29 a showing of malice, as commonly defined,3° was permitted for the
purposes of overcoming a conditional privilege or recovering punitive
damages.3 1 "[C]ourts across the country have," White pointed out,
24. 376 U.S. at 285-86. See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 334 n.6
(1974) (the New York Times standard requires inquiry into the defendant's "subjective
awareness of probable falsity"); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). For a
suggested jury instruction defining "clear and convincing proof," see Callahan v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 363 N.E.2d 240, 242-43 (Mass. 1977).
25. Justice Brennan, writing the opinion of the Court in New )rork
Times, discussed
how strict liability for libelous statements could lead to self-censorship: "A rule compelling
the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions-and to do so
on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount-leads to . . . 'self-censorship.'
Allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not
mean that only false speech will be deterred. Even courts accepting this defense as an adequate safeguard have recognized the difficulties of adducing legal proofs that the alleged
libel was true in all of its factual particulars. Under such a rule, would-be critics of official
conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true
and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear
of the expense of having to do so. They tend to make only statements which 'steer far wider
of the unlawful zone.' The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public
debate." 376 U.S. at 279 (citations omitted). Justice Brennan's ardent concern about selfcensorship was also evidenced in Herbert. See note 55 infra.
26. 441 U.S. at 169. More specifically, the compromise was to eliminate, on the one
hand, the risk of undue self-censorship and on the other hand, to compensate for injury and
deter publication of unprotected defamatory falsehoods. Id The Court also recognized that
such a compromise was generally not struck in the cases preceding New York Times. Id at
159 & n.4.
27. Id at 170.
28. Id at 160.
29. Id at 159 & n.4.
30. The common law definition of malice is ill-will or an equivalent. W. PROSSER, THE
LAW OF TORTS 771-72 (4th ed. 1971). See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 78
(1964) ("ill-will, enmity, or a wanton desire to injure"); Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan.
711, 741, 98 P. 281, 292 (1908) ("actual evil-mindedness"); Bromage v. Prosser, 107 Eng.
Rep. 1051, 1054 (1825) ("ill-will").
31. 441 U.S. at 165-68. Justice White cited and briefly summarized 41 libel cases from
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"long been accepting evidence going to the editorial processes of the
media without encountering constitutional objections."32
Justice White expressly rejected the contention of the court of appeals that Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo3 3 and Columbia
Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Committee3 4 unequivocally protected the editorial process. Tornillo invalidated a statute re-

quiring newspapers to publish editorial replies and Columbia
BroadcastingSystem held that a broadcaster is not required to accept

paid political advertisements. Editorial decisionmaking was protected,
but no mention was made of protecting the editorial process from pre-

trial discovery. Justice White concluded that "holdings that neither a
State nor the Federal Government may dictate what must or must not

be printed neither expressly nor impliedly suggest that the editorial
process is immune from any inquiry whatsoever."35
Noting that the law disfavors evidentiary privileges, Justice White
cited United States v. Nixon3 6 to illustrate that "the search for truth"
often penetrates otherwise privileged matters.3 7 In Nixon, the Court
ruled that the President's powerful interest in confidentiality "must
yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending crim-

inal trial."3 Justice White recognized the value of protecting editorial
discussion from mere casual inquiry.3 9 But such questioning is differ24 states in which editorial state of mind was held relevant and admissible evidence. Id at
165-67 n.15.
32. Id at 165.
33. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
34. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
35. 441 U.S. at 168. In the trial court below, Judge Haight rejected the contention that
such cases supported the creation of an additional editorial privilege: "I find no substance in
the argument defendants based upon the 'editorial judgment' concept. . . .These cases
(CBS, Tornilo, Branzburg)have nothing to do with the proper boundaries of pre-trial discovery in a defamation suit alleging malicious publication." 73 F.R.D. at 396.
36. 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (the President does not have an absolute privilege against disclosure of materials subpoenaed for a judicial proceeding).
37. 441 U.S. at 175 & n.24.
38. 418 U.S. at 713. In Nixon, the Court was faced with the problem of choosing between competing interests. It chose "to resolve those competing interests in a manner that
preserves the essential functions of each branch." Id.at 707. The Court took this same
approach in Herbert, seeking to preserve what it believed to be an equitable preexisting
balance between the First Amendment and the law of defamation. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
39. Justice White explained: "There is no law that subjects the editorial process to private or official examination merely to satisfy curiosity or to serve some general end such as
the public interest; and if there were, it would not survive constitutional scrutiny as the First
Amendment is presently construed. No such problem exists here, however, where there is a
specific claim of injury arising from a publication that is alleged to have been knowing or
recklessly false." 441 U.S. at 174.
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ent from direct inquiry into allegations of wrongful conduct. Justice
White was unable to articulate any practicable scope of the proposed

editorial privilege and thus feared that allowing the privilege would
dangerously foreclose inquiry essential to the plaintiff's cause of action.4 °
The respondents also argued that absent the proposed editorial
privilege, discovery would be so burdensome as to chill the editorial

process in that the expense of responding continually to alleged litigation-related inquiries might well require editors to temper their reporting.4 1

White responded that mushrooming litigation costs are a

pervasive fact of jurisprudential life4 ' and that the responsibility for
tempering these costs must, just as in other contexts, be borne by the

trial courts. Although "deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a
broad and liberal treatment to effect their purpose of adequately in-

forming the litigants in civil trials" the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure empower the courts to restrict discovery where it involves

irrelevant inquiries or unreasonably burdens a party or other person
from whom it is sought. 4 3 Justice White was not convinced by the argument that actual malice could be shown indirectly by objective evidence.' He claimed that "[p]ermitting such plaintiffs as Herbert to
prove their cases by direct as well as indirect evidence is consistent with

the balance struck by our prior decisions. 45 Justice White concluded
by noting that even if the Court created a privilege against direct inquiry into the editorial process, that would not relieve the press of the

costs and burdens attendant to defending defamation actions. "Only
40. Id at 170.
41. Id at 176 & n.25.
42. Justice White observed that the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of
the Judicial Conference of the United States has proposed amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure designed to ameliorate this problem. See id at 176-77 n.26.
43. Id at 177. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are subject to the limitation of
Rule I that they "be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action." Rule 26(b)(1) requires that material sought in discovery be "relevant." Rule
26(c) assists a party or the person from whom discovery is sought by empowering the district
court to issue any order which "justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense .... "
44. Id at 172. But see Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. at 156-58, where the
Court held that actual malice may be inferred when the investigation for a story which was
not "hot news" was grossly inadequate under the circumstances. See also Vandenburg v.
Newsweek, Inz., 441 F.2d 378, 380 (5th Cir. 1971).
45. Id Justice White added that direct inquiry might even help the defendant:
"[D]irect inquiry from the actors, which affords the opportunity to refute inferences that
might otherwise be drawn from circumstantial evidence, suggests that more accurate results
will be obtained by placing all, rather than part, of the evidence before the decisionmaker."
Id at 172-73.
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complete immunity from liability from defamation would effect this result," he pointed out, "and the Court has regularly found this to be an
untenable construction of the First Amendment."4 6
Justice Powell joined the opinion of the Court but also wrote separately to elaborate on the majority's discussion of the supervisory
power given the district courts under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Trial judges, observed Justice Powell, "are now increasingly recognizing the 'pressing need for judicial supervision' "I of the discovery
process, for "discovery techniques and tactics have become a highly
developed litigation art-one not infrequently exploited to the disadvantage of justice."4 8 While recognizing the value of allowing discovery of any evidence which may be relevant to a cause of action, Justice
Powell emphasized that courts also have an affirmative duty under the
First Amendment to protect the editorial process.4 9 Thus, he urged district courts to carefully weigh the needs of private litigants against the
public interest in the free flow of information protected by the First
Amendment: "[W]hen a discovery demand arguably impinges on First
Amendment rights a district court should measure the degree of relevance required in light of both the private needs of the parties and the
public concerns implicated."5 Apparently Justice Powell would have
the district courts apply stricter standards of relevance in cases involving media defendants. 5
Justice Brennan, dissenting in part, felt that the proposed editorial
privilege should be allowed unless "a public-figure plaintiff is able to
establish, to the prima facie satisfaction of a trial judge, that the publi*...-52 This recation at issue constitutes [a] defamatory falsehood .
quirement would not unduly burden the plaintiff, Justice Brennan
claimed, for such a showing must eventually be made if the plaintiff is
to recover. He also noted that because the proposed editorial privilege
would protect only "deliberating and policymaking processes," the
plaintiff could always discover factual material relevant to the alleged
46. Id at 176.
47. Id at 180 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting ACF Industries, Inc. v. EEOC, cert. denied,99 S. Ct. 865, 869 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ.)).
48. Id at 179 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell noted the "widespread abuse of
discovery that has become a prime cause of delay and expense in civil litigation." Id
49. Id
50. Id
51. Justice Powell concluded: "I join the Court's opinion on my understanding that in
heeding these admonitions, the District Court must ensure that the values protected by the
First Amendment, though entitled to be constitutional privilege in a case of this kind, are
weighed carefully in striking a proper balance." Id at 180.
52. Id at 197 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) (footnote omitted).
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falsehood. 3 Justice Brennan saw this requirement of establishing a
prima facie case of falsity as the best means of preserving the balance
struck by New York Times between the values of the First Amendment
and society's interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon regulation. . . -"4He believed that this balance was delicate and that abuse
of. discovery would upset it by dangerously inhibiting the editorial
process. 55 The threshhold requirement would protect the actions of responsible media defendants. Those at the margin, "who have some
awareness of the probable falsity of their work but not enough to constitute actual malice. . . might be discouraged from publication. But
this chill emanates chiefly from the substantive standard of New York
Times, not from the absence of an editorial privilege." 5 6
In his dissent, Justice Stewart assented that the majority had misperceived the issue. He believed the Court need not have decided the
constitutional question of whether Lando was to be afforded an editorial privilege; inquiries into "the broad 'editorial process' " are "simply
not relevant" to determining whether Lando knew the defamatory
statements were untrue or published them in reckless disregard of their
truth or falsity.57
Justice Stewart was also troubled by the use of the term "actual
malice" in New York Times and its subsequent application. Determination of malice, as that term is commonly understood,5 8 is best made
53. Id at 198. See also Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 89
(1973).
54. Id at 197. Justice White, writing the opinion of the Court, expressly criticized Justice Brennan's conclusion: "Mr. Justice Brennan would extend more constitutional protection to editorial discussion by excusing answers to relevant questions about in-house
conversations until the plaintiff has made a prima facie case of falsity. If this suggestion
contemplated a bifurcated trial, first on falsity and then on culpabiity and injury, we decline
to subject libel trials to such burdensome complications and intolerable delay. On the other
hand, if, as seems more likely, the prima facie showing does not contemplate a minitrial on
falsity, no resolution of conflicting evidence on this issue, but only a credible assertion by the
plaintiff, it smacks of a requirement that could be satisfied by an affidavit or a simple verification of the pleadings. We are reluctant to imbed this formalism in the Constitution." Id
at 174-75 n.23.
55. Justice Brennan warned of a particularly dangerous effect of abuse of discovery:
"[Plublic figures might bring harassment suits against the media in order to use discovery to
uncover aspects of the editorial process which, if publicly revealed, would prove embarrassing to the press. In different contexts other First Amendment values might be affected. If
sued by a powerful political figure, for example, journalists might fear reprisals for information disclosed during discovery. Such a chilling effect might particularly impact on the
press' ability to perform its 'checking' function." Id at 191 n.l 1 (citations omitted).
56. Id at 193.
57. Id at 199 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
58. See note 30 supra.
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by asking why the person acted as he did. But the actual malice standard is a constitutional term of art which "has nothing to do with hostility or ill will, and the question 'why' is totally irrelevant."5 9 Justice
Stewart argued that both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
had overlooked this distinction; thus the editorial privilege issue was
academic, for no inquiry into the motive behind a defamatory publication is necessary when "liability ultimately depends upon the publisher's state of knowledge of the falsity of what he published, not at all
upon his motivation in publishing it." 6 Justice Stewart concluded that
since the defendants' motivation was irrelevant to Herbert's cause of
action, those discovery questions which inquired into the editorial
process would likely fail the requirements of Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 6 '
Justice Marshall, also dissenting, opted for a "limited" editorial
privilege-one barring inquiry into "the substance of editorial conversation" but permitting relevant inquiry into the journalist's state of
mind.62 In not permitting all kinds of inquiry, Justice Marshall pointed
out that "there are a variety of other means to establish deliberate or
reckless disregard for the truth, such as absence of verification, inherent
implausibility, obvious reasons to doubt the veracity or accuracy of information, and concessions or inconsistent statements by the defendant."' 63 He asserted that broad discovery rules are inappropriate,
perhaps dangerous, in defamation cases because of their potential inhibitory effect on the robust debate contemplated by New York
Times.' Justice Marshall asserted that "the same constitutional concerns" which led the Court in New York Times to limit actionable defamation "also mandate some constraints on roving discovery. ' 65 He
concluded "that a limited [editorial] privilege might deny recovery in.
some marginal cases, [but that would be] an acceptable price to pay for
59. 441 U.S. at 199 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356
(1965); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 78 (1964).
60. Id at 200.
61. Rule 26(b)(1) provides in pertinent part: "Parties may obtain discovery regarding
any matter not privileged which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action. . . .It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible
at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence."
62. Id at 209 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
63. Id at 210.
64. Id at 202-03. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). Justice Marshall warned: "Given the circumstances under which libel actions arise, plaintiffs'
pretrial maneuvers may be fashioned more with an eye to deterrence or retaliation than to
unearthing germane material." Id at 204-05.
65. Id at 206.
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preserving a climate conducive to considered editorial judgment."6 6
Analysis
As a significant restriction on actionable defamation, New York
Times v. Sullivan6 7 was clearly a judicially-struck compromise between
the rights of free speech and free press under the First Amendment and
the individual's reputational interest. In Herbert v. Lando, the
Supreme Court sought to preserve this balance when for the first time it
discussed how the substantive requirements of New Tork Times were to
be implemented. Herbert refined, but did not materially alter, New
York Times; it simply permitted discovery calculated to meet the evidentiary burden of proving actual malice with "convincing clarity."
With respect to the law of defamation, Herbert did nothing more. 68
The law of defamation poses a threat of legal and precuniary reprisal that necessarily induces some degree of self-censorship. Herbert
reaffirmed the Court's willingness in New York Times to accept the inevitability of this result. Indeed, one of the more notable features of
Herbert is the Justices' unanimity in accepting the balance struck by
New York Times. The reservations expressed by Justices Brennan,
Powell and Marshall were addressed more to application than to reconsideration of the theory that some amount of liability for media defendants in defamation actions is harmonious with the First Amendment.
Refusing to "erect an impenetrable barrier" to the use of material
evidence,69 the Herbert Court declined, in effect, to abolish defamation
actions against the media. Notwithstanding the warnings, in terrorem,
of those who would limit discovery and perhaps deny justly deserved
recovery so as to protect First Amendment interests, the requirement of
relevance continues to be the only major barrier which the plaintiff
66. Id at 210. Justice Marshall elaborated on the dangers of unlimited discovery:
"Journalists cannot stop forming tentative hypotheses, but they can cease articulating them
openly. If prepublication dialogue is freely discoverable, editors and reporters may well
prove reluctant to air their reservations or to explore other means of presenting information
and comment. The threat of unchecked discovery may well stifle the collegial discussion
essential to sound editorial dynamics ....
Society's interest in enhancing the accuracy of
coverage of public events is ill-served by procedures tending to muffle expression of uncertainty. To preserve a climate of free interchange among journalists. the confidentiality of
their conversations must be guaranteed." Id at 208-09.
67. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
68. Justice White, writing the opinion of the Court in Herbert, emphatically stated:
"[T]he present construction of the First Amendment should not be modified by creating the
evidentiary privilege which the respondents now urge." 441 U.S. at 175.
69. Id at 170. Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). "Plainly many
deserving plaintiffs, including some intentionally subjected to injury, will be unable to surmount the barrier of the New York Times test." Id at 342 (Powell, J.).
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must overcome to inquire into the media defendant's mental impressions.7" To require more than a showing of relevance would be to depress the delicately balanced scales of New York Times in favor of the
media defendant.
It is understandable, however, that Herbert should be interpreted
by the press as yet another instance of the Burger Court's attack on
editorial autonomy. Reporters cannot decline to answer questions put
to them during a grand jury investigation." Newspaper offices may be
searched under authority of a warrant for evidence of a crime committed by a third party.7 2 The press has been denied a right of access to
sources of information greater than the right afforded the general public. 73 Notwithstanding that these intrusions into the editorial process
have been deemed justified by important competing interests, the potential, if not probable, chilling effect of these intrusions might be too
great a burden for society to carry. Without adequate safeguards
against excessive intrusions, the press might well be unable to fulfill its
constitutionally-designated function of informing the public. 74 The
question implicitly answered in Herbert, but nevertheless open to debate, is whether society can afford to assume this risk as a consequence
of protecting the rights of defamed individuals.
There are some who would contend that Herbert should not be
viewed as part of a dangerous judicial trend. While in prior decisions
the Court refused to grant the press certain privileges in recognition of
its important role as a provider of information to the public, Herbert
merely reaffirmed the limitations set out in New York Times. Content
with the general status of the law of defamation, the Court was unwilling to deprive its earlier decision in New York Times of the limited
utility it offered plaintiffs, fearing that otherwise that decision would
remain "only a promise to the ear to be broken to the hope, a teasing
'' 5
illusion like a munificent bequest in a pauper's will. "
It is as yet unknown whether the contentions of those who would
find Herbert's impact to be innocuous are in fact myopic. There is no
70. See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
71. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
72. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
73. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc. 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (prison facilities); Nixon v. Warner
Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978) (judicial records); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,
417 U.S. 843 (1974) (prison facilities); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (prison facilities).
74. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966), New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 269 (1964); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
concurring).
75. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 186 (1941) (Jackson, J.,
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easy escape, however, from the conclusion that the media defendant
can be compelled, pursuant to Herbert, to divulge in pretrial discovery
what might otherwise be privileged under the First Amendment.
Herbert v. Lando is a useful guide for the defamation plaintiff who
is required to meet the affirmative evidentiary burden of New York
Times. It represents but another instance of judicial compromise-a
weighing and balancing of First Amendment rights and the interests
with which they must compete. The extent to which Herbert will contribute to what some view as an erosion of editorial autonomy is as yet
unknown. But recent decisions of the Burger Court7 6 suggest that, at
least in the foreseeable future, this erosion will indeed continue.

IV.

Freedom of Religion

During the 1978-79 Term, the Supreme Court once again dealt
with the vexing question of the judiciary's .function in settling intrachurch disputes in light of First Amendment limitations. The specific issue in Jones v. Wolf was whether a civil court could apply
"neutral principles of law" to decide a church property dispute between
competing factions within a local congregation. The Court's holding
that this approach comported with First Amendment principles appeared to be in line with prior cases involving church disputes which
utilized a similar "neutral principles" analysis. As the four dissenters
pointed out, however, the result reached by the Court was inconsistent
with the decision in Watson v. Jones,' considered the forerunner of
neutral principles analysis. In what might therefore actually have been
a departure from precedent, the Court approved the use of "neutral
principles of law" to resolve church property disputes-and presumably all intrachurch disputes-without identifying these principles or delineating the extent to which they may be applied by a civil court.
Jones v. Woff
In Jones v. Woff' the United States Supreme Court considered the
76. See notes 71-73 and accompanying text supra.
a. 99 S. Ct. 3020 (1979).
b. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
* Commentary by Jon Escher, member, third-year class.
1. 99 S. Ct. 3020 (1979).
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validity of the application of "neutral principles" of law upon the resolution of disputes involving the ownership of church property. Specifically, the Georgia Supreme Court' had upheld a trial court decision
recognizing the schismatic majority faction of the Vineville Presbyterian Church of Macon, Georgia as the representatives of that congregation and owners of the church property. In affirming the basic
approach of the Georgia courts, the United States Supreme Court ruled
that a state may apply neutral principles of law in resolving church
property disputes without running afoul of the religion clauses of the
First Amendment.3
In 1904 the Vineville Presbyterian Church of Macon, Georgia was
organized as a member of the Augusta-Macon Presbytery of the Presbyterian Church of the United States (PCUS). The property upon
which the church was built was acquired in three separate transactions.
These transactions were evidenced by conveyances to the "Trustees of
or for Vineville Presbyterian Church and their successors in office." 4
For sixty-nine years the Vineville Church existed peacefully
within the hierarchical framework of the PCUS.5 Under the polity of
the PCUS, the government of the local church was committed to its
session.6 The actions of the session, however, were subject to review by
the higher church courts. The responsibilities of each level of the hierarchy were set forth in the constitution of the PCUS.
On May 27, 1973 the Vineville Church held a meeting attended by
a quorum of its members. At this meeting 165 of the members voted to
separate from the PCUS. Ninety-four members opposed the resolution
and remained loyal to the mother church. The majority of the members then united with another denomination known as the Presbyterian
Church in America. The minority withdrew and ceased their religious
activities at the Vineville Church.
Upon receiving notice of the schism, the Augusta-Macon Presbytery appointed a commission to investigate and resolve the conflict.
2. Jones v. Wolf, 241 Ga. 208, 243 S.E.2d 860 (1978).
3. The First Amendment provides in relevant part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
4. The funds used to acquire the property were provided entirely by local church
members.
5. The PCUS has a hierarchical or correctional form of government. Under this form,
the local church is a subordinate part of a larger church and is under the authority of the
general church. The other type of church government is congregational, where authority
over all church matters rests entirely in the local congregation or some body within it.
6. A "session" is defined as "the governing body of a local Presbyterian Church."
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1305 (1966).
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The commission ruled that the minority faction constituted "the true
congregation of the Vineville Presbyterian Church."7 Furthermore, the
commission withdrew from the majority faction "all authority to exercise office derived from the [PCUS]." 8 The majority did not challenge
or in any way appeal the ruling of the PCUS but retained possession of
the property.
Representatives of the minority faction first sought relief in federal
court; however, their complaint was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 9
They then brought suit in a Georgia state court seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief. They sought to establish the minority's exclusive right
to possession of the Vineville Church property. The trial court, however, applying Georgia's "neutral principles of law" approach to
church property disputes, granted judgment for the majority. The minority representatives appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court, challenging the lower court's ruling on the basis of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.
The Lower Court Decisions
The Georgia Supreme Court' ° began its analysis of the case by
reviewing the state's historical approach to the resolution of church
property disputes. Before 1969 the Georgia courts had applied an implied trust theory. Under this theory, the property of a local church
affiliated with a hierarchical church organization was deemed to be
held in trust in favor of the general church, provided the general
church had not substantially abandoned those tenets and practices of
faith which existed at the time of affiliation." In 1969, however, the
United States Supreme Court ruled that Georgia would be required to
apply some other principle to help resolve church property disputes to
the extent that the implied trust theory unconstitutionally entangled
civil courts in ecclesiastical questions. 12 If a trust was to operate in
favor of the hierarchical church, it must spring from some source other
than the mother church's nondeparture from traditional doctrine.
On remand the Georgia Supreme Court determined that the separate source for a trust must be found through the application of neutral
principles of law developed for use in all property disputes. These
7.
8.
9.
10.

99 S. Ct. at 3023. The majority faction took no part in the commission's inquiry.
Id
Lucas v. Hope, 515 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976).
Jones v. Wolf, 241 Ga. 208, 243 S.E.2d 860 (1978).
11. Id at 209, 243 S.E.2d at 862.
12. Id (citing Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull
Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969)).
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principles may be applied in church property disputes without resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine. As examples of
neutral principles of law which the United States Supreme Court had
sanctioned for use in resolving church property disputes, the Georgia
court listed language in deeds,' 3 applicable state statutes regarding reliconstitutions 5 and the corgious corporations,' 4 provisions in church
6
church.'
local
porate charter of the
An application of these principles led the Georgia high court to
conclude that the hierarchical church possessed no right to the use and
enjoyment of the church property. First, an examination of the deeds
revealed no language purporting to give the PCUS an interest in the
property.' 7 Second, the local church's corporate charter failed to show8
any interest in the corporation other than that of the congregation.'
Finally, the Georgia statutes did not give a general church any rights in
local church property unless those rights were set forth in the documents of church government. 19 The Book of Church Order, the church
document governing the relationship between the hierarchical church
and the local church, dealt only with faith and internal structure. No
language within the Book of Church Order gave the PCUS rights in the
local church property.2"
Satisfied that the trial court had correctly applied neutral principles of law, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed its ruling that, as a
matter of law, the legal title to all church property of the Vineville Presbyterian Church was vested in the local church congregation represented by the majority.2 ' The court also agreed that "'more than a
mere connectional relationship between the local and general churches
must exist' to give rise to property rights in the general church."2 2
13. Here a court is concerned with the formal instrument of conveyance and to whom
the deed transfers title.
14. A state may have special legislation which governs the conveyance of church property.
15. At this point in its examination a court attempts to isolate an express trust which is
made part of the hierarchical relationship.
16. This refers to language within the organic document of the local church which subordinates property rights to the hierarchy.
17. 241 Ga. at 210, 243 S.E.2d at 863.
18. Id
19. Id
20. Id.
21. Id at 212, 243 S.E.2d at 864.
22. Id (quoting Carnes v. Smith, 236 Ga. 30, 222 S.E.2d 322 (1976)). It is important to
note that the Georgia Supreme Court did not consider the effect of the PCUS finding that
the members of the minority faction were the true representatives of the Vineville Presbyte-
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The United States Supreme Court Decision
On appeal the United States Supreme Court vacated the Georgia
Court judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.2 3 The
five-member majority 24 held that a state is constitutionally entitled to
adopt a neutral principles of law analysis as a means of adjudicating
church property disputes.2 5 It also held that if Georgia adopted a presumptive rule of majority representation, defeasible upon a showing
that the identity of the local church is to be determined by some other
means, this presumptive rule would be consistent with the neutral principles analysis and the First Amendment. 26 The cause was remanded
because the Georgia Courts never explicitly stated that they were
adopting a presumptive rule of majority representation, nor how that
presumption could be overcome.2 7
In deciding which faction of the formerly united congregation was
entitled to possess and enjoy the property, the Court encountered two
primary issues: first, whether civil courts, consistent with the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, may resolve church property disputes on the
basis of neutral principles of law or whether they must defer to the
resolution of an authoritative tribunal of the hierarchical church; and
second, whether a presumptive rule of majority representation is consistent with both the neutral principles analysis and with the First
Amendment. After briefly summarizing the neutral principles analysis
followed by the Georgia Supreme Court, Justice Blackmun began his
analysis by examining First Amendment restrictions on civil courts in
resolving church property disputes. He conceded that the First
Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may play
in resolving church property disputes. 28 As a corrollary, Blackmun also
acknowledged that the religion clauses require civil courts to defer the
resolution of issues of religious doctrine or polity to the highest ecclesiastical court. 9 Justice Blackmun asserted, however, that the religion
clauses do not prevent a state from adopting any one of various methnan Church. Nor did the Court consider the true neutrality of the principle which it invoked, that of majority representation.
23. 99 S. Ct. at 3029.
24. Justice Blackmun wrote the Court's opinion. He was joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Rehnquist and Stevens.
25. 99 S. Ct. at 3026.
26. Id at 3027.
27. Id at 3028.
28. Id at 3025 (citing Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue
Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969)).
29. Id (citing Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710
(1976) (a civil tribunal must adopt a posture of noninterference with respect to the internal
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ods in order to resolve church property disputes.3" So long as the chosen method does not involve a civil court in the determination of an
essentially ecclesiastical dispute, then the purposes of the First Amendment have been served. Blackmun maintained that the neutral principles approach is consistent with the constitutional mandate. He
claimed that this approach is completely secular in operation, "yet flexible enough to accommodate all forms of religious organization and
polity."' I The chief advantage of such an approach is that it frees civil
courts from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity and
practice.
Justice Blackmun admitted, however, that the neutral principles
analysis is not free from difficulty. As the approach had evolved in
Georgia, a civil court had to examine certain church documents to determine if the relationship between the hierarchical church and the local church contemplated bestowing a property interest upon the
hierarchical association. Blackmun pointed out that the civil court had
to "take special care to scrutinize the document in purely secular terms
and not to rely on religious precepts in determining whether the document indicates that the parties have intended to create a trust."3 2 He
also noted that a court might be called upon to resolve a religious controversy in order to interpret an instrument of ownership. Again, the
court had to carefully avoid such involvement, but must "defer to the
resolution of the doctrinal issue by the authoritative ecclesiastical
body."3 3 Justice Blackmun concluded, however, that the nonentanglement and neutrality inherent in the neutral principles of law analysis
outweigh these occasional problems in application.3 4
Justice Blackmun then responded to certain arguments raised in
the dissent. He viewed the dissent as requiring states to abandon neutral principles and instead insisting on compulsory deference to the determination of the appropriate hierarchical church tribunal. 35 That
would entail affirming the finding of the PCUS commission that the
minority represented the local congregation. Justice Blackmun asserted that such a rule would invite even more entanglement in religious doctrine and organization, to the extent that a civil court would
organizational structure of religious associations in matters which involve the appointment
of clergy)).
30. Id at 3028.
31. Id at 3025.
32. Id at 3026.
33. Id
34. Id
35. Id
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be required to examine ecclesiastical doctrine and polity to determine
where the church has placed ultimate authority over the use of church
property. 36 While admitting that in some cases making such a determination would not prove too difficult, Justice Blackmun maintained that
in others isolating the locus of control could involve the civil court in
37
an unconstitutional consideration of religious doctrine.
Justice Blackmun then addressed the argument that application of
neutral principles would violate the free exercise rights of the hierarchical religious association. He determined that the neutral principles approach does not inhibit the free exercise of religion any more than do
other neutral state laws governing church property, taxes or employment practices. 38 Furthermore, Blackmun pointed out that before a
dispute arises, the parties may insure that the faction loyal to the hierarchical church will retain the church property.3 9 One way is to modify
deeds or corporate charters to include a right of reversion to the general
church.4" Alternatively, the general church constitution may recite an
express trust in favor of the general church.4 '
It remained for the Court to determine whether the Georgia neutral principles analysis had been faithful to the promise of nonentanglement. Justice Blackmun recognized that the schism existing within the
church injected a "complicating factor" into the analysis.4 2 He rejected, however, the argument that the true representatives of the
43
Vineville Church could only be determined by the mother church.
Blackmun believed that such a determination could be made by a civil
court without deciding between competing doctrinal preferences. The
respondents argued that this is what the Georgia Courts had done in
applying the ordinary presumption that a voluntary religious association is represented by a majority of its members.'
Blackmun responded that such a rule, if adopted by those courts, would be
consistent with both neutral principles analysis and the First Amend36. Id It would appear, however, that under the neutral principles analysis as outlined
by the majority, this disadvantage is common to both approaches. Even under the neutral
principles approach, a court must examine the appropriate documents in search of an express trust.
37. Id

38. Id at 3027. Justice Blackmun added that "[u]nder the neutral principles approach,
the outcome of a church property dispute is not foreordained." Id
39. Id

40. Id
41. Id
42. Id
43. Id
44. Id
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ment.45 Majority rule is employed in most religious societies. 46 Moreover, the majority faction can generally be identified without reference
to religious doctrine or polity.47 Finally, and most importantly, the
presumption of majority representation could be overcome under the
neutral principles approach by providing in an appropriate instrument
either that the local church's identity is to be established in some other
held in trust for the general church
way or that the church's property is
48
and those who remain loyal to it.
Blackmun pointed out, however, that the Georgia courts had
failed to state explicitly that they were adopting a presumptive rule of
majority representation. 49 Additionally, there were some indications
that Georgia law required those courts to consider questions of religious doctrine in determining who represented the Vineville church."
Therefore, because the Court could not declare what the law of Georgia was and did not know the grounds for the Georgia courts' decision
that the majority faction represented the church, the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Georgia was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings."
Justice Powell wrote the dissent for the four-member minority. 2
He maintained that the dispute was not over the ownership of church
property, as the deeds placed title in either the trustees or the church
itself.5 3 For Powell the real question was which faction had the right to
control the actions of the titleholder and thereby to control the use of
the property. 4
Powell argued that in approving the neutral principles of law approach, the Court had departed from long-standing principles first established in the 1871 case of Watson v. Jones.5 In Watson the Court
held that in deciding disputes over the control of church property, civil
courts should defer to the decisions of the church hierarchy's tribunals.
45. Id
46. Id
47. Id
48. Id at 3028.
49. Id
50. Id If such doctrine would have to be considered, Justice Blackmun explained, the
First Amendment required the courts to defer to the presbyterial commission's determination of the church's true representatives. The PCUS had decided that the minority faction,
not the majority represented the church.
51. Id at 3029.
52. Justice Powell was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and White.
53. 99 S. Ct. at 3029 (Powell, J., dissenting).
54. Id
55. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
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It was the dissenters' view that the neutral principles analysis would
inevitably require greater involvement of civil courts in church disputes, in violation of the First Amendment. 6
According to Justice Powell the first stage of neutral principles
analysis, wherein the court must examine various instruments to determine whether property titled to the local church is held in trust for the
general church, operates as a restrictive rule of evidence.5 7 Under the
First Amendment, civil courts are deemed incompetent to resolve questions of ecclesiastical concern. Hence, they may not consider certain
evidence contained in church documents which are invariably drawn
up in terms of religious precepts. Justice Powell pointed out that under
the neutral principles approach, forcing a civil court to read these documents in purely secular terms is more likely to promote confusion than
understanding. 9 Additionally, if religious polity has not been expressed in specific statements referring to the church property, the court
will not recognize that polity but will impose rules derived from state
law.60 Justice Powell suggested that the restrictive rule of evidence inherent in the neutral principles approach prevented the Georgia courts
from discovering the true relationship between the hierarchical organization and the local church.6 1 As a result, the undisputed authority of
the PCUS to resolve doctrinal differences within a member church was
ignored by the Georgia Supreme Court. By thus limiting the evidence
relative to church government, Powell argued that the Georgia courts
had become more, rather than less, entangled in questions of religious
doctrine, thereby violating the First Amendment:
The schism in the Vineville Church . .. resulted from disagreements among the church members over questions of doctrine and
practice. . . . Under the Book of Church Order, these questions
were resolved authoritatively by the higher church courts, which
then gave control of the local church to the faction loyal to that
resolution. The Georgia courts, as a matter of state law, granted
control to the schismatic faction, and thereby effectively reversed
the doctrinal decision of the church courts. This indirect interference by the civil courts with the resolution of religious disputes
within the church is no less proscribed by the First Amendment
than is the direct decision of questions of doctrine and practice.6 2
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

99 S. Ct. at 3029 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 713 (1871).
99 S. Ct. at 3030 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id
Id
Id (footnote omitted).
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When a civil court resolves an intrachurch dispute over church property, Justice Powell pointed out it will inevitably either support or oppose a particular faction representing a particular theology.6 3 Justice
Powell indicated that for this reason the neutral principles approach
violated the establishment clause.' 4 His view was that when the appropriate hierarchical tribunal had resolved an intrachurch dispute over
control of church property, the constitutional requirement of neutrality
meant that civil courts should defer to that body's decision.65
The second stage of the neutral principles analysis, according to
Justice Powell, involves deciding which faction of a divided church
should control the church property when the court's first-stage determination is that there should be local control. In making that decision the
Court allowed the states to adopt a presumptive rule of majority representation, defeasible upon a showing that the identity of the local
church is to be determined by some other means.6 6 Justice Powell
claimed that the petitioners had rebutted this presumption by demonstrating that the PCUS had committed to the presbytery the determination of the identity of the local congregation.6 7 He also criticized the
Court for failing to provide state courts with any guidance as to the
constitutional limitations on the evidentiary rule which they may
68
adopt.
Relying on Watson v. Jones,6 9 Justice Powell asserted that when
faced with an intrachurch dispute of any nature, a civil court could
avoid interfering with the free exercise of religion only by ascertaining
and following the decision made within the church governance. 70 By
following this course the court would refrain "from direct review and
revision of decisions of the church on matters of religious doctrine and
practice that underlie the church's determination of intrachurch controversies. . .. ,,71 Additionally, "by recognizing the authoritative resolution reached within the religious association, the civil court avoids
interfering indirectly with the religious governance of those who have
72
formed the association and submitted themselves to its authority.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id at 3031.
See id at 3031-32.
Id at 3032-33.
Id at 3031 (quoting the majority opinion id at 3027).
Id
Id at 3031-32.
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
99 S. Ct. at 3033 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id
Id
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Justice Powell concluded that in a case involving an intrachurch
dispute over church property, the question which a civil court should
decide is where within the religious association the members, prior to
the schism, had placed ultimate authority over the use of the church
property.7 3 The Constitution requires this limitation on the object of
the inquiry, rather than a restriction on the evidence to be considered;
hence, courts should be able to examine and consider statements of
polity unrelated to the church property.7 4 Applying this analysis to the
instant case, Justice Powell determined that the presbytery had ultimate
authority over the use of the Vineville Church property and that the
Georgia courts were required to adhere to the decision of the presbytery's commission granting use and control of the property to the minority faction.7 5
Analysis
The obvious and overriding question which this case raises is what
are "neutral principles of law." Since Watson v. Jones,76 civil courts
have considered the validity of applying certain neutral principles of
law in resolving particular church property disputes. 77 While in Watson the Court held such principles inapplicable to the facts in that case,
the decision nevertheless is considered the forerunner of neutral principles analysis because of the Court's ruling that in the absence of a dispute within a hierarchical church organization,
[r]eligious organizations come before us in the same attitude as
other voluntary associations for benevolent or charitable purposes, and their rights of property, or of contract, are equally
under the protection of the law, and the actions of their members
subject to its restraint. . . . [W]e enter upon . . . consideration
[of this case] with the satisfaction of knowing that the principles
on which we are to decide so much of it as is proper for our
decision, are those applicable alike to all of its class, and that our
duty is the78 simple one of applying those principles to the facts
before us.
In Watson rival claimants within the Presbyterian Church of the
United States competed for control of church property located in Ken73. Id
74. Id at 3034.
75. Id
76. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
77. See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
78. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 714.
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tucky. During the Civil War a schism developed in a small church in
Louisville between pro-slavery and abolitionist forces. The General
Assembly of the PCUS recognized the abolitionist group as the trustee
of the church property. The federal court in Kentucky accepted the
General Assembly's decision. It found that the abolitionists were the
true representatives of the church in that diocese and that they were the
legal trustees of the church property. The United States Supreme
Court affirmed this judgment, holding that whenever questions of discipline, of faith, or of ecclesiastical rule, custom or law have been decided by the highest church authority to which the matter has been
submitted, legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final. 79 Consequently the determination by the General Assembly that the abolitionists were the trustees of the property was a decision incapable of being
disturbed by the civil courts.80 By accepting the validity of the church
hierarchy's determination, the Court recognized the right of a religious
association to settle internal ecclesiastical disputes without judicial interference.8 Although the Courts' opinion never mentioned the First
Amendment, the decision was based on a general acceptance of the
proposition of separation of church and state.8"
It would appear that Watson supports the dissenting justices' position in Jones. The majority mentioned the case as authority for limiting civil courts in passing on questions of religious doctrine or polity83
and for requiring courts to enforce an instrument which expressly determines church property ownership.8 4 The majority failed, however,
to confront the approach taken by the Court in Watson, and followed
by the Jones dissenters, of deferring to the decision of a church tribunal
where a hierarchical church dispute of any nature, including property
disputes, is involved. Rather, the majority adopted a "neutral principles of law" analysis which the Watson Court deemed applicable only
when either an instrument expressly dedicated the property for a particular purpose or the dispute is among members of an independent
church. Thus while Watson may have been the forerunner of neutral
principles analysis,85 it would seem that the Court's holding in that case
would have required the Court in Jones to defer to the decision of the
presbytery and that the Jones dissenters were correct in characterizing
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id at 727.
Id
Id
See Id See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 873 (1978).
99 S. Ct. at 3025.
Id at 3025 n.3.

85. See note 78 and accompanying text supra.
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the majority's approach as a "depart[ure] from long-established precedents." 6
It remains uncertain after Jones how far a civil court may go in
employing neutral principles of law to resolve intrachurch disputes
which tangentially involve church property. For instance, it is unconstitutional for a civil court to find that property of a local church affiliated with a hierarchical church organization is impliedly held in trust
for the general church, provided that the general church has not "substantially departed" from the tenets of faith and practice existing at the
time of the local church's affiliation. 7 On the other hand, under the
ruling in Jones, a civil court, after examining in secular terms the relevant church documents, may apply a presumptive rule of law which
effectively serves to resolve more than the mere ownership of local
church property but incidentally recognizes one schismatic faction as
the representative of the local church. By holding that a presumptive
rule of majority representation is consistent with both neutral principles analysis and the First Amendment, however, the Court in Jones
reached a result inconsistent with that in Watson, even though Watson
is considered the origin of neutral principles analysis. The decision in
Jones therefore leaves unclear just how a civil court is to determine
what is a "neutral principle of law" which may be applied to church
property disputes. In fact, one may well wonder if the neutrality of a
particular principle is to be determined either by the policy which initiated its acceptance as law or by the fortuity of circumstance which
presages its application.

V.

Due Process

One of the burgeoning areas of constitutional law in recent years
has involved the constitutional rights of minor children. Two cases decided during the 1978-79 Term tred into this relatively new, still uncertain field.a Both included due process challenges to statutes
86. 99 S.Ct. 3029.
87. Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969). The' Court held that "the departure-from-doctrine element of the Georgia implied trust theory requires the civil court to determine matters at the very core of a religion-the interpretation of particular church doctrines and the
importance of those doctrines to the religion. Plainly, the First Amendment forbids civil
courts from playing such a role." Id at 450.
a. A third case, Secretary of Public Welfare v. Institutionalized Juveniles, 99 S.Ct.

Winter 19801
Winter 19801

SUPREME COURT REVIEW
SUPREME COURT REVIEW

restricting the freedom of minors. In Parham v. JR.,b the Court upheld
a procedure for the commitment of minor children to state mental insti-

tutions by their parents or guardians which provided for neither a
preadmission or postadmission adversarial hearing. On the other
hand, in Bellotli v. Baird,' the Court struck down a state statute which
required either parental consent or judicial authorization before an
abortion could be performed on unmarried women under age eighteen.
These decisions reflect an emerging approach towards minor children's constitutional rights. The Court recognizes that minors, like

adults, are protected by the Constitution.d Yet, in applying constitutional principles, courts must take into account children's vulnerability
and lack of maturity as well as the traditional authority role of parents
in the child-rearing process. The result in a flexible approach towards

minor children's rights, with the outcome in a particular case dependent upon the importance of the right asserted, the nature of the restriction on that right, and the respective interests of the state, the parents,

and the child in connection with the restricted right.
Parham v. JR.*

In Parham v. JR., Ithe Supreme Court was faced with the question of what process is constitutionally due a minor committed to a
state-administered mental health institution by his parents or guardi(1979), was consolidated with Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979). Relying chiefly on the
principles set forth in Parham, the Court reached a similar conclusion.
b. 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979).
c. 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979).
d. "Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one
attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the
Constitution and possess constitutional rights." Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979) (state statute
requiring parental consent before an unmarried woman under age eighteen could obtain an
abortion held unconstitutional); Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678
(1976) (right to privacy in connection with decisions affecting procreation extend to minors
as well as adults); Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (states
may not condition a minor's right to obtain an abortion on securing parental consent); Breed
v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (trial of a child in superior court for the same offense as he was
tried for in an earlier juvenile proceeding violated the double jeopardy clause); Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (the suspension of a child from a public school without a hearing
prior to the suspension or within a reasonable time thereafter violated the due process
clause); Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1967) (schoolchildren are entitled to First Amendment protection while within the school environment).
* Commentary by Kevin William Finck, member, third-year class.
1. 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979).

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[V/ol. 7.315

ans. Parham was a class action suit brought by children placed in a
Georgia state mental hospital, seeking a declaratory judgment that
Georgia's statutory procedures for the voluntary commitment of children under age eighteen to the state mental hospitals violated the due
process clause of the Fourth Amendment. 2 In an opinion by Chief Justice Burger,3 a majority of the Court held that Georgia's statutory admission procedures comported with minimum due process
requirements.4 Chief Justice Burger acknowledged that a child has interests in freedom from unnecessary bodily restraints and from erroneous classifications due to improper admissions decisions.5 He claimed,
however, that those interests were adequately protected by: (a) a parent's or guardian's concern for the well-being of his or her child when
making the admission request6 and (b) Georgia's independent medical
decision-making process.7 Justice Stewart wrote a concurring opinion
in which he emphasized that a fundamental principle in American society is that parents act in their child's best interests and have the authority to do so.' Eschewing a due process analysis, Justice Stewart
asserted that, absent evidence of abuse or neglect, the courts should
respect the exercise of parental discretion in a mental commitment context.9 Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, wrote
an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.' 0 He believed
that while states are not obligated to treat children who are committed
at the request of their parents in precisely the same manner as adults
who are involuntarily committed, due process still requires formal postcommitment hearings."
The Lower Court Decisions
When he was three months old, J.R. was declared a neglected
child by the county and removed from his natural parents.' 2 During
the first seven years of his life, he was placed in seven different foster
2. Id. at 2496-97, 2496 n. 2.
3. The majority opinion was joined by Justices White, Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist.
4. Id. at 2511.
5. Id. at 2503-04.
6. Id. at 2505.
7. Id. at 2505-07.
8. See id. at 2513-15 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
9. Id. at 2515.
10. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Marshall and
Stevens, JJ.).
11. Id. at 2520-21 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
12. Id. at 2498.

Winter 19801

SUPREME COURT REVIEW

homes. J.R. was so incorrigible and disruptive at school that he could

not conform to normal behavior patterns. J.R. began receiving outpatient treatment at a county mental health center. Finally, J.R.'s seventh set of foster parents requested his removal from their home.
The Department of Family and Children Services then sought his
admission to Central State Regional Hospital. The hospital's admission team determined that J.R. was borderline retarded and suffered

from an "unsocialized, aggressive reaction to childhood."'13 The team
unanimously recommended J.R.'s admission to the hospital.

J.R.'s progress was periodically reexamined by the medical staff.
Furthermore, the Department of Family and Children Services made
consistent but unsuccessful efforts to place J.R. in another foster home.
Finally, J.R. filed suit requesting a court order placing him in a less
drastic environment more suitable to his needs.
J.R.'s suit was a class action'" based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983.11 An-

other child, J.L., who was committed to a Georgia state mental hospital

at the request of his natural parents, was also a named plaintiff.' 6 The

defendents were the Commissioner and the Mental Health Division
Director of the Georgia Department of Human Resources as well as

the Chief Medical Officer of Central State Regional Hospital. The
plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that Georgia's voluntary com-

mitment procedures for children under eighteen' 7 violated the due
13. Id.
14. The class certified by the district court consisted "of all persons younger than 18
years of age now or hereafter received by any defendant for observation and diagnosis
and/or detained for care and treatment at any 'facility' within the State of Georgia pursuant
to" section 88-503.1 of the Georgia Code. Although testimony indicated that on any given
day there may be 200 children in the class, there were only 140 in the class at the time the
suit was filed. 99 S. Ct. at 2496. n.2.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdictions thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity or other proper proceeding for redress.
16. J.L. died while the case was awaiting review by the Supreme Court. 99 S. Ct. at
2496 n.l.
17. See GA. CODE §§ 88-503.1, 88-503.2. Section 88-503.1 provided: "The superintendent of any facility may receive for observation and diagnosis. . . any individual under 18
years of age for whom such application is made by his parent or guardian. . . . If found to
show evidence of mental illness and to be suitable for treatment, such person may be detained by such facility for such period and under such conditions as may be authorized by
law."
Section 88-503.2 provided: "The superintendent of the facility shall discharge any voluntary patient who has recovered from his mental illness or who has sufficiently improved
that the superintendent determines that hospitalization of the patient is no longer desirable."
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process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs also requested an injunction against further enforcement of the procedures.
Georgia Code section 88-503.1 outlined the procedure utilized in
the voluntary admission of J.R. and J.L. into state mental institutions.
Under this provision, admission commences upon an application for
hospitalization signed by a parent or guardian. This application gives
the superintendent of a hospital the authority to temporarily admit a
child for observation and diagnosis. If after such observation, the
superintendent finds evidence of mental illness and believes the child is
suitable for treatment in the hospital, then the child may be admitted
period and under such condition as may be authorized by
"for such
18
law."
Georgia's mental health statute also provided that any child who
has been hospitalized for more than five days may be discharged at the
request of a parent or guardian.' 9 Even without such a request, every
regional hospital superintendent is under a statutory duty to release
any child "who has recovered from his mental illness or who has sufficiently improved that the superintendent determines that hospitalization of the patient is no longer desirable." 2
A three-judge district court was convened to consider the merits of
the plaintiffs' allegations. After reviewing a considerable amount of
testimony and exhibits and visiting two of the state's regional mental
health facilities, the district court held that Georgia's statutory system
was unconstitutional because it did not adequately protect the plaintiffs' due process rights.2
The district court's decision was based on the underlying premise
that a child's commitment to a mental institution constitutes a severe
deprivation of liberty.2 2 This liberty interest was defined both in terms
of a freedom from bodily restraint and a freedom from the "emotional
and psychic harm" caused by institutionalization.2 3 The court held
that the procedural due process safeguards necessary to protect this liberty interest include "at least the right after notice to be heard before an
impartial tribunal."2 4
18. GA. CODE § 88-503.1.
19. Id. at § 88-503.3(a).
20. Id. at § 88-503.2.
21. J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112, 139 (M.D. Ga. 1976).
22. Id. at 137.
23. Id. at 136-37. The district court found support for these arguments in In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1 (1967), which held that a state cannot institutionalize a juvenile delinquent without initially providing certain due process protections. See 99 S. Ct. 2501 n.7.
24. 412 F. Supp. at 137 (citation omitted).
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In requiring an adversarial hearing, the court rejected Georgia's
argument that such a hearing was unnecessary because the state was
merely making available comparable treatment for children of parents
who were unable to afford the services of private hospitals and private
physicians. Although the court acknowledged that most parents who
seek to have their children admitted into a state mental hospital do so
in good faith, it emphasized a danger brought out in the testimony of
one of the plaintiffs' witnesses, who stated "there are a lot of people
who treat [mental hospitals] as 'dumping grounds.' "25
The district court also rejected the state's argument that periodic
medical reexaminations by the superintendents of the hospitals and
their staffs adequately safeguarded the committed children's liberty interest. The court reasoned that the inexactness of psychiatry and the
questionable sources of information relied upon to make the commitment decision made a superintendent's determination too arbitrary to
satisfy due process requirements. 26 As a result, the court enjoined future commitments based on the Georgia statutory procedures. The district court also ordered the state to appropriate and expend the
resources necessary to provide nonhospital facilities for those members
of the class "who could be cared for in a less drastic, nonhospital environment. 27
The United States Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment and
held Georgia's commitment factfinding processes reasonable and consistent with constitutional guarantees. 28 The majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice Burger and joined by Justices White,
Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist, was divided into two sections. The
first part scrutinized the constitutionality of Georgia's commitment
procedures governing parental requests to have a child admitted into a
state hospital. The second section dealt with those situations in which a
juvenile ward of the state is committed on the state's request.
In order to determine whether the challenged state procedures afforded due process, Chief Justice Burger asserted that the balancing of
three factors was required:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 133 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 138.
Id. at 139.
99 S. Ct. 2493, 2513.
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through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.29
In applying these criteria, Chief Justice Burger first examined the
child's interest in not being committed. He noted initially that "a child
. . .has a substantial liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment and. . . the State's involvement in the commitment decision constitutes state action under the Fourteenth
Amendment. ' 30 Burger found that a child facing commitment possesses two constitutionally protectible interests: freedom from unnecessary bodily restraints and freedom from being erroneously labelled as
mentally ill. 3 ' The appellees argued that "the constitutional rights of
the child are of such magnitude and the likelihood of parental abuse is
so great that the parents' traditional interests in and responsibility for
the upbringing of their child must be subordinated at least to the extent
of providing a formal adversary hearing prior to a voluntary commitment. '32 The majority found this argument unpersuasive:
The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience and capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions.
More important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds
of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children. That some parents "may at times be acting against the interests of their child" . . . creates a basis for caution, but is
hardly a reason to discard wholesale those pages of human experience that teach that parents generally do act in the child's best
interests. 3
Chief Justice Burger reasoned that the child's protectible interests were
inextricably linked with the parents' interest in and obligation to the
child's health and welfare. Therefore, he determined, the private interests under scrutiny should be viewed as a combination of the child's
and the parents' concerns. 34 Burger concluded that parents may "retain a substantial, if not the dominant, role in the [commitment] decision, absent a finding of neglect or abuse, and that the traditional
presumption that the parents act in the best interests of their child
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 2502-03 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
Id. at 2503 (citations omitted).
Id. at 2503-04.
Id. at 2504.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 2503.
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should apply."3 5
The potential for abuse in such an arrangement was not overlooked by the majority.3 6 Chief Justice Burger conceded that the risk
of error inherent in the parental decision to institutionalize a child was
great enough to require some kind of inquiry by a neutral factfinder in
order to determine whether the statutory requirements for admission
had been satisfied.37 He found, however, that due process does not require that the neutral factfinder be law-trained or a judicial or administrative officer. 38 Nor did he find it necessary that the admitting
physician conduct a formal or quasi-formal adversary hearing, 39 or that
such a hearing be conducted by someone other than the admitting physician.4" Although Burger acknowledged the fallibility of medical and
psychiatric diagnosis, he nevertheless concluded that Georgia's independent medical decision-making process, which included a thorough psychiatric investigation followed by additional periodic reviews
of a child's condition, 4 1 was constitutionally sufficient to identify those
children who should not be admitted. 42 The Chief Justice did concede,
however, that
35. Id. at 2505. Chief Justice Burger was careful to point out, however, that "[p]arents
in Georgia in no sense have an absolute right to commit their children to state mental hospitals, the statute requires the superintendent of each regional hospital to exercise independent
judgment as to the child's need for confinement." Id.
36. Id. at 2506.
37. Id. Chief Justice Burger delineated several of the constitutional requirements for
such an inquiry. The inquiry must carefully probe the child's background, utilizing all
available sources. The child must be interviewed. The decisionmaker must have the authority to refuse to admit any child that does not satisfy the medical standards for admission.
Finally, to protect against possible arbitrariness in the initial admission decision, the child's
continuing need for commitment must be periodically reviewed. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2507.
40. Id.
41. Under Georgia's medical procedures, an admissions team composed of a psychiatrist and at least one other mental health professional examined and interviewed the child
prior to actual admission. This team examined all available medical records and interviewed the parents. Based on this and any other available background information, the
admissions team then determined whether the child suffered from mental illness and
whether the child would benefit from institutionalized care. If either of these two conditions
were not met, admission was refused.
After admission, the child's condition and continuing need for institutionalized care
were reviewed periodically by at least one independent medical team of psychiatrists. These
reviews occurred in some hospitals as frequently as weekly, but none occurred less often
than once every two months. Additionally, the superintendent of each hospital was charged
with an affirmative statutory duty to discharge any child who was no longer mentally ill or
in need of further treatment. GA. CODE § 88-503.2.
42. 99 S. Ct. at 2510. The constitutionality of the independent medical decisionmaking
process, according to Chief Justice Burger, was firmly buttressed by the state's significant
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[a]s with most medical procedures, Georgia's are not totally free
from risk of error in the sense that they give total or absolute
assurance that every child admitted to a hospital has a mental
illness optimally suitable for institutionalized treatment. But it
bears repeating that "procedural due process rules are shaped by
the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to
the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions.4 3
The majority did not believe that the risks of error inherent in
Georgia's commitment process could be significantly reduced by a
more formal judicial-type hearing. 44 In reversing the district court's
holding, which required a formalized adversary hearing prior to a
child's admission, the Court identified several problems that could be
created by such an inquiry. For one, an adversary hearing would significantly intrude into the parent-child relationship by putting into
question whether the parent's motivation was consistent with the
child's interest.4 5 Such an intrusion would only exacerbate whatever
tensions already existed between parent and child.4 6 This increased estrangement, in turn, might severely interfere with the parent's ability to
assist in treatment both during and after the child's hospitalization.47
The majority also believed that the requirement of a prior adversary hearing would unnecessarily constrain two significant state interests. The state has a significant interest in avoiding any superfluous
procedural obstacle that might discourage the mentally ill or their families from seeking needed psychiatric aid.48 The majority was of the
interest in confining the use of its costly mental health facilities to cases of genuine need. Id.
at 2505-06.
43. Id. at 2509-10 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976)).
44. Chief Justice Burger believed that parents seeking to "dump" their children on the
state would not be able to conceal their motives and thereby deceive an admitting psychiatrist and other mental health professionals who periodically reviewed the initial admission
decision: "It is elementary that one early diagnostic inquiry into the cause of an emotional
disturbance of a child is an examination into the environment of the child. It is unlikely if
not inconceivable that a decision to abandon an emotionally normal, healthy child and
thrust him into an institution will be a discrete act leaving no trail of circumstances. Evidence of such conflicts will emerge either in the interviews or from secondary sources. It is
unrealistic to believe that trained psychiatrists, skilled in eliciting responses, sorting medically relevant facts and sensitive to motivational nuances will often be deceived about the
family situation surrounding a child's emotional disturbance. Surely a lay, or even lawtrained factfinder, would be no more skilled in this process than the professional." 99 S.Ct.
at 2509 (footnote omitted).
45. Id. at 2508.
46. Id.
47. Id. "A confrontation over such intimate family relationships would distress the
normal adult parents and the impact on a disturbed child almost certainly would be significantly greater." Id. (footnote omitted).
48. Id. at 2505.
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view that many parents, believing they were acting in good faith, would

forgo state-provided hospital care if such care was contingent on participation in an adversary proceeding designed to probe their motives
and other private family matters in seeking the voluntary admission. 9
The state also has a genuine interest in efficiently allocating its medical

employees' working hours to the treatment of patients.5 0 State psychiatrists would be of little help to their patients when engaged in preparing
for and participating in pre-admission hearings."
Having determined the due process requirements where a child's
natural parents request his admission to a state mental hospital, the
Court next examined those situations where the child is a ward of the
state and the state requests his admission into a mental hospital. 2
Based on the premise that the state's application is made in good
faith,53 the majority concluded that the differences between the situation where the child is a ward of the state and the situation where the
child has natural parents were insufficient to justify requiring different
admission procedures. 4
Based on the foregoing considerations, the Court held that Georgia's general administrative and statutory scheme for the voluntary
commitment of children complied with minimum due process requirements." On remand, the district court was accorded the discretion to
examine two areas. First, the court could review the claims of individ-

ual children that their initial admission did not meet the due process
standards set down by the Supreme Court.5 6 Second, the district court
was also allowed to consider whether the procedures utilized by the
49. Id.
50. Id. at 2506.
51. Id. Chief Justice Burger cited with approval the following statement by Judge
Friendly: "It should be realized that procedural requirements entail the expenditure of limited resources, that at some point the benefit to individuals from an additional safeguard is
substantially outweighed by the cost of providing such protection, and that the expense in
protecting those likely to be found undeserving will probably come out of the pockets of the
deserving." Friendly, Some KindofHearing,123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1276 (1975). See also
Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280, 282 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
52. 99 S. Ct. 2511-13.
53. Referring to the facts in the present case, Chief Justice Burger noted: "There is no
evidence that the State, acting as guardian, attempted to admit any child for reasons unrelated to the child's need for treatment." Id. at 2512.
54. Id. The majority did believe, however, that it was possible that the procedures for
reviewing a ward's need for continued institutionalized care should be different than those
used for a chilal with natural parents. Consequently, the Court left it for the district court on
remand to determine the procedures required to justify continuing a voluntary commitment.
55. Id. at 2513.
56. Id. at2511.
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Georgia state hospitals for periodic review of a patient's need for institutionalized care were sufficient to justify continuing a voluntary commitment.57
Justice Stewart filed a short concurring opinion in which he emphasized that under American law "parents constantly make decisions
for their minor children that deprive them of liberty, and sometimes
even of life itself."'5 8 Nonetheless, the Fourteenth Amendment has not
been held applicable when an informed parent decides to submit his
child to major surgery, even in a state hospital.5 9 Justice Stewart could
perceive no basic constitutional difference between the commitment of
one's child and other parental decisions that result in a child's loss of
liberty.6°
Justice Stewart did concede that a parent's decision to have his
child committed resulted in a far greater loss of liberty than having the
child operated on in a state hospital. 61 He believed, however, that the
difference was one of degree, not of kind.62 Furthermore, Justice Stewart asserted that even if this factual difference were one of constitutional proportions, the objective checks upon the parent's commitment
decision included in the Georgia statute were more than constitutionally sufficient to protect a child's interest in not being committed.63
Justice Brennan wrote an opinion, joined by Justices Marshall and
Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part.' Justice Brennan
agreed with the majority that a child's commitment to a state mental
institution constituted a massive curtailment of liberty which the state
cannot accomplish without procedures consistent with due process. 65
He noted, however, that absent a voluntary, knowing and intelligent
waiver, adults facing commitment to mental institutions are entitled to
full and fair adversarial hearings in which the necessity for commitment must be established to the satisfaction of a neutral tribunal.66
Brennan reasoned that since a child's commitment proceeding is initiated by a third party, and the child therefore lacks any control in the
57. Id.at 2512.
'58. Id.at 2515.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.at 2515-22 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
65. Id. at 2515-16.
66. Id. at 2516. At these hearings, adults have the rights to be represented by counsel,
to have an opportunity to be heard, to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and to
offer evidence on their own behalf. See Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967).
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decisionmaking process, a full and fair adversarial hearing should also
be required in this situation.67
Justice Brennan conceded, however, that due to the special cir-

cumstances pointed out in the majority opinion, 68 states are not obligated to treat children who are committed at the request of their
parents in precisely the same manner as adults who are involuntarily

committed. 69 He believed that, unlike the situation where an adult is
involuntarily committed, a state may legitimately postpone conducting
a formal adversarial hearing regarding a child's commitment until after
institutionalization.7" Consequently, to the extent that the district court
invalidated Georgia's juvenile commitment admission procedures and

mandated preconfinement hearings in all cases, Justice Brennan agreed
with the majority that the district court was in error.7 '
Justice Brennan dissented, however, from the rest of the majority

opinion.72 He believed that while a state "may postpone formal commitment hearings, when parents seek to commit their children, the
67. Id. at 2516-17. Justice Brennan asserted that children may be entitled to even more
protection than adults, because children, on the average, are confined for longer periods
than adults. Id. Moreover, lower court decisions have recorded many inadequacies in existing mental health facilities for children. Id. See New York State Ass'n. for Retarded
Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752,756 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). Furthermore, Justice Brennan reasoned that since childhood is a particularly vulnerable period of life, children erroneously institutionalized during their formative years may well bear the scars of that
experience for the rest of their lives. 99 S. Ct. at 2517.
68. The majority concluded, and Justice Brennan concurred, that the prospect of an
adversarial hearing prior to admission might deter parents from seeking needed medical
attention for their children. Justice Brennan also agreed that adversarial hearings conducted
prior to commitment would directly challenge parental authority in a manner which might
traumatize both parent and child, thereby making the child's eventual return to his family
more difficult. He noted that the requirement of such hearings might delay the treatment of
children whose home life is impossible and who are in immediate need of in-patient psychiatric treatment. Id. at 2519.
69. "The demands of due process are flexible and the parental commitment decision
carries with it practical implications that States may legitimately take into account." Id.
70. "While as a general rule due process requires that commitment hearings precede
involuntary hospitalization, when parents seek to hospitalize their children special considerations militate in favor of postponement of formal commitment proceedings and against
mandatory adversarial preconfinement commitment hearings." Id.
71. Id. at 2520.
72. One of the main targets of Justice Brennan's opinion was the majority's presumption that parents act in their children's best interests when they apply for their commitment:
"Numerous studies reveal that parental decisions to institutionalize their children often are
the result of dislocation in the family unrelated to the children's mental condition. Moreover, even well-meaning parents lack the expertise necessary to evaluate the relative advantages and disadvantages of in-patient as opposed to out-patient psychiatric treatment." Id.
at 2519 (footnote omitted).
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State cannot dispense with such hearings altogether."7 3 Justice Bren-

nan viewed Georgia's postadmission procedures as insufficient to be
classified as hearings, since they lacked all traditional due process safeguards. 74 He reasoned that the good faith and good intentions of Geor-

gia's psychiatrists and social workers were insufficient to render
constitutional the state's exparte postadmission procedures, since their

decisions were frequently based on the reports and advice of others.7 5
Brennan believed that too often the classification of a child's conduct
went undisputed.7 6 He claimed that the risk of error inherent in Geor-

gia's commitment procedures was not as trivial as the majority suggested.77
Justice Brennan asserted that the risk of erroneous commitment
could be lessened, without prohibitive cost or interference with Geor-

gia's mental health program, by modifying the state's postadmission
review procedures. 78 He reasoned that the special considerations that

militate against preadmission adversarial hearings when parents seek
to institutionalize their children do not militate against reasonably
prompt postadmission adversarial hearings. 79 Justice Brennan reflected on the benefit of such a hearing: "Secrecy is not congenial to
73. Id. at 2520. "Children incarcerated in public mental institutions are constitutionally entitled to a fair opportunity to contest the legitimacy of their confinement. They are
entitled to some champion who can speak on their behalf and who stands ready to oppose a
wrongful commitment. Georgia should not be permitted to deny that opportunity and that
champion simply because the children's parents or guardians wish them to be confined without a hearing. The risk of erroneous commitment is simply too great unless there is some
form of adversarial review. And fairness demands that children abandoned by their supposed protectors to the rigors of institutionalized confinement be given the help of some
separate voice." Id. at 2522.
74. Id. at 2520. Justice Brennan objected to the exparle nature of Georgia's commitment decisionmaking process. He found the informal postadmission procedures constitutionally deficient in that the institutionalized juveniles were not informed of the reasons for
their commitment, nor were they accorded the right to be present at their commitment determination, the right to legal representation, the right to be heard, the right to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses, and the right to offer evidence on their own behalf. "By
any standard of due process," Brennan claimed, "these procedures are deficient." Id. See
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), McNeil
v. Director, 407 U.S. 245 (1972), Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967). See also
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269-71 (1970).
75. 99 S. Ct. at 2521.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2520-21.
79. Justice Brennan pointed out that postadmission hearings would not delay the commencement of needed treatment because children could be cared for by the state pending the
disposition decision. He also asserted that postadmission hearings are unlikely to disrupt
family relationships because the doctors urging commitment, not the parents, would stand as
the child's adversaries. Id.

Winter 1980]

SUPREME COURT REVIEW

truth-seeking and self-righteousness gives too slender an assurance of
rightness. No better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth
than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case

against him and opportunity to meet it."8 Contrary to the majority's
holding, Justice Brennan concluded that the due process clause requires a state to provide a child committed to a state mental institution
on the request of his parents the opportunity to contest his commitment
8
by way of a prompt postadmission adversarial hearing. '

Justice Brennan also examined the procedural due process rights

of children committed by their state guardians. Again disagreeing with
the majority, he distinguished the situation where a child is a ward of
the state and the state requests his commitment from the situation
where a child's natural parents request his commitment. 82 Brennan asserted that "[t]he rule that parents speak for their children. . . cannot
be transmuted into a rule that state social workers speak for their minor

clients. ' 83 He also claimed that the special circumstances which justify
postponing formal commitment hearings until after admission when
parents seek to hospitalize their children are absent when children are
wards of the state and are being committed upon a social worker's rec-

ommendation.84 Justice Brennan concluded that, in the absence of exigent circumstances, juvenile wards of the state who are committed to
state mental institutions upon the recommendations of social workers

are constitutionally entitled to preadmission adversarial commitment
hearings.
80. Id. at 2521 (quoting Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
81. 99 S. Ct. at 2522.
82. Id. Justice Brennan reasoned that the rule that parents speak for their children is
designed to shield parental control of childrearing from state interference. Id. See Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). He considered it inappropriate to invoke this
rule "in defense of unfettered state control of child-rearing or to immunize from review the
decisions of state social workers." 99 S.Ct. at 2522. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S.
563 (1975); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
83. 99 S. Ct. at 2522.
84. Id. Justice Brennan believed that the prospect of preadmission hearings are unlikely to deter state social workers from recommending a child's commitment to a state
mental institution when they consider such care appropriate. He also pointed out that since
children are already in a form of state custody as wards of the state, children in need of
treatment could receive state care during the pendency of a preadmission commitment hearing. Finally, Justice Brennan reasoned that hearings in which the decisions of state social
workers are reviewed by other state officials are unlikely to traumatize juvenile wards of the
state or hinder their eventual recovery. Id.
85. Id.
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Analysis
The United States Supreme Court has recently begun to examine

the impact of age and parental supervision on the existence and character of the constitutional rights of minors.86 Do children have the same

constitutional rights as adults, or are the constitutional rights of minors
somewhat curtailed by society's belief that decisions which directly affect the life, liberty and property of children are properly subject to the
dictates of parental authority? Although the answer to this question is

not yet clear, the Parham decision provides some insight into the attitude of the current Supreme Court toward this increasingly controversial subject.
Upon initial examination, Parham v. JR. appears to have some
severe ramifications for the constitutional rights of minors. If Justice
Brennan's analogy between adults facing involuntary commitment to a

mental institution and children whose commitment is requested by
their parents or the state acting in locoparentis87 is correct, the Court's

opinion may be interpreted as holding that children are, in some situations, entitled to less procedural due process than adults. This conclusion is inconsistent with recent Supreme Court decisions which have
held that "[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into being
magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Mi-

nors, as well as adults, are protected by the constitution and possess
constitutional rights."8' 8
Such an interpretation, however; would clearly go beyond the intention of the majority. The fundamental issue in Parham v. Jk was
the constitutional sufficiency of the process utilized in Georgia to pro-

tect a child committed to a state mental institution at the request of his
parent or guardian, 89 not whether a child committed at the request of
86. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S.Ct. 3035 (1979) (state statute requiring parental
consent before an unmarried woman under age 18 could obtain an abortion held unconstitutional); Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1976) (right to privacy in connection
with decisions affecting procreation extends to minors as well as adults); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (states may not condition a minor's right to
obtain an abortion on securing parental consent); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (trial
of a child in superior court for the same offense as he was tried for in an earlier juvenile
proceeding violated the double jeopardy clause); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (the
suspension of a child from a public school without a prior hearing or within a reasonable
time thereafter violated the due process clause); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S.
503 (1967) (school children are entitled to First Amendment protection while within the
school environment).
87. See 99 S. Ct. at 2517 (Brennan, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
88. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (citations omitted). See
note 86 supra.
89. 99 S.Ct. at 2496.
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his parents stands in the same position as an adult facing involuntary
commitment. The majority viewed the two situations as distinguishable due to the legal presumption that parents act in their child's best
interests.9" The majority also claimed that the state's application for a
juvenile ward's admission to a hospital should be presumed to be made
in good faith; consequently, different admission procedures are not required between a juvenile ward and a child whose natural parents request his admission. 9 1 Moreover, the majority believed that Georgia's
independent medical admission standards adequately protected against
any risk of error inherent in the parental or guardian's decision to have
a child institutionalized.9 2
In contrast, Justice Stewart felt that his brethrens' due process
analysis was inappropriate and in conflict with the traditional American principle that parents act in their child's best interests and are empowered to do so. 93 Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens were of
the view that a child's fundamental rights endangered by institutionalization could be protected only through an adversarial commitment
hearing.9" The majority, on the other hand, argued that while a state is
free to require such a hearing, due process is not violated if a state uses
informal medical investigative techniques instead.95 The dissenters'
approach was criticized by the majority as inconsistent with previous
cases holding that "due process isflexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands." 96 The majority believed that whether a person is mentally ill turns on the meaning of
facts which must be interpreted by psychologists and psychiatrists. 97
Even if a hearing is conducted, a medical-psychiatric decision must be
made.98 While acknowledging the fallibility of medical and psychiatric
diagnosis, the majority nevertheless asserted that medical professionals
are better qualified than judges or administrative hearing officers to determine a child's mental and emotional condition and corresponding
need for treatment. 99
The majority, however, failed to consider whether a more formal,
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 2504.
Id. at 2512.
See id. at 2506.
See id. at 2513-15 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 2516-17.
Id. at 2508 n.18.
Id. at 2507 n.16 (quoting Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
99 S.Ct. at 2507.
Id. at 2508.
Id.
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judicial-type hearing would be ineffective in reducing the risk of error
in Georgia's commitment process; its opinion only claimed that the risk
of error would not be "significantly reduced."100 In thus refusing to
require an adversarial commitment hearing, the majority weighed the
cost to the state of providing increased due process safeguards against
the likelihood that erroneous determinations will be prevented. Since
the Court is concerned only with minimum due process requirements,
economic realities may often dictate that certain maximum due process
safeguards are constitutionally unnecessary or even excessive.' 0 '
Recent Supreme Court decisions have begun to erode the traditional ascendancy of parental discretion over the exercise of children's
constitutional rights. In PlannedParenthoodv. Danjbrth, °2 the Court

held that states may not condition a minor's right to obtain an abortion
on securing parental consent. In Carey v. PopulationServices Interna-

tional,103 the Court ruled that the right to privacy in connection with
decisions affecting procreation extends to minors as well as adults, and
that a blanket prohibition on the distribution of contraceptives to minors is unconstitutional. In Bellotti v. Baird,'°4 another case decided

during the 1978-79 Term, the Court declared unconstitutional a Massachusetts statute requiring parental consent before an unmarried woman

under the age of eighteen could obtain an abortion.
Parham v. JR. should be viewed as a setback to this trend. Although notions of parental authority and family autonomy do not
stand as immovable barriers to the assertion of constitutional rights by
children, a majority of the Supreme Court Justices still believe that parents possess considerable authority in making decisions, outside the
area of procreation, which directly affect a child's freedom.
100. Id. at 2509.
101. See id. at 2507-09. "As the scope of governmental action expands into new areas
creating new controversies for judicial review, it is incumbent on courts to design procedures
that protect the rights of the individual without unduly burdening the legitimate efforts of
the states to deal with difficult social problems. The judicial model for factfinding for all
constitutionally protected interests, regardless of their nature, can turn rational decisionmaking into an unmanageable enterprise." Id. at 2507 n.16.
102. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
103. 431 U.S. 678. (1977).
104. 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979).
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Bellotl v. Baird*

In Bellotti v. Baird' the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute2 which regulated a minor's access to
abortions. The Supreme Court, by judgment of the Court, held uncon-

stitutional a statute which required either parental consent or consent
by judicial order before an abortion could be performed on an unmarried woman under age eighteen? The Baird decision serves to under-

score the Court's previously expressed view that a state cannot give a
third party an absolute veto over the decision4 of the physician and his

patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy.
The Lower Court Decisions

On August 2, 1974, the Massachusetts legislature passed section 12
S,chapter 112, of the Massachusetts General Laws,5 which made it a
criminal offense to perform an abortion upon a minor without first ob-

taining consent to the abortion from both parents or by judicial order.
A class action was brought to enjoin the enforcement of this statute
(Baird1).6 Plaintiffs in this action were Parents Aid Society, Inc., a
clinic where abortions were performed; William Baird, founder and director of Parents Aid; Gerald Zupnick, M.D., medical director of Parents Aid and a physician who regularly performed abortions at the
Parents Aid clinic and "Mary Moe," 7 an unmarried minor who resided
* Commentary by Kester K. So, member, third-year class.
1. 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979).
2. Now codified as MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West 1974).
3. 99 S. Ct. at 3035.
4. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
5. As originally propounded, section 12S was designated section 12P. It was not until
1977 that the provision was renumbered without any substantive change. This commentary
will refer to the provision as section 12S. Section 12S provided in part: "If the mother is less
than eighteen years of age and has not married, the consent of both the mother and her
parents [to an abortion] is required. If one or both of the mother's parents refuse such
consent, consent may be obtained by order of a judge of the superior court for good cause
shown, after such hearing as he deems necessary. Such a hearing will not require the appointment of a guardian for the mother. If one of the parents has died or has deserted his or
her family, consent by the remaining parent is sufficient. If both parents have died or have
deserted their family, consent of the mother's guardian or other person having duties similar
to a guardian, or any person who had assumed the care and custody of the mother is sufficient. The commissioner of public health shall prescribe a written form for such consent.
Such form shall be signed by the proper person or persons and given to the physician performing the abortion who shall maintain it in his permanent files." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 112, § 12S (West 1974).
6. Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F. Supp. 847 (D. Mass. 1975).
7. "Mary Moe" is a pseudonym. The district court in Bairdi gave a clear descriptive
summary of what her situation was at the time of the commencement of the litigation:
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at home with her parents and who desired to have an abortion without
informing them. Defendants in the suit were Francis Bellotti, the At-

torney General of Massachusetts, and district attorneys of all counties
in the state of Massachusetts. 8

In BairdI the district court invalidated and enjoined defendants
from enforcing section 12S of the statute. The court explicitly rejected

plaintiffs' contention that all minors were capable of giving an informed consent to an abortion.9 The court did recognize, however, that
"a substantial number of females under the age of eighteen are capable
of forming a valid consent."'" Accordingly, the court's analysis centered on the determination of whether the statute impermissibly restrained the free exercise of that consent. The district court recognized
that "there can be no doubt but that a female's constitutional right to
an abortion in the first trimester does not depend upon her calendar
age." " The court then proceeded to balance the minor's constitutional
right to an abortion against various parental rights and concluded that

the former outweighed the latter.' 2 This outcome was due in large part
to the court's observation that the statute was "cast not in terms of protecting the minor, . . . but in recognizing independent rights of parents.""3 In effect, the court interpreted the statute as giving parents

certain substantive powers, particularly the right to veto a minor's decision to abort. Therefore the statute, according to the court, granted
parental rights which could in fact be independent of the minor's best

interests. Consequently, the parental consent requirement included in
the statute was found to be constitutionally invalid. 14
"Plaintiff Mary Moe is an unmarried minor residing at home with her parents in Massachusetts. At the time of the institution of the action, she was 16 years of age and about 8 weeks
pregnant. She has not informed her parents of her condition, and does not wish to. Her
father had told her, in connection with the pregnancy of a contemporary friend, that if that
happened to her he would evict her and kill her boy friend. . . . Her reasons for not informing her parents were in part apprehension of what might happen to her as a result of their
learning she had had intercourse, in part the fear of what would happen to her boy friend,
and in part the desire to spare her parents' feelings." Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F. Supp. at 850
(citation omitted).
8. Id. at 849.
9. Id. at 854-55. The district court also remarked parenthetically that it was logically
inconsistent for the state to provide that a minor could consent to intercourse at age 16
(MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 23 (West Supp. 1979) (making the act of sexual intercourse with a child under the age of 16 a statutory offense)), yet prevent her from "get(ting)
rid of the product until she is two years older." 393 F. Supp. at 855.
10. 393 F. Supp. at 855.
11. Id. at 855-56.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 856 (citations omitted).
14. Id. at 857.
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The case was subsequently appealed to the United States Supreme
Court. 5 In this first appeal, the Supreme Court noted that the section
of the statute in question could be interpreted in such a manner so as to
avoid constitutional challenge. 6 As a result, the Court vacated the dis-

trict court's judgment. The district court on remand was instructed by
the Supreme Court to certify certain questions to the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts in order to ascertain that state court's interpretation of the statute. 17 In response to the district court's request, the

Supreme Judicial Court, in Baird v. Attorney General,'" answered the
15. Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
16. Id. at 148.
17. In all there were nine questions which the district court certified to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. They were as follows: "'1. What standards, if any, does the
statute establish for a parent to apply when considering whether or not to grant consent?
a) Is the parent to consider exclusively. . . what will serve the child's best interest?
b) If the parent is not limited to considering exclusively the minors best interests, can
the parent take into consideration the 'long-term consequences to the family and her parents' marriage relationship'?
c) Other?
'2. What standard or standards is the superior court to apply?
a) Is the superior court to disregard all parental objections that are not based exclusively on what would serve the minor's best interests?
b) If the superior court finds that the minor is capable, and has, in fact, made and
adhered to, an informed and reasonable decision to have an abortion, may the court refuse
its consent based on a finding that a parent's, or its own, contrary decision is a better one?
c) Other?
'3. Does the Massachusetts law permit a minor (a) 'capable of giving informed consent,' or (b) 'incapable of giving informed consent,' 'to obtain [a court] order without parental consultation'?
'4. If the court answers any of question 3 in the affirmative, may the superior court, for
good cause shown, enter an order authorizing an abortion, (a), without prior notification to
the parents, and (b), without subsequent notification?
'5. Will the Supreme Judicial Court prescribe a set of procedures to implement c. 112,
[§ 12S] which expedite the application, hearing, and decision phases of the superior court
proceeding provided thereunder? Appeal?
'6. To what degree do the standards and procedures set forth in c. 112, § 12F (Stat.
1975, c. 564), authorizing minors to give consent to medical and dental care in specified
circumstances, parallel the grounds and procedures for showing good cause under c. 112,

[§ 12S]?
'7. May a minor, upon a showing of indigency, have court-appointed counsel?
'8. Is it a defense to his criminal prosecution if a physician performs an abortion solely
with the minor's own, valid, consent, that he reasonably, and in good faith, though erroneously, believed that she was eighteen or more years old or had been married?
'9. Will the Court make any other comments about the statute which, in its opinion,
might assist us in determining whether it infringes the United States Constitution?'
Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. at 1007-10.
18. 371 Mass. 741, 360 N.E.2d 288 (1977). Among the more important constructions
given the statute by the Supreme Judicial Court were the following: (I) When determining
whether or not to grant consent to their daughter's abortion, section 12S required parents to
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certified questions regarding the statute.
Once the Supreme Judicial Court resolved the potential statutory
ambiguities, plaintiffs again sought a stay against the operation of the
statute pending final determination of its constitutionality by the district court. The stay was granted in BairdII.19 After further deliberation, the district court in Baird II ° again held the statute
unconstitutional and permanently enjoined its enforcement.
The district court disapproved of three provisions of the statute.
First, since the statute was interpreted by the Supreme Judicial Court
to require parental notification in nearly every case, the district court
found the statute went much further than merely stating a preference
for parental consultation. So construed, the statute would prevent a
mature minor from obtaining a court order permitting an abortion unless the minor first consulted with her parents. 2 1 The court wnt on to
list the reasons it might be in the minor's best interest to keep her parents ignorant of her pregnancy. 22 Consequently the court held that "it
is an improper burden in those cases where a court, if given free rein,
would find that it was to the minor's best interests that one or both of
her parents not be informed, but is forbidden by the statute to make
this decision."23
Second, the district court noted not only was parental notification
and consent required, but the minor was also required to submit to a
judicial determination even if it was not. in accord with her own decision.24 The statute, in effect, rejected the use of Massachusetts' mature
minor rule25 in abortion cases. That rule would ordinarily permit a
consider only what would be in the minor's best interests. Id. at 748, 360 N.E.2d at 292-93.
(2) Even though a judge may find the minor to be mature, the judge can withhold consent if
he determines it is in the best interests of the minor not to have an abortion. Id. 360 N.E.2d
at 293. (3) Generally, a minor desiring an abortion would not be able to obtain judicial
consent without first seeking parental consent. Id. at 750, 360 N.E.2d at 294. (4) A parent
must be notified of any judicial proceeding brought under section 12S. Id. at 756, 360
N.E.2d at 297. (5) The statute forecloses the viability in applying the state's common law
mature minor rule. Id. at 749, 360 N.E.2d at 294.
19. Baird v. Bellotti, 428 F. Supp. 854 (D. Mass. 1977).
20. Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997 (D. Mass. 1978).
21. Id. at 1000.
22. Some of these reasons are the child might become a victim of physical abuse or
parental hostility, some parents would insist on an undesired marriage as punishment and
some parents might obstruct or prevent the minor from obtaining judicial consent. Id. at
1001.
23. Id. at 1002.
24. Id. at 1003.
25. Id. The Supreme Judicial Court held the common law mature minor rule inapplicable to abortion decisions. "The Legislature has left no room to apply a mature minor rule
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minor's informed consent to stand in certain situations where the best

interests of the minor would be served. Finding no reasonable basis for
this distinction between a mature minor and an adult, the court held

the statutory restriction imposed by section 12S to be not only unduly
burdensome but also a denial of equal protection.26
Finally, according to the court, the statute was defective because of
what it termed "formal overbreadth. ' '27 In other words, the statute
failed to give notice to parents that in determining whether or not to

give their consent to an abortion, the parents could only take into consideration the minor's best interests. In its current form, the statute

suggested that some form of parental rights existed. Therefore, when
contemplating whether or not to give their consent, parents may very
well have let their own interets conflict with the minor's interest. To do
so would run counter to the Supreme Judicial Court's interpretation
requiring that only the minor's best interest be taken into account.
Consequently, the district court determined the statute in question was
overbroad as well.2 8
The United States Supreme Court Decision

On direct appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's
decision by a judgment of the Court.29 Justice Powell announced the
judgment of the Court3 ° and delivered an opinion in which he found
the statute in question constitutionally defective primarily for two rea-

sons. First, the statute permitted judicial approval for an abortion to be
witheld even if a minor was found to be mature. Second, the statute

also required parental consultation in every case without allowing a
pregnant minor to receive an independent judicial determination as to
her maturity or an evaluation as to whether an abortion would be in
where an unmarried minor seeks an abortion without parental consultation." Baird v. Attorney General, 371 Mass. at 749, 360 N.E.2d at 294.
26. 450 F. Supp. at 1004.
27. Id. at 1004-05.
28. Id.
29. Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S. Ct. at 3037.
30. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart joined in Justice Powell's opinion. Justice
Rehnquist concurred, stating: "I join the opinion of Mr. Justice Powell and in the judgment
of the Court. At such time as this Court is willing to reconsider its earlier decision in
PlannedParenthoodofAissouri v. Danforth, in which I joined the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice White, I shall be more than willing to participate in that task. But unless and until
that time comes, literally thousands of judges cannot be left with nothing more than the
guidance offered by a truly fragmented holding of this Court." 99 S. Ct. at 3053 (citation
omitted). Justice Stevens wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he was joined by
Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun. Justice White dissented.
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her best interests.3 '
Justice Powell began his opinion with the general observation that
the Constitution and the rights contained therein were applicable to
minors.3 2 Unlike the district court, however, he emphasized the unique
role played by the family in American society.3 3 As a result, constitutional principles had to be applied in a flexible manner by taking into
account both adolescent and parental concerns. Justice Powell believed these concerns included the potential vulnerability of children,
their inability to make informed and mature decisions, and the importance of parents in the child-rearing process.34 According to Justice
Powell, these three reasons supported the conclusion that constitutional
rights belonging to children in reality were not coextensive with the
rights belonging to adults.3 5
First, Justice Powell pointed out that many guarantees and procedures afforded an adult within the criminal justice system were also
applicable to a minor within the juvenile justice system. 36 Justice Powell recognized, however, that juveniles may be treated somewhat differently than adults.3 7 Justice Powell used this example to support his
argument that the legal system has recognized that it must remain flexible in order to take into account a child's peculiar vulnerability. Justice Powell next addressed the authority of a state to limit a child's
freedom in making certain choices which may result in potentially serious and irreversible consequences. 38 The justification for this authority
was premised on the belief that "during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective,
and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental
to them."' 39 Finally, according to Justice Powell, the importance of the
parental role in the child-rearing process provided a third reason for
limiting a minor's complete freedom to make certain decisions.4 0 It
31. Id. at 3051.
32. Id.at 3043.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. These include the right to adequate notice, assistance of counsel, opportunity to
confront their accusers and the privilege against compulsory self incrimination. See, e.g., In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
37. In his opinion Justice Powell stated: "In order to preserve this separate avenue for
dealing with minors, the Court has said that hearings in juvenile delinquency cases need not
necessarily 'conform with all the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative, hearing.'" Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S. Ct. at 3044 (citations omitted).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 3045.
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was felt parental consent was required to protect youths from their own

immaturity. Moreover, parents had a duty to teach and guide their
children so they could eventually become socially responsible citizens.
In order to succeed in their mission, parents impliedly required a certain amount of authority over their children, an idea "deeply rooted in
our nation's history and tradition ... ." According to Justice Powell, only if these restrictions on minors were maintained would the
chances for growth and maturity increase, eventually leading to the

making of an individual who would participate in society in a meaningful and rewarding manner.4 2

Against this background, Justice Powell addressed the constitutional questions involved in the case. He felt the crucial question was

whether section 12S, as interpreted by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court provided for parental notice and consent which would not
unduly burden4 3 the right to seek an abortion.'

The answer required a balancing of the constitutional right to an
abortion with the state's interest in requiring that an unmarried preg-

nant minor seek the advice. of her parents before making such a serious
decision. As previously noted, Justice Powell recognized parental con-

sent was required, or actively encouraged, in a myriad of other situations.45 Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, minors might
41. Id.
42. Id. at 3046.
43. Justice Powell uses the undue burden test to determine constitutionality. It is likely
the term was first used in Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976), where the Court ordered the
district court to certify certain questions to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in
order to ascertain that state court's interpretation of the statute in question. While the exact
meaning of the term is not clarified in Baird, it is arguable that the undue burden test logically follows principles announced in previous Supreme Court decisions. Specifically, the
concept of an undue burden can be implicitly found in the Roe v. Wade requirement that
burdens must be narrowly drawn. For example, if fundamental rights are involved, the state
may regulate or burden these rights if justification to do so can be found in a compelling
state interest. In effect, application of the undue burden test to the statute in question would
require a two-step process. First, it must be determined whether the statute burdens the
constitutional right to seek an abortion. Second, if such a burden is found to exist it must be
determined whether the "legislative enactments [can] be [more] narrowly drawn to express
only the legitimate state interests at stake." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
44. 99 S. Ct. at 3046.
45. Mr. Justice Stewart, in his concurrence in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52 (1976), discussed the state's interest in requiring parental involvement in the abortion decision: "There can be little doubt that the State furthers a constitutionally permissible
end by encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of her parents
in making the very important decision whether or not to bear a child. That is a grave decision, and a girl of tender years, under emotional stress, may be ill-equipped to make it
without mature advice and emotional support. It seems unlikely that she will obtain counsel
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lack the requisite ability to make an informed decision regarding these
matters.
Even though these parental concerns were deemed important, Justice Powell recognized that abortion was qualitatively different from
those situations, such as marriage, where parental consent was normally required. That is, the state must be aware of "the unique nature
...
46 As Powell noted, far from being able
of the abortion decision.
to postpone her decision, a pregnant adolescent had to make a decision
requiring immediate action. The potential detriment'and hardship facing an unmarried pregnant minor lacking employment skills, financial
resources and maturity could be severe.4 7 In short, "the abortion decision is one that simply cannot be postponed, or it will be made by default with far-reaching consequences. 4 8
Justice Powell next emphasized that for similar reasons, the Court
in the prior decision of PlannedParenthoodv. Danforth had held that
"the State may not impose a blanket provision. . . requiring the consent of a parent or person in locoparentisas a condition for abortion of
49
an unmarried minor during the first 12 weeks of her pregnancy."
Taking into account the Danforth holding and the uniqueness of the
abortion situation, Justice Powell concluded, "f the State decides to require apregnantminor to obtain one or bothparent'sconsent to an abortion, it also must provide an alternativeprocedure whereby authorization
for the abortion can be obtained."5 After stating this general requirement, Justice Powell discussed specific provisions of the statute which
he found objectionable. 1 As with the district court, he disagreed with
the section 12S provision requiring parental consent. Because the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had interpreted section 12S to require parental consent and parental notification of any judicial
proceeding, Justice Powell felt that the statute unduly burdened a minor's exercise of her right to seek an abortion. 2
Justice Powell also agreed with the district court's finding that section 12S was constitutionally defective because it permitted judicial authorization for the abortion to be withheld even though the court found
and support from the attending physician at an abortion clinic, where abortions for pregnant
minors frequently take place." Id. at 91.
46. Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S.Ct. at 3047.
47. Id. at 3048.
48. Id.
49. 428 U.S. at 74.
50. 99 S.Ct. at 3048 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 3049-50.
52. Id. at 3049.
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the minor mature enough to make the decision on her own.5 3 As noted
earlier, the Supreme Judicial Court, in answering certified questions,
stated that although a minor is found to be mature, "the judge's determination should prevail, assuming that his conclusion is supported by
the evidence and adequate findings of fact."54 Emphasizing again the
unique nature of the constitutional right to an abortion, Justice Powell
held that if a minor is found to be mature, her decision to have an
abortion must stand.
Justice Powell could have ended his analysis with the conclusion
that the statute was constitutionally infirm. He went on, however, to
delineate the procedure he perceived a valid state regulation should
provide: (1) Every minor must be able to go to court without having to
notify her parents; (2) if the court is satisfied the minor is mature
enough to make the abortion decision by herself, the court must authorize the abortion without parental consultation or consent; and, (3)
if the court is not.satisfied as to.thp minor's maturity, the minor must be
permitted to show that an abortion would still be in her best interests.5 6
Concurring in the judgment of the Court, Justice Stevens wrote a
separate opinion in which Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun
joined. 7 Justice Stevens' opinion was generally in accord with Justice
Powell's views as to which specific aspects of section 12S were unconstitutional. The principal disagreement arose because Justice Stevens felt
that Justice Powell's analysis went further than necessary. Believing
that prior case law was controlling, requiring the Court to hold section
12S unconstitutional, Justice Stevens thought the Court should have
ended its analysis upon a finding of unconstitutionality. According to
Justice Stevens, the Court should not have discussed the procedures an
abortion statute of this nature should provide in order for the statute to
pass constitutional muster. Justice Stevens believed Justice Powell's
opinion was advisory in nature, addressing issues not in controversy. 9
53. Id. at 3052.
54. Baird v. Attorney General, 371 Mass. at 748, 360 N.E. 2d at 293.
55. Justice Powell did not address the equal protection issue raised in the district court.
He stated: "As we have concluded that the statute is constitutionally infirm for other reasons, there is no need to consider this question." 99 S. Ct. at 3052 n. 30. Justice Powell was
equally concerned with which portions of section 12S withstood constitutional scrutiny.
Those particular aspects of the statute which Justice Powell felt were valid will be discussed
in the Analysis section of this commentary. See notes 71-89 and accompanying text infra.
56. Id. at 3050.
57. Id. at 3053.
58. Id. at 3055.
59. See id. at 3055 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring, joined by Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.).
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The substantive area of concern most troubling to Justice Stevens
was the fact that the statute provided an opportunity for judicial veto of
a minor's decision to have an abortion.60 According to its terms, "no
minor. . . no matter how mature and capable of informed decisionmaking, may receive an abortion without the consent of either both her
parents or a Superior Court Judge. In every instance, the minor's decision to secure an abortion is subject to an absolute third-party veto." 6
Justice Stevens thought the Court's previous holding in Planned
Parenthood,which prohibited an absolute third party veto, was dispos6 2
itive of the issue.
Unlike Justice Powell, however, Justice Stevens placed an emphasis on the privacy interests which underlie the constitutional right to an
abortion. Justice Stevens cited Whalen v. Roe63 for the proposition that
an individual had an interest in avoiding disclosure of certain personal
matters and an interest in independence when making important decisions. 4 He found section 12S "fundamentally at odds with [these] privacy interests. '65 Therefore, Justice Stevens agreed that section 12S
was unconstitutional.
Justice White wrote the only dissenting opinion. 6 As for the parental consent provision of section 12S, Justice White stated he would
not strike down the Massachusetts statute for the same reasons he expressed in his dissent in PlannedParenthood. His argument in Planned
Parenthoodcentered around the existence of the state's interest in protecting an unmarried minor from making a decision not in her best
interests.6 7 In that case Justice White stated, "[tihe purpose of the [parental consent] requirement is to vindicate the very right created in Roe
v. Wade,. . . the right of the pregnant woman to decide 'whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy.' "68 Therefore, the statute would presumably further the state's interest in protecting minors by insuring
that their right to an abortion be exercised wisely.
Finally, Justice White criticized the Court for holding unconstitutional a state requirement of parental notification. 69 Apparently he felt
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 3054.
Id. at 3053 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 3054.
429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
99 S.Ct. at 3054.
Id.
Id. at 3055.
428 U.S. at 94-95.
Id.
99 S.Ct. at 3055 (White, J., dissenting). Contrary to what Justice White believes, at
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the Baird decision went beyond the holding of Planned Parenthood.
He stated, "Until now, I would have thought inconceivable a holding
that the United States Constitution forbids even notice to parents when
their minor child who seeks surgery objects to such notice and is able to
convince a judge that the parents should be denied participation in the
decision. '"70
Analysis
In order to properly analyze the potential impact of the Bairddecision, emphasis should be focused on two aspects of the case. Since the
Court held the Massachusetts abortion statute unconstitutional, thereby
invalidating its parental consent requirement, it appears the Supreme
Court is at least reaffirming the position it took in PlannedParenthood
concerning a similar parental consent provision. Moreover, the Baird
decision may be read by some as an illustration of the Court's willingness to further diminish the concept of parental authority and parental
control, a task some commentators feel was begun in the Planned
Parenthooddecision.7 1 The first section that follows will discuss the
merits of this latter interpretation. The second section will examine the
predictive validity of the Baird decision in determining what types of
statutory schemes might be acceptable to the Court in the future.
To fully understand the impact of Baird,two prior abortion decisions of great significance should be briefly reviewed. In the landmark
decision of Roe v. Wade72 the Court recognized that the right of privacy was sufficiently broad to encompass a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy. Although recognizing that this right was of
constitutional dimension, the Roe Court specifically reserved discussing the constitutionality of a parental consent requirement until such a
provision was at issue.7 3 The Court finally addressed the issue in
PlannedParenthood."' In that case, a provision of the abortion statute
in question required an unmarried minor to obtain written consent
from her parents before the abortion could be performed. In finding
the provision unconstitutional, the Court held that a state may not give
least four justices feel that Bairdis not determinitive of the parental notification issue. .d. at
3053 n.1.
70. Id. at 3055.
71. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 987 (1978); J. NOWAK, R. RoTUNDA

& J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

72. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
73. Id. at 165 n.67.
74. 428 U.S. at 52.

633-34 (1978).
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a third party an absolute veto over the minor's abortion decision.75 In
the PlannedParenthooddecision, two Justices obliquely hinted that a
Baird-type provision which generally required parental consent but
also provided for the alternative of judicial resolution, might survive
constitutional challenge.76
Bellotti v. Bairdpresented just this issue.77 The abortion statute in
question, however, did not survive constitutional challenge.78 By invalidating the statute, the Court in essence weighed the minors' interests
against parental and state concerns and found the minors interests to be
of paramount importance. The Court in Baird reaffirmed its recognition and support of a minor's constitutional right to an abortion and
arguably continued to undermine the concept of the parental role in
American society. At least four members of the Court concluded in
Bairdthat an abortion statute of this nature would be valid only if it
allows the minor to go directly to court without having to consult or
notify her parents.79 If so, parents could be effectively foreclosed from
ever discovering that their daughter desires, or has in fact had an abortion. Parents necessarily would be incapable of performing their advisory role, counseling and assisting their child in making a responsible
decision. Hence, the criticism that traditional notions of parental authority and obligation are on the wane seems to have merit.
This interpretation, however, may not be entirely accurate. It cannot be overemphasized that Baird was decided by a judgment of the
Court. While four Justices did expound the view stated above, four
other Justices specifically reserved determining the constitutionality of
a statute which did no more than require notice to the parents but did
not afford them or anyone else the opportunity to absolutely veto the
minor's abortion decision." Those Justices believed parental notification was not at issue in Baird. In addition, a fifth Justice, the lone
dissenter, thought it "inconceivable" that the Court would forbid notice
to parents.8 1 Therefore, it is more accurate to say the Court is probably
moving in the direction of reducing parental control. Since four Justices believe parental notification cannot be required, however, the
75. The case also dealt with statutory prohibition against certain types of abortion procedures, the discussion of which is beyond the scope of this commentary.
76. Id. at 90-91 (Stewart, J., concurring).
77. 99 S. Ct. at 3035.
78. Id. at 3052.
79. Id. at 3050.
80. Id. at 3053 n. I (Stevens, J., concurring, joined by Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun,
81. Id. at 3055 (White, J., dissenting).
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Court is very close to allowing an unmarried minor to foreclose parental involvement in her abortion decision, if she so desires."2 As yet, the
Court has not directly addressed the parental notification issue.
Nonetheless, the Baird decision in general and Justice Powell's
opinion in particular give us some indication of other types of provisions which might survive future constitutional challenge. Both Justice
Powell and Justice Stevens are in agreement that the parental consent
requirement and the potential judicial veto of the minor's decision to
have an abortion unduly burden the exercise by minors of the right to
seek an abortion. 3 Justice Powell, however, goes even further to delineate how a state might constitutionally provide for parental involvement in the abortion decision process.84
First, Justice Powell believes a minor should be able to attempt to
receive court authorization for her abortion without having to notify
her parents.8 5 At the same time, however, Justice Stevens specifically
noted that Justice Powell's view on parental notification is not conclusive since the Court did not address that issue in Baird.86 Therefore,
the Court is actually undecided on the parental notification issue. Second, according to Justice Powell, if the court is satisfied that the minor
is mature enough to make the abortion decision by herself, the court
must authorize the abortion decision without parental consultation or
consent.8 7 If the court is not satisfied as to the minor's maturity, the
minor must be permitted to show that an abortion would be in her best
interests.8 8 Third, while in Baird the statute provided for the superior
court as the appropriate forum in which to make these decisions, Justice Powell noted that there is no reason to suggest that a juvenile court
or administrative agency could not adequately perform this function. 9
Finally, the fact that the statute in question requires the consent of
both parents does not unduly burden a minor's right to seek an abortion. Given the unique nature of and the potential ramifications involved in the abortion decision itself, both parents have an interest in
"helping to determine the course that is in the best interest of [their]
daughter." 90 If for some reason the minor receives approval of one
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 3035.
at 3051, 3053-54.
at 3050.
at 3053 n.l.
at 3050.
at 3048 n.22.
at 3051.
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parent, that parent's support may be dispositive in a subsequent judicial determination. 91
Baird is a significant decision because it reaffirms the constitutional principles previously applied by the Court in Planned
Parenthood,which held that a state may not provide a third party with
an absolute veto over a minor's abortion decision. In Baird the Court
applied this principle to an abortion statute which required parental
consent and provided for a judicial veto. The decision is also important because four of the Justices offer some guidance in determining
what types of provisions future abortion statutes of this nature must
contain in order to pass constitutional muster.
As to the constitutionality of a statute which requires parental notification but does not afford parents or any other third party an absolute veto, Baird leaves us in an uncertain position. Therefore, the
inquiry begun by the Court in PlannedParenthoodhas yet to be fully
resolved.

Equal Protection
Perhaps the single most dynamic-and hence among the most confusing-areas of Supreme Court decision making in recent years has
been the equal protection area. This is well exemplified by the 1978-79
Term. So significant were the decisions in this rapidly changing field,
over half of the cases in this Review are from the equal protection area.
They involve classifications based upon gender, legitimacy, alienage
and residency. Also included are two more cases in a long*line of public school desegregation decisions.
Just as the equal protection area is uncertain, the most unpredictable of the equal protection cases seem to be those alleging genderbased discrimination. Although a majority of the Court has clearly accepted the middle-tier approach established in Craig v. Borenl-with
the other justices now leaning towards accepting it-the members remain in conflict as to when and how to apply it. In holding in Orr v.
Orrb that a state statute imposing alimony obligations on husbands but
91. Id. at 3051 n.29.
a.
In
mental
at 197.
b.

429 U.S. 190 (1976).
Craig, the Court held that "classifications by gender must serve important governobjectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." Id.
440 U.S. 268 (1979).
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not wives was invalid, six members of the Court joined an opinion applying the Craigtest. While in PersonalAdministratorofMassachusetts
v. Feeneyc the majority held that there was no showing that a state's
veterans preference statute purposefully discriminated against women,
the entire Court appeared to accept the Craig test; notably, however,
the test was never actually applied by the majority. In Caban v. Mohammed,d five members of the Court found that a state statute which
allowed an unwed mother, but not an unwed father, to block the adoption of their mother was invalid under the Craigstandard. The dissenters followed a different track, asserting that unwed mothers and unwed
fathers are generally not similarly situated, and that the legislature was
not required to provide for those infrequent instances where they are so
situated. Finally, the various opinions in Parham v. Hughese which upheld a state statute precluding the father of an illegitimate child who
has not legitimated the child from recovering for his or her wrongful
death, demonstrate the basic differences in approach toward equal protection cases among the members of the Court. A plurality found that
there was no discrimination based upon illegitmacy or gender, and applied the deferential rational basis test to the statutory classification;
one justice found gender-based discrimination, and concluded that one
of the asserted state interests met the Craig test; and the other four
justices, applying the Craig standard, determined that none of the asserted state interests justified the discriminatory statute.
While there is less controversy among the Court regarding the
proper standard to be applied in cases of discrimination based upon
illegitimacy, the justices are divided on how that standard should be
applied. In La//i v. Lali,f the Court upheld a state statute allowing an
illegitimate child to inherit from his or her intestate father only if there
has been a judicial declaration of paternity during the father's lifetime.
The third of a trilogy of seeming irreconcilable cases involving similar
statutes, nearly all of the justices applied the middle-tier standard
which the Court had utilized in Trimble v. Gordon, 9 but only the four
dissenters concluded, as in Trimble, that the statute was invalid. Three
justices determined that the middle-tiered standard had been satisfied;
one applied a rational relation test in upholding the statute, and another asserted that Trimble should be expressly overruled in favor of
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

99 S. Ct. 2282 (1979).
441 U.S. 380 (1979).
441 U.S. 347 (1979).
439 U.S. 259 (1978).
430 U.S. 762 (1977).
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the principles set forth in the first of the three cases, Labine v. Vincent.h
These different approaches seem to have made it even more difficult for
lower courts to determine the proper rule to apply to intestacy statutes
limiting inheritance by illegitimates.
In Ambach v. Norwick,i a case involving discrimination based
upon alienage, the lines between the justices were more clearly drawn,
yet the Court was just as equally divided. In upholding a state statute
forbidding certification as elementary and secondary school teachers
aliens who are eligible for United States citizenship but refuse to seek
naturalization, the five-man majority expanded the "governmental
function" exception established in earlier alienage-based discrimination cases i to include all jobs which "go to the heart of representative
govenment." The Court thus further narrowed the scope of application
of the "close judicial scrutiny" standard set forth in Graham v. Richardson. k
Similarly, in Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, I the opposite
conclusions reached by the majority and the dissenters were due to different readings of earlier cases, resulting in the application of different
standards of scrutiny. The case involved a state statute which extended
the police jurisdiction of a municipality, including its police and safety
regulations, licensing requirements, and some of its planning authority,
to persons residing outside the city's geographic boundaries without
permitting those persons to vote in municipal elections. Interpreting
the Court's decision in Dunn v. Blumsteinm as allowing a governmental
unit to restrict participation in its political processes to those residing
within its geographic borders, the majority applied a rational relation
test in upholding the statute. The dissenters, on the other hand, viewed
Dunn as permitting only residential restrictions designed to preserve a
"political community," and therefore utilized "exacting judicial scrutiny" in finding that the statute violated equal protection.
Finally, on the last day of the term, the Court announced its decisions in two public school desegregation cases, Columbus Boardof Education v. Penick n and Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman.0 These
h. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
i. 441 U.S. 68 (1979).

j.
(1973).
k.
1.
m.
n.
o.

See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634
403 U.S. 365 (1971).
439 U.S. 60 (1978).
405 U.S. 330 (1972).
99 S. Ct. 2941 (1979).
99 S. Ct. 2971 (1979).
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decisions broke little new ground. Aside from allowing foreseeability

of segregative effects as evidence in establishing discriminatory intent,
the Court otherwise merely reaffirmed the principles set forth in Keyes
v. School DistrictNo. 1. P In fact, what is probably most noteworthy

about these decisions is that they demonstrated that the justices remain
committed to the use of the federal courts to desegregate the nations

public schools, despite public criticism and ever growing doubts about
the effectiveness of these efforts among the Supreme Court members

themselves.
Orr v. Orr*
In Orr v. Orr,' the Supreme Court found that Alabama alimony
statutes relying on gender-based classification 2 violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The statutes provided
that husbands, but not wives, may be required to pay alimony upon
divorce. The Court concluded that use of the gender classification produced "perverse results' 3 by generalizing need according to sex.
The Lower Court Decisions
The factual context from which this case arose was uncomplicated
and undisputed. On February 26, 1974, a divorce decree dissolving the
marriage of William and Lillian Orr was entered in Alabama state
court. The decree directed appellant, William, to pay appellee, Lillian,
$1,240 per month in alimony. On July 28, 1976, Lillian initiated a contempt proceeding in Circuit Court of Lee County, Alabama, alleging
p. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
* Commentary by Seyda Varol, member, third-year class.
1. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
2. The statutes provide: "If the wife has no separate estate or if it be insufficient for
her maintenance, the judge, upon granting a divorce, at his discretion, may order to the wife
an allowance out of the estate of the husband, taking into consideration the value thereof
and the condition of his family.
"If the divorce is in favor of the wife for the misconduct of the husband, the judge
trying the case shall have the right to make an allowance to the wife out of the husband's
estate, or not make her an allowance as the circumstances of the case may justify, and if an
allowance is made, it must be as liberal as the estate of the husband will permit, regardbeing
had to the condition of his family and to all the circumstances of the case.
"Ifthe divorce is in favor of the husband for the misconduct of the wife and if the judge
in his discretion deems the wife entitled to an allowance, the allowance must be regulated by
the ability of the husband and the nature of the misconduct of the wife." ALA. CODE fit. 30,
§§ 30-2-51 to 30-2-53.
3. 440 U.S. at 282.
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that William was in arrears in his alimony payments.4 Subsequently,
on August 19, 1976, at the hearing on Lillian's petition, William submitted a motion in his defense alleging that Lillian's petition was based
on an illegal decree in that it relied on Alabama statutes which should
be declared unconstitutional because they authorize courts to order the
payment of alimony by husbands but never by wives.5
The trial court denied his motion, and judgment was entered
against William for the arrearages and attorneys' fees.6 The Alabama
Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, finding a fair and substantial relationship between the object of the legislation, that of cushioning the
financial impact of divorce, and the differential treatment afforded the
sexes. "It is the wife of a broken marriage who needs financial assistance for whom the alimony statutes of Alabama were designed," 7 the
court said. Thus the state statutes were reasonably designed to further
the state policy of cushioning the financial impact of divorce upon the
sex for whom that loss imposes a disproportionally heavy burden. William's appeal on writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Alabama,
initially granted, was later quashed as improvidently granted.' In a
strong dissent, Justice Jones noted that "[g]iven the legal inhibition
against sexual discrimination, the fact that statistically a wife is much
more likely to be an alimony recipient cannot mean, as a matter of law,
that a husband should be excluded altogether from access to alimony."9
This dissent foreshadowed, in great part, the logic which would be applied by the Supreme Court.
I

The United States Supreme Court Decision
Before turning to the merits, the Supreme Court, per Justice Brennan, l 0 addressed three preliminary questions which, although not
raised by the parties or the Alabama courts, were considered on the
Court's own motion because of their jurisdictional implications. 1 The
first concerned appellant's standing to assert in his defense the unconstitutionality of the Alabama statutes. William's challenge in the state
4. Id. at 270-71.
5. Id. at 271.
6. Id.
7. Orr v. Orr, 351 So. 2d 904, 905 (1977).
8. Id. at 906.
9. Id. at 909.
10. 440 U.S. at 270. Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Stewart, White, Marshall,
Blackmun and Stevens, with concurring opinions from Justices Blackmun and Stevens. Justices Powell and Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, filed two dissenting opinions.
11. Id. at 271.
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courts had not included a claim that he was entitled to alimony. He
had only contended that he should not be required to pay alimony if
similarly situated wives could not be ordered to pay. It was argued that
it was possible for William to prevail in the Supreme Court and yet
obtain no relief from the outstanding state contempt judgment. "The
state could respond to a reversal by neutrally extending alimony rights
plaintiff
to needy husbands as well as wives."'" Thus the only proper
3
would be a husband who requested alimony for himself.1
Justice Brennan found that "[t]his argument quite clearly proves
too much."' 4 He noted that in every equal protection attack upon a

statute challenged as underinclusive, the state could remedy the constitutional infirmity either by extending benefits to the previously disfavored class or by denying benefits to both parties. Thus, unless the
Court were to hold that underinclusive statutes could never be chalmight have been
lenged because any plaintiffs success theoretically
15
thwarted, William must have had standing.
In addition, the Court noted that there was no question that Mr.
Orr bore a burden he would not have borne were he female. Transposing the issue into the sphere of race, Justice Brennan stated that "[t]here
is no doubt that a state law imposing alimony obligations on blacks but
not whites could be challenged by a black who was required to pay.
The burden alone is sufficient to establish standing. 16
Returning to his first point, Justice Brennan noted that the Court's
resolution of a statute's constitutionality often did not finally resolve
the controversy between appellant and appellee: "We do not deny
standing simply because the 'appellant, although prevailing here on the
federal constitutional issue, may or may not ultimately win [his] lawsuit.' "'1 In Justice Brennan's view, the Alabama decisions stood as a
total bar to relief for appellant and his constitutional attack held the
12. Id. at 272.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. Alabama could validate its divorce statutes, if held unconstitutional, by amending them either (1) to permit awards to husbands as well as wives or (2) to deny alimony to
both parties. Under the first alternative, it is possible for William to gain nothing from
success in the Supreme Court, although the hypothetical "proper" plaintiff would. Under
the second alternative, however, William would benefit. Thus, as the Supreme Court has no
way of predicting how a state will respond, it must find standing. Id.
Justice Brennan also noted that the Court on several occasions had considered this inherent problem of challenges to underinclusive statutes and never denied standing on this
ground, citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n.24 (1976) and Stanton v. Stanton, 421
U.S. 7, 17 (1975).
16. 440 U.S. at 273.
17. Id. (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. at 18).
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only promise of relief from the burden imposed by the challenged statute. Accordingly, he concluded that William had "' alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the contoversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
[this] court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." ' " 8

The second preliminary question concerned the timeliness of appellant's challenge to the constitutionality of the statutes. Mr. Orr had
not made his constitutional challenge until his ex-wife had sought the
contempt judgment. This "unexcused tardiness might well have constituted a procedural default under state law," and left the Court without
jurisdiction to consider the challenge.' 9 As neither Mrs. Orr nor the
Alabama courts had objected at any time to the timeliness of the constitutional challenge and had deemed the federal constitutional question
properly before the court, "'we could not treat the decision below as
resting upon an adequate and independent state ground even if we
were to conclude that the state court might properly have relied upon
such a ground to avoid deciding the federal question.""'20 This conclusion was "merely the application" of the elementary rule that it is irrelevant to inquire whether a federal question was raised in a court below
when such question was actually considered and decided. 2
The final preliminary question arose from indications in the record
that William's alimony obligation was part of a stipulation--entered
into by the parties, and which had been incorporated into the divorce
decree. The end result, therefore, as in the second question, might have
been that despite the unconstitutionality of the statutes, Mr. Orr might
have had a continuing obligation based upon the stipulation--"in essence a matter of state contract law."22 If the Alabama courts had
based their judgment upon such a ground, the Court might have been
without power to hear the constitutional argument because an in18. Id. (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 616 (1973) (quoting Baker v.
Carr,369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962))). Justice Brennan noted that on indistinguishable facts, the
Court has upheld standing. In LindaRS. v. RichardD., the Court stated that "the parent of
a legitimate child who must by statute pay child support has standing to challenge the statute on the ground that the parent of an illegitimate child is not equally burdened." 410 U.S.
at 619 n.5 (Marshall, J.).
19. 440 U.S. at 274 (citing C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 541-42 (3d ed. 1976)).
20. 440 U.S. at 274 (quoting Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 37 n.3 (1967)).
21. 440 U.S. at 274-75 (quoting Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 234 U.S. 123, 134
(1914)). Accord, Harlin v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 459 (1979); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153,
157 (1974); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423,436 (1959). See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 542

(3d ed. 1976).
22. 440 U.S. at 275.
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dependent and adequate state ground might have existed. 23 At no

time, however, was the stipulation raised as a possible alternative
ground in support of the contempt judgment. Based on that record,
therefore, the Court could not "'refuse jurisdiction because the state
court might have based its decision, consistently with the record, upon
an independent and adequate non-federal ground.'"24

Having found proper jurisdiction over Mr. Orr's constitutional
challenge and recognizing a properly presented article III "case or con-

troversy," the Court turned to the merits of the case.25 Justice Brennan
stated that because Alabama's statutory scheme of imposing alimony
payments on husbands but not wives provided that different treatment
be accorded on the basis of sex, it "'establishes a classification subject
to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.' "26 The majority found

no protection from scrutiny because the classification discriminated expressly against men rather than women. 27 Rather, they relied on
Califano v. Webster,28 in which the Court heldper curiam that genderbased differentials in old-age Social Security benefits were allowable
since there was proof that "the statute was deliberately enacted to
'redres[s] our society's longstanding disparate treatment of women', 29

and was not 'the accidental byproduct of a traditional way of thinking
about females."' 30 The Court in Califano v. Webster had, in turn, relied heavily on its earlier pronouncement in Craig v. Boren3 1 that to

withstand constitutional challenge under equal protection principles
"classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." 2
The Court then considered the three governmental objectives that

Alabama's statutory scheme might serve.3 3 Appellant viewed the
23. Id. at 276. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945); Fox Film Corp. v.
Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935).
24. 440 U.S. at 276 (quoting Indiana exrel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 98 (1938)).
25. 440 U.S. at 276.
26. Id. at 278-79 (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971)). The Court in Reed
held violative of equal protection a mandatory provision of the Idaho probate code giving
preference to men over women when otherwise equally situated individuals apply for appointment as administrator of a decedent's estate. Id.
27. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
28. 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
29. Id. (quoting Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 209 n.8 (1977)).
30. 430 U.S. at 314 (quoting Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 223 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)).
31. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
32. Id. at 197.
33. 440 U.S. 279.
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state's statutes as demonstrating the state's preference for an allocation

of family responsibilities where the wife played a dependent role and as
reinforcing that model among its citizens.34 Justice Brennan agreed
with appellant's assertion that prior cases established that this purpose
could not sustain the statutes. In Stanton v. Stanton,35 the Court had

held that "old notions" imposing the primary financial responsibility
on the man could no longer justify gender-based discrimination. 36 This
objective could not support the statute since the Court was persuaded
that "[n]o longer is the female destined solely for the home and the
rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the
world of ideas." 37

Two other possible objectives for the statute were gleaned from the
opinion of the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals. 38 The first was to provide help for needy spouses, using sex as a proxy for need. 39 The statutes, however, would not be justified even if sex were a reliable proxy

for need and even if the institution of marriage did discriminate against
women, because "[u]nder the statute, individualized hearings at which

the parties' relative financial circumstances are considered already occur."40 There was thus no reason to use sex as a proxy for need.
The second legislative purpose, the goal of compensating women
for past discrimination during marriage, which assertedly has left them

unprepared to fend for themselves in the working world following divorce, was dismissed on similar grounds "since individualized hearings
can determine which women were in fact discriminated against vis-Avis their husbands, as well as which family units defied the stereotype

and left the husband dependent on the wife." 4 ' Recognizing that as34. Id.
35. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
36. Id. at 10.
37. Id. at 14-15.
38. 440 U.S. at 280. Justice Brennan quotes the lower court's opinion that the statutes
were "designed [for] the wife of a broken marriage who needs financial assistance," 351 So.
2d at 905. He extracts from this opinion two possible legislative objectives. Id.
39. 440 U.S. at 280. See Russell v. Russell, 24 So. 2d 124, 126 (1945); Ortman v.
Ortman, 203 Ala. 167, 82 So. 417 (1919). In dismissing this purpose the Court began the
analysis of the "needy spouse" objective by considering whether sex was a sufficiently "accurate proxy" for dependency to establish that the gender classification rests "'upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.'"
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415
(1920) (citation omitted)).
40. 440 U.S. at 280.
41. 440 U.S. at 281-82. The Court recognized the "'[r]eduction of the disparity in economic condition between men and women caused by the long history of discrimination
against women . . . as . . . an important governmental objective . . . ."' Id. (quoting
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977)). The majority approached this "compensa-
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sisting needy spouses is a legitimate and important governmental objective, the majority concluded that the compensatory purpose in the
Alabama statues could be satisfied without placing burdens solely on
husbands.42
Justice Brennan pointed out that as compared to a gender-neutral
law placing alimony obligations on the spouse best able to pay, the
gender-based classification produced "perverse results"; in the instant
case only financially secure wives with needy husbands derived an advantage.43 The Court concluded that "[a] gender-based classification
which, as compared to a gender-neutral one, generates additional benefits only for those it has no reason to prefer cannot survive equal protection scrutiny."' This conclusion was buttressed by the Court's
concern that stereotypes about the "proper place" of women and their
need for "special protection" ran the risk of reinforcement by legislative classifications which distributed benefits and burdens on the basis
of gender.45
Having found Alabama's alimony statutes unconstitutonal, the
Court reversed the lower court decision and remanded the case.4 6
Thus, on remand, the question remained open as to whether the stipulated agreement to pay, or other grounds of gender-neutral state law,
bound Mr. Orr to continue alimony payments.47
Brief concurrences were filed by Justices Blackmun and Stevens.
Justice Blackmun joined the Court on the assumption that the Court
did not mean to imply that society-wide discrimination was always irtion" rationale by asking whether women had in fact been discriminated against in the context of the sex-based classification, leaving them "'not similarly situated with respect to
opportunities"' in that context. 440 U.S. at 281 (quoting Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S.
498, 508 (1975)). Compare Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 318 (1977) and Kahn v.
Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 353 (1974) with Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975).
42. 440 U.S. at 282.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 282-83.
45. Id. at 283. Cf. United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 173-74 (1977)
(concurring opinion). The Court was especially cautious because the gender-based classifications did not enhance the state's "compensatory and ameliorative purposes" any more
than gender-neutral classifications would have. Additionally, the majority was struck by the
inconsistency in allowing benefits mainly to "those without need for special solicitude." 440
U.S. at 283.
46. Id. at 283-84.
47. Id. (citing Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 109 (1938)). There, the
Indiana state courts had to choose between two potential grounds to uphold the dismissal of
a public school teacher. The Indiana courts decided the question on the basis of the contracts clause of the Federal Constitution, not passing upon a question of pure state law.
Thus, the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to "reach the merits of the constitutional question
without relying on the potential state ground." 440 U.S. at 284 n.13.
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relevant to the determination whether the classification at issue was
substantially related to achievement of important governmental objectives, and on the further assumption that the Court did not intend to
"cut back" the decision in Kahn v. Shevin. 8
In his brief concurring opinion, Justice Stevens rejected both alternative suggestions Justice Rehnquist "seem[ed] to be making" that the
Court should decide the state law issue or direct the Supreme Court of
Alabama to decide that issue before deciding the federal constitutional
issue.4 9 In the judgment of Justice Stevens, to accept either of these
principles of federalism that transcend the
alternatives "would violate
50
significance of this case."

Two dissents were filed, the second by Justice Rehnquist, with
Chief Justice Burger joining. 5' This dissent attacked Mr. Orr's standing to bring suit. 2 Justice Rehnquist argued that Mr. Orr had no personal stake in the controversy which would satisfy article III, and that
there was no "'causal connection'" between the injury-in-fact and the
challenged government action. 3 Mr. Orr's standing to raise the equal
protection claim was analyzed within the framework of two separate
gender classifications: "that between needy wives, who can be awarded
alimony under the statutes, and needy husbands, who cannot; and that
between financially secure husbands, who can be required to pay alimony under the statutes, and financially secure wives, who cannot." 54
Justice Rehnquist found that Mr. Orr would derive no benefit from a
sex-neutral statute, as the parties had agreed to the amount of alimony
and Mr. Orr could not claim alimony because he was not a "needy
husband.155 Relying on Linda R.S. v. RichardD.56 and advocating the
57
enforceability of the alimony obligation under state contract law, Jus-

tice Rehnquist recognized no undue burden to Mr. Orr because he
"[had] failed to show a 'substantial likelihood'5 8 that the requested re48. 416 U.S. 351 (1974). See 440 U.S. at 284.
49. 440 U.S. at 284.
50. Id. at 285.
51. Id. at 290-300.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 292-93.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 293-95.
56. 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
57. Justice Rehnquist relied here on the following pronouncement in Duke Power Co.
v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 75 n.20 (1978): "'Our recent
cases have required no more than a showing that there is a 'substantial likelihood' that the
relief requested will redress the injury claimed to satisfy the second prong of the constitutional standing requirement.'" 440 U.S. at 298 n.5.
58. 440 U.S. at 298.
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lief [would] result in termination of his alimony obligation." 9
Nor could Justice Rehnquist justify Mr. Orr's standing merely because the state courts had decided his claim on its constitutional merits.
He emphasized that "Article III is a jurisdictional limitation on federal
courts, and a state court cannot transform an abstract or hypothetical
60
question into a 'case or controversy' merely by ruling on its merits.
Justice Powell's dissent paralleled that of Justice Rehnquist, agreeing that the majority had "dealt too casually with the difficult [article
III] problems."'6 1 He would have abstained in order to provide the state
courts an opportunity to settle the underlying state law questions, any
of which might have eliminated the necessity of deciding the equal protection issue. 6 1 Moreover, he noted that since the alimony arrangements were part of a comprehensive agreement not made subject to
have been a "question
approval by the divorce court, there might also
63
as to the binding effect of the divorce itself."
Analysis
Although opposed by two lengthy dissents, the majority in Orr
took a firm stand in deciding to reach the constitutional claims despite
unanswered underlying state questions. Six members of the Court,6 4
recognizing Mr. Orr's standing to bring this case, declared unconstitutional the Alabama statutes requiring husbands, but not wives, to pay
alimony as violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Neither of the dissents took up the equal protection question, choosing to ignore it in favor of an emphasis on Mr. Or's lack of
standing or the underlying state law question.6
The main issue separating the majority from the dissenters is how
far the article III "case or controversy" requirement can be stretched to
allow an appellant standing in the federal courts.66 The majority favors
59. Id.
60. Id. at 299 (citing Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952)). Based on similar reasoning, the Court in .Doremus held that a state statute requiring Bible reading in
public schools could not be challenged by a taxpayer who lacked the "requisite special injury" in the outcome of a First Amendment challenge. 342 U.S. at 435.
61. 440 U.S. at 285.
62. Id. (citing Harris County Comm'rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 83 (1975)).
63. 440 U.S. at 288.
64. The six members were Justices Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun and
Stevens.
65. Justice Powell's dissent did not deal with either of the constitutional questions, expressing a reticence to entertain such questions unnecessarily. 440 U.S. at 285-90 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
66. Id.
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an interpretation of Linda R.S. which sustains Mr. Orr's standing, finding his status similar to that of the parent of a legitimate child who
must by statute pay child support while that of an illegitimate child is
not equally burdened.67 However, Justice Rehnquists's dissent derives
a different result from Linda R.S., finding instead that the "'direct' relationship between the alleged injury and the claim sought to be adjudicated, which previous decisions of this Court suggest is a prerequisite
of standing, is absent in this case" 68 because Mr. Orr had failed to
that his alimony obligations would
prove to a "substantial likelihood" 69
terminate with the requested relief.
70
Similarly, whereas the majority relied upon Califano v. Webster
to justify its examination of the governmental objectives that might be
served by the Alabama statutes,7 1 the dissent by Justice Rehnquist did
not discuss that case in the context of the substantial relationship test
discussed in Webster.72 Rather, he used Webster to illustrate that
"[s]tanding to raise these constitutional claims was not destroyed by the
fact that. . . Congress. . . [was] capable of frustrating a victory in this
Court by merely withdrawing the challenged statute's benefits from the
favored class rather than extending them to the excluded class." 73 Additionally, he relied on Caifano v. Goldfarb,74 for his finding that Mr.
Orr did not suffer from the effects of a statute which placed a burden on
members of one sex, but not on the similarly situated members of the
other sex. 75 Although the majority gave some credence to the notion
that Mr. Orr's motion challenging the constitutionality of Alabama's
statutes might be interpreted as constituting an alimony claim,7 6 Justice
Rehnquist disagreed with the majority's construction.7 7
67. Id., at 273 (citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. at 619 n.5 (Marshall, J.)).
68. 410 U.S. at 618.
69. 440 U.S. at 298.
70. 430 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1977).
71. 440 U.S. at 278-81.
72. Id. at 291-92.
73. Id. at 292.
74. 431 U.S. 199 (1977). This case declared unconstitutional a provision of the Social
Security Act that burdened widowers, but not widows, with proof of dependency upon the
deceased spouse before survivors' benefits would be allowed.
75. 440 U.S. at 292.
76. Id. at 271 n.2.
77. Id. at 295 n.3. He based his confusion on three points: 1) that Mr. Orr's contentions
regarding the archaic nature of the Alabama statutes' characterization of women went to the
merits of his equal protection claim and not to his standing to raise it, 2) that Mr. Orr's
alimony payments were fixed by a contract between the parties, and 3) that Mr. Orr's claim
is patently meritless since, by definition, a gender-neutral statute treats men and women the
same. Id.
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Justice Powell's dissent, like that of Justices Rehnquist and Burger,
did not reach the same issues as the majority opinion. In fact, Justice
Powell's dissent was even narrower in scope because it refused to consider either of the constitutional questions.7 8 Instead, this opinion concentrated on the necessity of deciding the underlying state law
questions prior to reaching the constitutional issues. 9 In this connection, Justice Powell emphasized that the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, in a case subsequent to its decision in Orr, held that a claim
identical to appellant's would not be considered, where the husband
raised it for the first time on a motion for a new trial.8 0 This dissent
also recounted the probable validity of the contract enforcing Mr. Orr's
alimony obligation. 1
The vast differences of opinion among the Justices in Orr illustrates the Court's difficulty in reaching a unanimous decision in the
area of federal standing. Despite a six to three majority opinion, the
Court is still divided without a favored view of article III for "case or
controversy." It is regrettable that the Court could not create a more
solid front in its decision supposedly clarifying a complex area of constitutional law. Perhaps more significant is the fact that a majority of
the Court was willing to extend article III over the strong dissent of
three of its members in order to reach the merits of another genderbased, equal protection claim. In light of the other equal protection
opinions handed down during the 1979-80 Term, the Court's holding in
Orr v. Orr would seem to confirm their acceptance of a "middle tier"
analysis in equal protection cases.

PersonnelAdministratorof Massachusetts v. Feeney*
In Personnel Administrator of Afassachusetts v. Feeney' the
Supreme Court held that the Massachusetts Veterans' Preference Statute,2 which gives veterans a hiring preference for certain state civil
78. Id. at 285-86 (Powell, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 286-90.
80. Hughes v. Hughes, 362 So.2d 910 (1978), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted,
362 So.2d 918 (Ala. 1978).
81. 440 U.S. at 288.
* Commentary by Benjamin G. Davidian, member, third-year class.
1. 99 S. Ct. 2282 (1979).
2. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 31, § 23 (West Supp. 1977) (current version at MAss.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 31, § 26 (West 1979)). The general Massachusetts Civil Service law,
MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 31, was recodified on Jan. 1, 1979, and the veterans' preference
is now found at MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 31, § 26 (West 1979). Citations in this commen-
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service jobs, does not discriminate against women in violation of the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Under the Massachusetts Veterans' Preference Statute, all veterans
who qualify for state civil service positions must be considered for appointment ahead of any qualifying nonveterans. The preference operates to the overwhelming advantage of males. Veterans' preference
statutes have long been used by the federal government and virtually
all state governments as a means of rewarding returning veterans and
assisting their assimilation into nonmilitary jobs. Although these statutes vary widely in design and application, Massachusetts' is among the
most generous. 3 All applicants for positions in Massachusetts' official4
service must take competitive examinations. Applicants are then
graded according to a formula which gives weight both to objective test
results and to training and experience. The provisions of the statute
require that disabled veterans, veterans, surviving spouses and parents
of veterans be ranked above all other candidates according to their respective examination scores.' The Massachusetts statute grants veterans a permanent preference that may be exercised at any time and as
many times as the veteran may wish to use it and is applicable to all but
the lowest-level state civil service positions.
Appellee Helen B. Feeney, a widow, was not a veteran. She entered the state civil service work force in 1963 as a senior clerk stenographer in the Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency and worked in that
capacity for four years. In 1967 she was promoted within the agency to
federal funds and personnel coordinator. The agency and her job were
eliminated in 1975. Feeney worked as a public employee for twelve
years. During her tenure she took a number of open competitive civil
service examinations. She did very well on several of them, achieving
the second highest score on an examination for the Board of Dental
Examiners in 1971 and the third highest score on an examination for a
position as an administrative assistant with a mental health center in
1973. Her high scores failed to qualify her for a place on the certified
tary, unless otherwise indicated, are to the chapter 31 codification in effect when this litigation was commenced.
3. The Massachusetts statute defined a veteran as "any person, male or female, including a nurse," who was honorably discharged from the nation's armed forces after at least 90
days active service, at least one day of which was during "wartime service." MAss. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch 4, § 7 (West 1974).
4. State civil service positions in Massachusetts are divided into two categories: labor
and official. The statute involved in the instant case deals only with procedures employed in
recruitment for official positions.
5. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 31, § 23 (West Supp. 1977).
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eligible list,6 however, because of the veterans preference statute. She
was ranked sixth behind five male veterans on the Dental Examiners
list and the job was given to a lower scoring veteran. On the 1973 ex-

amination Feeney was placed on the list behind twelve male veterans,
eleven of whom had received lower scores.
The Lower Court Decisions
Appellee Feeney brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, 7 arguing that the statute's absolute preference formula excludes

women from consideration for the best civil service jobs, thereby deny-

ing women equal protection of the law.8 The three-judge district court
agreed with her claim, one judge dissenting. 9 The district court found
that the goals of the preference were worthy and legitimate and that the

statute had not been enacted for the purpose of discriminating against
women, but that the distinction between veterans and nonveterans
drawn by the statute was so severe as to require the state to further its
goals through a more limited form of preference. The court declared
the statute unconstitutional and enjoined its further operation.

On appeal, the United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for consideration in light of Washington v.
Davis.'0 On remand, the district court reaffirmed its earlier decision,
one judge concurring, one dissenting. 1 The district court concluded
6. 99 S. Ct. at 2288. When an official civil service position becomes available, the
applicable public agency receives a list of "certified eligibles" from the state personnel division. Unless the person whose name is highest on the list is selected to fill the position, the
agency must file a written statement of reasons. If only one position is open, there are usually three candidates' names placed on the list. Veterans who qualify are placed above all
others even though their examination scores may be considerably lower than nonveterans.

Thus it is virtually impossible for a nonveteran to be selected.

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.

ch.

3 1, § 25 (West 1979).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1974).
8. No statutory claim was brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e (1974).
9. Anthony v. Massachusetts, 415 F.Supp 485 (D. Mass. 1976) (Murray, J., dissenting
in part). Feeney's case had been consolidated with that of Carol B. Anthony, a lawyer
whose efforts to secure a civil service job were similarly thwarted by the veterans' preference
statute. But in 1975 Massachusetts exempted all attorney positions from the preference,
thereby rendering Anthony's claim moot.
10. Massachusetts v. Feeney, 434 U.S. 884 (1977). In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229 (1976), the Supreme Court held that a neutral law does not necessarily violate the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment simply because it results in a racially disproportionate impact. Secondly, the Court required that any disproportionate impact must
be traced to a specific legislative purpose to discriminate on the basis of race. Id. at 238-44.
11. Feeney v. Massachusetts, 451 F.Supp 143 (D. Mass. 1978) (Campbell, J., concurring; Murray, J., dissenting).
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that a veterans' hiring preference is inherently non-neutral because it
favors a class from which women have traditionally been excluded and
that the results of the Massachusetts absolute preference formula were
too inevitable to have been "unintended."'3 2 The Attorney General
again appealed the district court decision.1
The United States Supreme Court Decision
Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the majority opinion, reversing the
judgment of the district court and remanding the case for further proceedings. " The Court began its analysis with a review of the statutory
history of chapter 31, section 23. The Court determined that although
the preference did not guarantee that the veteran would always be appointed, it gave an almost absolute advantage to veterans who acquired
passing scores. '5 Justice Stewart reasoned that the veterans' hiring
preference was a traditionally justified method with which to "reward
veterans for the sacrifice of military service, to ease the transition from
military to civilian life, to encourage patriotic service, and to attract
loyal and well-disciplined people to civil service occupations."' 16 Jus-

tice Stewart analyzed the historical aspects of the veterans preference
statute in Massachusetts and, in a footnote, added that veteran preference laws had been challenged so often that the supporting rationale
had beome "essentially standardized."' 7 The instant case, however,
was the first to challenge the Massachusetts scheme on the grounds that
it discriminates on the basis of gender.' 8
12. Id.
13. 99 S.Ct. at 2286.
14. The opinion was joined by Burger, C.J., and White, Powell, Blackmun, Rehnquist
and Stevens, JJ. Stevens, J., wrote a concurring opinion, joined by White, J. Marshall, J.,
wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, J.,
joined.
15. See note 6 supra.
16. 99 S.Ct. at 2288. See also Hutcheson v. Director of Civil Serv., 361 Mass. 480, 281
N.E.2d 53 (1972).
17. Id. at 2288 n.12. See, e.g., Rios v. Dillman, 499 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1974); August v.
Bronstein, 369 F. Supp. 190 (S.D.N.Y.), a~fdmem., 417 U.S. 901 (1974); Koelfgen v. Jackson, 355 F. Supp. 243 (Minn. 1972), ajf'dmem., 410 U.S. 976 (1973). Cf.Mitchell v. Cohen
333 U.S. 411, 419 n.12 (1948) (argued in favor of special consideration for veterans). See
generally Blumberg, DeFacto and DeJure Sex Discrimination Under the Equal Protection
Clause. A Reconsideration ofthe Veterans'Preferencein PublicEmployment, 26 BUFFALO L.
REV. 3 (1977).

18. Similar challenges have been made in other states. See Branch v. Du Bois, 418 F.
Supp. 1128 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (sustaining Illinois' modified point preference); Wisconsin Nat'1
Organization for Women v. Wisconsin, 417 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Wis.. 1976) (sustaining Wisconsin's point preference); Feinerman v. Jones, 356 F. Supp. 252 (M.D. Pa. 1973) (sustaining
Pennsylvania point preference); Ballou v. Department of Civil Sen'., 75 N.J. 365, 382 A.2d
1118 (1978) (sustaining New Jersey's absolute preference).
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The Court established that Massachusetts had historically defined
the term "veteran" in gender-neutral language, as "any person, male or
female, including a nurse" and "any person who served in the United
States army or navy."' 19 Justice Stewart illustrated how women who
had served in the armed services during wartime had long enjoyed the
benefits of the veteran preference. The Court noted, however, that despite Massachusetts' attempts to include military women as well as
men, the statute still operated to the benefit of an overwhelmingly male
class. The result was largely attributable to a number of federal statutes, regulations and policies that limited the number of women serving
in the nation's armed services and precluded women from being subject
to the military draft. 20 When the instant case was initiated, over 98% of
the veterans in Massachusetts were male and only 1.8% were female.
Over one quarter of the state's entire population were veterans at that
time.
The state conceded that for" 'many of the permanent positions for
which males and females have competed [the veterans' preference has]
resulted in a substantially greater proportion of female eligibles than
male eligibles'" not being certified for consideration.2" For this reason
the Court concluded that the impact of the statute upon the right of
women to seek public employment had been severe and therefore lay at
the heart of the appellees' federal constitutional claim.
Justice Stewart began the analysis of the equal protection question
with an exploration of the Court's position on equal protection challenges to state legislation.2 2 The Fourteenth Amendment did not deny
the states all powers of classification. 3 When basic classifications were
rationally drawn, a law's uneven effects on certain groups were not usually of constitutional concern.24 The only question for the judiciary in
such matters was whether the legislative classification itself was valid. 5
The Court noted that certain classifications, such as those involving race, were particularly suspect. Racial classifications have been
19. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 4, § 7 (West 1974).
20. 99 S. Ct. at 2290-91. See generaly M. BINKIN & S. BACH, WOMEN AND THE MILITARY 4-21 (1977).

21. 99 S. Ct. at 2292.
22. Id. at 2292-93.
23. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976).

24. New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406
U.S. 535, 548 (1972). Cf.James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (equal protection challenge
to a California law requiring a referendum to approve low-rent housing projects).
25. See Railway Express Co. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Barrett v. Indiana, 229
U.S. 26, 29-30 (1913). See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). See generally

Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979).
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held presumptively invalid regardless of their purported motivation

and could be upheld only if supported by an extraordinary justification.26 Moreover, a statute ostensibly neutral on its face still could be
held unconstitutional if the Court established that it is an obvious pretext for discrimination.2 7 The dispositive question was not whether the
'law causes a disproportionately adverse effect upon a particular group,
but whether that impact could be traced to a discriminatory purpose.2 8
Only then would it run afoul of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although race classifications have long been the central focus of
such inquiries, gender classifications have themselves been a touchstone for various forms of discrimination.29 The Feeney Court
adopted, perhaps more clearly than ever before, the standard established in Craig v. Boren3 ° whereby the Court determined that gender

classifications must bear a close and substantial relationship to important governmental objectives.3 Failure to meet the test necessarily rendered the statute unconstitutional.32 Justice Stewart extended this
standard to public employment3 3 and determined that "any state law
overtly or covertly designed to prefer males over females in public employment would require an exceedinglypersuasivejustfcationto withunder the Equal Protection Clause of
stand a constitutional challenge
34
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The opinion next discussed the Supreme Court decisions in Wash26. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
27. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886). Cf. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (black citizens challenged a state
gerrymander law which prohibited blacks from voting in municipal elections); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939) (a constitutional challenge to racially discriminatory voter registration laws).
28. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
29. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 398 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
30. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
31. Id. at 197.
32. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979);
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Weinberger
v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
33. There is no constitutional right to employment in either the federal or state civil
service. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). It is generally
for the states to prescribe employee qualifications and they have wide discretion in doing so.
See, e.g., New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
34. 99 S. Ct. at 2293 (emphasis added).
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ington v. Davis35 and Village ofArlington Heights v. MetropolitanHousing Development Corp.,36 as cases which recognized that an
unconstitutional purpose may have been at work when an otherwise
neutral law was shown to have had a disparate impact on a group that
historically had been the victim of discrimination. Washington v. Davis
upheld a police department's written personnel test in which a higher
percentage of blacks failed than whites. The Davis Court found no
evidence that racial discrimination tainted either the establishment or
fomulation of the test. Arlington Heights upheld a zoning board's decision which resulted in a racially disproportionate impact, thereby perpetuating racially segregated housing patterns. The Court determined
that the zoning board's decision was nothing more than an application
of a constitutionally neutral zoning policy. Justice Stewart concluded
that the two cases did nothing to affect the well-settled rule that the
37
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees "equal laws, not equal results.
The two cases did, however, form the basis for evaluating gender dis-

crimination cases.38

Justice Stewart enunciated the two-fold inquiry that should be
used when a statute, which is gender-neutral on its face, is challenged
on the ground that its effects are disproportionately adverse to women:
"The first question is whether the statutory classification is indeed neutral in the sense that it is not gender-based. If the classification itself,
covert of [sic] overt, is not based upon gender, the second question is
whether the adverse effect reflects invidious gender-based discrimination." 9 Justice Stewart offered this two-fold inquiry as the basis for
analyzing the merits of Feeney's claim as to the presence or absence of
purposeful discrimination within the statute.
Applying this two-fold inquiry, the Court first considered whether
chapter 31, section 23, which was clearly gender-neutral on its face, was
nonetheless gender-based in its purpose." The majority opinion
agreed with the district court's central findings that chapter 31, section
23 served legitimate purposes and that the statute had not been estab35. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
36. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
37. 99 S. Ct. at 2293.
38. Id.
39. Id. Justice Stewart noted that a finding of adverse impact is, in itself, only a starting
point. It is the purposeful discriminationthat is offensive to the Constitution. Id See also
Swarm v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
40. Appellee Feeney admitted that the veterans' hiring preference was gender-neutral
on its face. She further acknowledged that such hiring statutes were not per se invalid and
she limited her attack to the Massachusetts "absolute preference." 99 S. Ct. at 2293-94.
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lished for the purpose of discriminating against women. The Court
thereby determined that the distinction between veterans and nonveterans, as drawn by the statute, had not been originatedfor the purpose of
gender discrimination.4 '
Turning next to the statute's impact, the Court explored whether
the statute's "real classification" was in fact neutral. 2 The seminal
question here was whether significant numbers of women were precluded by the statute from obtaining preferred state civil service jobs
because they were women, or rather, because they were nonveterans.
The Court again noted that Massachusetts had consistently defined
"veterans" in gender-neutral language and had always included women who served in the nation's military forces. Since veteran status
was not "uniquely male" and the nonveteran class was not substantially all-female, the fact that few women benefit from the preference
statute was not conclusive of a gender-based discriminatory purpose.
Conversely, the Court found that the statute's disadvantages affected
all nonveterans, male as well as female. The Court concluded: "Too
many men are affected by ch. 31, § 23 to permit the inference
that the
43
statute is but a pretext for preferring men over women.
Viewing the statute's purposes as the surest explanation of its impact, the Court held: "Just as there are cases in which impact alone can
unmask an invidious classification . . . there are others, in which-

notwithstanding impact-the legitimate noninvidious purposes of a law
cannot be missed. This is one. The distinction made by ch. 31, § 23, is,
as it seems to be, quite simply between veterans and nonveterans, not
between men and women." 44 Consequently, the dispositive question
became "whether the appellee has shown that a gender-based discriminatory purpose has, at least in some
measure, shaped the Massachusetts
'45
veterans' preference legislation.

Feeney argued that chapter 31, section 23 could not fall within the
"neutral" rubric of Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights for two
reasons. First, she contended that the nature of the preference was "demonstrably gender-biased" because "it favors a status reserved under
federal military policy primarily to men."4 6 Second, she argued that
the statute's impact upon the employment opportunities for women was
41. Id. at 2294. See also note 16 and accompanying text supra.
42. Id See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 266 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
43. 99 S.Ct. at 2294.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. This argument was premised on federal regulations that restricted the number
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simply too inevitable to have been unintended. She concluded that by
coupling these factors with the statute's lack of any relevance to actual
job performance, she had clearly proved a discriminatory intent forbidden by the Constitution. But the majority of the Court could not agree
with her conclusions.
Justice Stewart dimissed Feeney's contention that the veterans'
preference was "inherently non-neutral" or "gender-biased." He concluded that such a presumption must necessarily assume that the legislature's intention in passing the statute was to incorporate into its civil
service employment policies the array of allegedly discriminatory federal laws that limited the number of women who could acquire veteran
status.4 7 The Court did not agree with that contention for two reasons. a" First, it was at odds with the district court's finding that Massachusetts had not purposefully discriminated against women by offering
the veteran preference. Second, it could not be reconciled with the assumption made by both the appellee and the district court that a less
extensive veteran preference could have been sustained. "Taken together," the majority concluded, "these difficulties are fatal."4 9
Justice Stewart admitted that veterans' hiring preferences, however
modest or extreme, were inherently gender-biased.5" But, he opined,
the dispositive issue was whether the intent was to benefit veterans, or
instead, to discriminate against women. He concluded that if it were
the latter, the discriminatory intent, no matter how slight or small,
would mandate that the preference statute be struck down. Justice
Stewart stated: "Invidious discrimination does not become less so because the discrimination accomplished is of a lesser magnitude. Discriminatory intent is simply not amenable to calibration. It either is a
factor that has influenced the legislative choice or it is not."'" Concurring with the reasoning of the district court that the preference statute
was not originally enacted or subsequently reaffirmed for purposes of
sex discrimination, the majority concluded that "the State . . . intended nothing more than to prefer 'veterans.' "52
The majority opinion next addressed what Justice Stewart termed
the appellee's "ultimate argument." The argument rested on the preof women in the military to no more than 2% of the total force. Such limitations have since
been abolished.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2294-95.
49. Id. at 2295.
50. Id.
51. Id. (footnote omitted).
52. Id.
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sumption, common to the criminal and civil law, that a person intends
the natural and foreseeable consequences of his voluntary actions. 3
The Massachusetts legislature was clearly aware that most veterans are
men and that passage of the preference statute would have had an adverse effect on women candidates for the more desirable state civil service positions. But the term "discriminatory purpose" means more than
intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. 4 It implies
that the legislature selected or reaffirmed a course of action at least in
part because of, not merely in spite of, the adverse effects it would have
on an identifiable group." The Court could not discern such a purpose
in the instant case. Instead, the legislative history showed that the preference was consistently offered to "any person," rather than just to
males. Justice Stewart, applying the Washington v. Davis56 rationale,
found that: "the law remains what it purports to be: a preference for
veterans of either sex over nonveterans of either sex, not for men over
57
women."
The opinion concluded with a short dissertation on the awkwardness of veterans' hiring preferences as an "exception to the widely
shared view that merit and merit alone should prevail in the employment policies of government."5 8 There is no question that veteran hiring preferences enjoy more public support in wartime than in
peacetime and that absolute and permanent preferences are thought by
some to give the veteran more than a square deal. But as the Court
determined "the Fourteenth Amendment 'cannot be made a refuge
from ill-advised. . . laws.' -59 The Court made no attempt to advocate
the Massachusetts law. It simply concluded that Appellee Feeney
failed to demonstrate that the law reflected a discriminatory purpose on
the basis of gender.
The judgment of the district court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.60
53. Id. Justice Stewart cited the concurring opinion in the district court decision, Feeney v. Massachusetts, 451 F. Supp. 143, 151 (D. Mass. 1978), for a definitive statement of
appellee's argument.
54. Id. at 2296. See also United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 179
(1977) (Stewart, J., concurring).
55. Id.
56. 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
57. 99 S.Ct. at 2296.
58. Id. at 2296-97. This commentary will not explore the political ramifications of a
literal interpretation of the Court's phase "merit and merit alone" on various government
equal opportunity policies.
59. Id at 2297 (quoting District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S. 138, 150 (1909)).
60. Id. On remand, the United States District Court, Massachusetts, held that plaintiffs'
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Justice Stevens wrote a one-paragraph concurrence, joined by Justice White. Justice Stevens had difficulty with the majority's treatment
of classifications that were determined not to be overtly based on gender. For such cases, Justices Stevens and White felt that the question
whether the classification is covertly gender-based was the same as the
question whether the classification's adverse effects reflected invidious
gender-based discrimination. Regardless of which approach was taken,
the concurrence found sufficient numbers of disadvantaged males in
the instant case to refute any claim that the veteran hiring preference
was intended to benefit males as a class and to disadvantage females as
a class.61
Justice Marshall wrote a vigorous dissent and was joined by Justice Brennan. The dissent found that a clear discriminatory intent behind the statute was to be inferred from the inevitable or foreseeable
impact of the preference. Justice Marshall concluded: "In my judgment, Massachusetts' choice of an absolute veterans' preference system
evinces purposeful gender-based discrimination. And because the statutory scheme bears no substantial relationship to a legitimate governmental objective, 6it2 cannot withstand scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause."

The dissent asserted that when a legislature sought to advantage
one group, it was not illogical that they also sought to disadvantage
another group. Further, they asserted that it was often impossible to
63
ascertain a sole or even dominant intent behind any given statute.
The critical constitutional inquiry, then, should not be "whether an illicit consideration was the primary or but-for cause of a decision, but
rather whether if had an appreciablerole in shaping a given legislative
enactment."' The dissent acknowledged that in analyzing such cases,
it is often necessary to use inferences based on objective factors since
equal protection and due process claims were rendered insubstantial by the Supreme Court's
decision. Feeney v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 475 F. Supp. 109 (1979) (Tauro, J.
dissenting). The district court refused to review plaintiff's newly-raised due process argument that non-veterans substantive liberty interest in public employment is subverted by the
veteran's preference statute. 475 F. Supp. at 11. The United States Supreme Court affirmed. Feeney v. Personnelldministratorof Massachusetts (79-953, February 25, 1980).
61. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
62. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 2297-98. See McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1973); Ely, Legislative andAdministrativeMotivation in ConstitutionalLaw, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1214 (1970).
64. Id. at 2298 (emphasis added). See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977).
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reliable evidence of subjective intentions is seldom available. 65 Justice
Marshall cited several cases in which the Court had considered the underlying degree, inevitability and foreseeability of a statute's dispropor66
tionate impact, as well as the reasonable alternatives to the statute.
The undisputed impact of the Massachusetts statute had been to
render desirable civil service employment an almost exclusively male
prerogative.6 7 Justice Marshall concluded that when a statute reserves
a major sector of public employment for one class, 98% of whom were
males, the foreseeable impact of the "neutrar' policy was so disproportionate that the burden should rest on the state to establish that genderbased considerations did not enter into the enactment of the legislative
scheme.6 8 It was this burden, the dissent insisted, that the state should
have been required to satisfy.
Justice Marshall asserted that the Massachusetts statute created a
gender-based civil service hierarchy, with women holding low grade
clerical and secretarial jobs and men holding the more prestigious
higher paying positions. 69 He concluded that the wide range of less
discriminatory alternatives available to assist veterans and the predictably adverse effects of the statute on women rendered it anything but
gender-neutral.7" This statutory scheme, the dissent asserted, perpetuated the type of archaic assumptions about women's roles that had previously been held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.7 '
In the second section of Justice Marshall's dissent, he revisited the
equal protection test from Craigv. Boren,7" whereby any statute reflecting gender-based discrimination must be substantially related to the
achievement of important governmental objectives.7 3 The dissent next
65. Id. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 148-49 n.4 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
66. See Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450,459 (1968); Goss v. Board of Educ.,
373 U.S. 683, 688-89 (1963); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12, 17 n.11 (1956).
67. 99 S. Ct. at 2298 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 2298-99. See generally, Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of UnconstitutionalLegislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. L. REv. 95, 123.
69. 99 S. Ct. at 2299. See Feeney v. Massachusetts, 451 F. Supp. 143, 148 n.9 (D. Mass.
1978); Anthony v. Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. 485, 488 (D. Mass. 1976).
70. Id.
71. Id See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 210-11
(1977); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636,
645 (1975).
72. 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
73. 99 S. Ct. at 2299 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313,
316-17 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76
(1971).
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examined the three salient interests proposed by Massachusetts to support the absolute veterans' preference: (1) assisting veterans to readjust
to civilian life; (2) encouraging military enlistment by providing a
"headstart" to substantial employment upon leaving the service; and
(3) rewarding those individuals who have served their country.7 4
Justice Marshall asserted that the interest in facilitating veteran
transition to civilian status was overinclusive.7 5 This effect was due to
the large number of veterans who enjoyed the benefits of the statute but
who were discharged from the armed services many years before. Justice Marshall contended that such veterans had no need for readjustment assistance. The disseent also attacked the state's second asserted
justification for the statute, that of encouraging military enlistments.
Justice Marshall pointed out that the majority of those affected by the
statute were drafted into the service. If the statute's purpose was to
encourage enlistment, he opined, it was ill-suited for its purpose. 6
Finally, the dissent attacked Massachusetts' third proposed justification, that of rewarding veterans for service to their country. Justice
Marshall wrote: "Where a particular statutory scheme visits substantial
hardship on a class long subject to discrimination, the legislation cannot be sustained unless 'carefully tuned to alternative considerations.'" ' 77 He then discussed a number of less discriminatory
alternatives such as a points system or an absolute preference of limited
duration.7 8 Finally, he addressed a number of Massachusetts programs
that already assisted the veteran in various ways such as tax abatements, educational subsidies and special programs for needy veterans.
The dissent concluded: "In its present unqualified form, the Veterans Preference Statute precludes all but a small fraction of Massachusetts women from obtaining any civil service position also of
interest to men. . . . Given the range of alternatives available, this degree of preference is not constitutionally permissible. I would affirm
the judgment of the court below."7 9
74. 99 S. Ct. at 2300 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
75. Id. The dissent argued that the statute conferred a permanent preference, which
could be invoked repeatedly, thus negating its justification as an aid to readjustment to civilian life.
76. Id See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. at 317; Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at
648.
77. 99 S. Ct. at 2300 (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 772 (1971)). See Caban
v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
78. 99 S. Ct. at 2300.
79. Id.
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Analysis
The Supreme Court has long treated state classification by race,
national origin or alien status as suspect and therefore subject to strict
scrutiny." Gender discrimination, however, has never been held to the
high standards of review characteristic of the Supreme Court's handling of the other forms of stereotypic classification and legislation.
Not until its decision in Reed v. Reed 8 did the Court choose to review
political judgments respecting the role of women.8 2 In Reed, the Court
unanimously invalidated an Idaho statute requiring that a male be appointed to administer an estate if two individuals, one male and one
female, were otherwise equally entitled to the appointment. Although
the Court purported to use its traditional rational relationship test, it
stated that "[tlo give a mandatory preference to members of either sex
over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of
hearings on the merits, [was] to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by [the guarantee of equal protection]." 8 3
It became clearer in later decisions that the Court was indeed assuming a special sensitivity to gender as a classifying factor. In Frontiero v. Richardson 4 a plurality of the Court discussed support for
holding classifications based on gender to be suspect.s In Weinberger
v. Wiesenfeld8 6 and Stanton v. Stanton,8 7 the Court continued searching for a clear test with which to analyze gender classifications. These
cases dealt with laws affecting behavior: "All either prevented, or economically discouraged, departures from 'traditional' sex roles, freezing
biology into social destiny."88
In 1976 the Court decided Craig v. Boren,8 9 which invalidated a
80.

L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1060 (1978).

81. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
82. TRIBE, supra note 80, at 1063.
83. 404 U.S. at 76. See TRIBE supra note 80, at 1063. See also Gunther, The Supreme
Court 1971 Term: Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrineon a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer EqualProtection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 34 (1972).
84. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
85. Id. at 682. Justices Douglas, Marshall and White joined Justice Brennan's plurality
opinion, -announcing the judgment of the Court. Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment
but did not join the plurality opinion. Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Blackmun, also concurred in the judgment of the Court, but determined that it was
unnecessary to decide whether gender constituted a suspect classification.
86. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
87. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
88. TRIBE, supra note 80, at 1065. See also Davis v. Passman, 439 U.S. 925 (1979)
(holding United States Congressman's dismissal of female staff member on basis of gender
violative of Fifth Amendment).
89. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Justice Brennan wrote the opinion for a seven-to-two Court.
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state statute forbidding the sale of 3.2% beer to males under twentyone, but permitting such sales to females over eighteen. The Craigmajority adopted a new intermediate standard of review in which they
determined that gender classifications must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially relatedto the achievement
of those objectives. 90 This new intermediate test falls short of the strict
scrutiny test employed in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke9t and sets a new standard for analysis of statutory gender classifications. In Feeney, decided two years after Craigv. Boren, the entire
Court appeared to adopt the intermediate standard of review for gender classifications. What this may mean in the future is open to speculation, but the instant case, like Vorchheimer v. School District,9 2
strongly suggests that a new pragmatism is on the horizon for cases
involving gender classifications. The standard of review is now clearer,
but the future judicial interpretation of that standard is not. Without
strict scrutiny the cases may well be filled with appellate review of essentially factual determinations.
The intermediate standard for judicial review of statutory gender
classifications provides that any law overtly or covertly designed to prefer males over females, or vice versa, requires an importantgovernmental objective and must be substantially related to the achievement of
that objective. The instant case further defines the Court's position by
requiring an exceedinglypersuasivejustocationto support such a statute.93 The Court must also discern the purpose behind statutes which,
on their face, appear neutral. The disparate impact of such statutes
upon groups that have historically been the victims of discrimination is
of particular concern. But the important consideration is the discriminatorypurose behind the law, not the disparate impact or result.
Unequal results merely point to the possibility of an unconstitutional
purpose; they are not conclusive evidence of such a purpose. In the
instant case the unequal result of the veterans' preference was not the
principal issue. The dispositive determination in Feeney was that the
intent was to benefit veterans rather than to discriminate against woJustices Powell, Stevens, Stewart and Blackmun each wrote separate concurring opinions.
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist both fied dissenting opinions.
90. TRIBE, supra note 80, at 1066.
91. 439 U.S. 265 (1978).
92. 430 U.S. 703 (1977) (per curiam) (4-4) (Rehnquist, J., not participating). An evenly
divided Court upheld the Philadelphia School District's maintenance of two sexually segregated senior high schools where the education and facilities were determined to be equal,
although separate.
93. See notes 34-37 and accompanying text supra.
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94

The Court appears to have had some difficulty in justifying the
statute's obviously non-neutral nature in that it overtly prefers one class
of people, veterans, over others. This problem is compounded somewhat in that the statute does not attempt to define a job-related characteristic. 95 The statute simply confers upon veterans-a class evidently
perceived to be deserving-a competitive, if not overwhelming, head
start. The Court makes no attempt to defend the enlistment policies of
the armed forces and even admits that they may have discriminated on
the basis of gender.96 But, as Justice Stewart concludes, "the history of
discrimination against women in the military is not on trial in this
97
case."
The Court clearly indicated displeasure with the awkwardness and
permanence of the Massachusetts preference and admitted that the
state legislature may have been following an unwise policy. 98 Interestingly, the majority alluded to the "widely shared view that merit and
merit alone should prevail in the employment policies of government." 99 This is curious language coming from a Court so concerned
with the success of a myriad of equal opportunity and affirmative action policies which serve to supplement the merit system in governmental procedures for employment and administration. The Court insisted,
however, that it would not make the Fourteenth Amendment a "refuge
from ill-advised. . . laws."' 00
The dissent merely reflects the antithesis of the majority's findings
concerning the existence of a discriminatory intent behind the veterans'
preference statute, that it is to be inferred from its inevitable and foreseeable impact. 1 ' This approach is a logical result of the intermediate
test, whereby some justices discern the facts in one manner, some in
another. But the dissent seems to want to move the intermediate test
closer to the strict scrutiny analysis of Regents of the Universiy of California v. Bakke.102 Justice Marshall's desire to alter the causative con94. See notes 47-50 and accompanying text supra.
95. 99 S. Ct. at 2295. For example, in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 229, the written
test at issue was defended as a gauge with which certain human characteristics desired in
police officers could be measured.
96. 99 S.Ct. at 2295. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
97. 99 S.Ct. at 2295.
98. 99 S.Ct. at 2297. See notes 58, 59 and accompanying text supra.
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. Id. See notes 58, 59 and accompanying text supra.
101. Id. at 2298 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
102. 439 U.S. 265 (1978).
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stitutional inquiry is designed for that purpose. 10 3 He was successful,
however, in recruiting only Mr. Justice Brennan in support of the proposal.
In Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, the
Supreme Court apparently adopted the Craig v. Boren intermediate
standard of judicial review for cases involving assertions of genderbased discrimination. All nine members of the Court appeared to accept its premise and adopt its test. On a legal basis the test promises a
case-by-case factual analysis of statutes and their legislative histories,
however tedious and subjective. The difficulties associated with such
analysis seem to be necessary if we are to avoid the suspect classification for gender and the concomitant purge of all statutory provisions
which contain even the slightest hint of gender bias. The Court clearly
refused to indulge in such a total reconstruction of government employment and administration practices and procedures. They left such
restructuring to the state legislatures but they left no question that they
believed Massachusetts should reevaluate its preference system.
What of Feeney and others like her who may fall between the
cracks of the intermediate test? There is no doubt that this decision will
make it more difficult for women to base gender discrimination claims
on the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The alternatives are few and they are not promising. First, they may bring
their cases to state courts and base their claims on state constitutional
grounds, grounds which may provide more protection in such matters
than the federal constitution provides. Second, they can try to change
the laws in the state and federal legislatures. This too is a bleak prospect since veterans possess strong political power in the legislatures. 104
Unless such changes occur, challengers must establish for the courts a
clear discriminatory intent or purpose behind the statute they seek to
nullify.

Caban v. Mohammed*
In Caban v. Mohammed,' a divided United States Supreme Court
struck down on equal protection grounds a New York statute which
allowed an unwed mother, but not an unwed father, to block the adop-,
103. See notes 63, 64 and accompanying text supra.
104. NEWSWEEK, June 18, 1979, at 52.
* Commentary by Dorothy McArthur, member, third-year class.
1. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
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tion of their illegitimate child. The five Justice majority found the statute unconstitutional on the grounds that the gender-based distinction
contained in the statute was not substantially related to the achievement of important governmental objectives.
Abdiel Caban sired two children, David Andrew Caban2 and Denise Caban,3 during the six-year period in which he lived with Maria
Mohammed in New York City. The couple held themselves out as
husband and wife during this time and Caban had been denoted as the
father on the birth certificates of the two children. Although the couple
was never legally married,4 both contributed to the support of the family unit.5 In December of 1973 the couple separated. The following
January, Maria, who had custody of the children, married Kazim Mohammed. 6 Caban continued to see the children on a weekly basis7 until, at the Mohammeds' request, the children moved to Puerto Rico
with Maria's mother.8 Both parents kept in touch with the children,
and in November of 1975, Caban secured their return to New York
through deceptive means.9 After unsuccessfully attempting to retrieve
the children, Maria instituted custody proceedings and was awarded
temporary custody.' ° Caban retained visitation rights." In the interim, 12 the Mohammeds filed a petition to adopt the children under
section 110 of the New York Domestic Relations Law.' 3 Two months
later, Caban and his new wife, Nina, cross-petitioned for adoption.
2. Born July 16, 1969.
3. Born March 12, 1971.
4. Caban was married to another woman throughout the period of cohabitation. 441
U.S. at 382.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Caban was able to see the children when Maria brought them to visit her mother
who lived one floor above Caban. Id.
8. Id.
9. The grandmother agreed to let Caban take the children for a few days while he was
visiting in Puerto Rico. Caban returned to New York with them. Id. at 383.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. The custody proceeding was stayed pending determination of the adoption proceeding. Id.
13. Id. Section 110 of the New York Domestic Relations Law provides in pertinent
part: "An adult or minor husband and his adult or minor wife together may adopt a child of
either of them born in or out of wedlock and an adult or minor husband or an adult or
minor wife may adopt such a child of the other spouse." N.Y. DoNi. REL. LAW § 110 (MCKinney 1977).
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The Lower Court Decisions
In granting the petition filed by the Mohammeds, the Surrogate 4
noted that Maria had exercised her rights under section 111 of the New
York Domestic Relations Law 5 and had withheld her consent to the
cross-petition lodged by the Cabans, thus effectively precluding Abdiel,
the natural father, from ever adopting the children. Abdiel, on the
other hand, had no corresponding power but was merely entitled to a
voice in the adoption proceedings instituted by Maria.' 6
Caban appealed the Surrogate's decision to the Appellate Division
of the New York Supreme Court17 and to the New York Court of Appeals.'" Both courts affirmed the Surrogate's decision on the ground
that the New York Court of Appeals decision in In re Adoption of
Aapica-Orsini9 foreclosed the possibility of a different decision on the
constitutional challenge levied by appellant.
In that case, the New York Court of Appeals had noted that it was
outside the province of the judiciary to legislate2" and that states could
14. The two petitions were heard by a law assistant to a New York Surrogate in Kings
County, N.Y.
15. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney 1977).
16. 441 U.S. at 380-87.
17. In re David Andrew C., 56 A.D.2d 627, 391 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1977).
18. In re David A.C., 43 N.Y.2d 708, 372 N.E.2d 42, 401 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1977).
19. 36 N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E.2d 486, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511, appealdismissedsub noma. Orsini
v. Blasi, 423 U.S. 1042 (1977) (lack of substantial federal question).
The facts in In re Adoption of Malpica-Orsini are virtually on point with the action
before the Court. In that case a child was born to Hector Orsini and Corrine Caberti outside
the bonds of marriage. The father readily admitted paternity and provided support for the
child. Upon separation, the mother retained custody of the child, but Orsini made monthly
payments and continued to visit the child. In January of 1973, the mother took steps to sever
all ties with the father, the following February she married another man. The natural father
did not learn of the mother's marriage until he brought an action to enforce his visitation
rights. At this time the natural mother announced her marriage and instituted adoption
proceedings.
Although the family court required that Orsini be notified, they held that the natural
father's consent was not a prerequisite to the adoption.
Orsini appealed the court's holding directly to the New York Court of Appeals. That
court, in a split decision, upheld the lower court's finding that there had been no abridgment
of Orsini's rights under either an equal protection or due process challenge.
20. The court articulated several well-established principles which guided their inquiry
concerning the constitutionality of the challenged statute: "that a legislative enactment carries with it an exceedingly strong presumption of constitutionality; that, while this presumption is rebuttable, unconstitutionality must be demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt; that
every intendment is in favor of the statute's validity; that the party alleging unconstitutionality has a heavy burden; and that only as a last resort will courts strike down legislative
enactments on the ground of unconstitutionality. Nor may courts substitute their judgment
for that of the Legislature as to the wisdom and expediency of the legislation.
"There is a further presumption that the Legislature has investigated and found facts
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treat different classes of people in different ways so long as the classification was reasonable, not arbitrary and bore a fair and substantial
relation to the objective sought-thus resulting in equal treatment for
all persons similarly situated."'
Because "sensitive and fundamental personal rights" were involved, a five judge majority of the appellate court recognized the need
for elevated scrutiny. 2 The court's inquiry focused on two essential
questions: first, the legitimate state interest promoted by the classification, and second, the fundamental personal rights endangered by the
classification.2"
The court determined that the child's welfare was the state interest
behind the enactment of section 111 of the New York Domestic Relations Law.24 As a corollary to that state interest, the court contrasted
the negative and unjust impact that the status of illegitimacy could
have on a child25 with the positive benefits afforded such a child
through the adoption process. "Adoption," as the court saw it, "is a
means of establishing a real home for a child."2 6 A happy family life
necessary to support the legislation. . . as well as the existence of a situation showing or
indicating its need or desirability. . . Thus, if any state of facts, known or to be assumed,
justify the law, the court's power of inquiry ends." 36 N.Y.2d at 570-71, 331 N.E.2d at 488,
370 N.Y.S.2d at 514.
21. Id. at 571, 331 N.E.2d at 488-89, 370 N.Y.S. 2d at 515.
22. "Though the latitude given state economic and social regulation is necessarily
broad, when state statutory classifications approach sensitive and fundamental personal
rights, this Court exercises a stricter scrutiny." Id. at 574, 331 N.E.2d at 490, 370 N.Y.S.2d at
517-18 (citing Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
23. 36 N.Y.2d at 574, 331 N.E.2d at 490, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 517-18.
24. Id. at 575, 331 N.E.2d at 491, 370 N.Y.S. 2d at 519. "The welfare of a child is a
legitimate State interest and the State has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in matters affecting the child's welfare." Id. (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944)).
25. 36 N.Y. 2d at 574-75, 331 N.E.2d at 491, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 518 (quoting Weber v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1972)). "'The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society's condemiation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds
of marriage. But visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust.'" Id.
26. 36 N.Y.2d at 572, 331 N.E.2d at 489, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 511. See SCHATKIN, DIsPUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS 119 (3d ed. 1944). The New York court looked to Isaac's
book, Adopting a Child Today, for further support for its views on the preferability of adoption: "Adoption has always had the dual function of giving children homes and homes children. . . . The emphasis is now on promoting the welfare of an otherwise homeless child.
• . . Illegitimacy and family breakdown have become problems on an unprecedented scale
in modem industrial societies. Never before have there been so many thousands of children
for whom society finds each year that it must make some provision. . . . [T]he purpose of
adoption is almost uniformly seen as promoting the welfare of children." ISAAC, ADOPTING
A CHILD TODAY 210-11 (1965).
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secured the additional benefit of producing well-adjusted citizens. To
require the illegitimate father's consent would only serve to impede the
adoption process2 7 which would work to the detriment of the child.28

The second question was concerned with the fundamental personal rights endangered by a classification of illegitimacy. The state
appellate court in examing this issue utilized the equal protection mode
of analysis formulated by Justice Powell in Weber v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 29 in weighing the rights claimed by the illegitimate father
against the aforementioned interest of the state.
Although an illegitimate father may indeed have an interest in the

future of his child, the difficulties posed by requiring his consent were
considered too onerous to make such a prerequisite viable in the eyes of
the court. In addition to the difficulty and expense involved in obtaining such consent, the appellate court looked to the burdens that

would be placed upon institutions and foundling homes due to the resulting uncertainity concerning the children they placed and the possibility of extortion that could. conceivably arise out of such a
requirement.3 0 Prospective parents, it was also feared, would be dissuaded from adopting illegitimates in light of such possible entanglements.3 '
With these considerations in mind the New York Appellate Court
stated:
The inferior classification of the father of the child born out of
wedlock bears a significant relationship to the recognized purpose which section 111 of the Domestic Relations Law commendably serves. Without it, the chances that such a child will
have the equal rights and benefits of a home will be immeasurably diminished and the likelihood that he or she will be a pawn
for the avaricious and embittered will be greatly enhanced.3 2
27. 36 N.Y.2d at 572, 331 N.E.2d at 489, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
28. Id. at 575-76, 331 N.E.2d at 491, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 519. Dr. Ner Littner, psychiatric
consultant to adoption agencies in Chicago has stated, "We know today that keeping a baby
in a boarding house can cripple him emotionally." Littner, Fathers'Rights-Supreme Court
Rulings on Adoption Complicate the Placingof Children, Wall St. J., July 9, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
29. 406 U.S. 164 (1972). "Justice Powell's formulation of the equal protection question
centers on the merits of the particular controversy at hand. It appears to allow a realistic
examination of conflicting policies and interests in a challenged statute without resort to the
tired formulations and stock responses which the two-tier approach automatically invokes."
In re Adoption of Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 575, 331 N.E.2d 486, 491, 370 N.Y.S. 2d
511, 518 (1975).
30. Id. at 572-73, 331 N.E.2d at 489-90, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 516-17.
3 I. Id. The court also expressed concern that marriages to illegitimate mothers having
custody of their child would be similarly discouraged because the prospective spouse might
never be able to adopt the child. Id.
32. Id. at 575, 331 N.E.2d at 491, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 519.
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The United States Supreme Court Decision
33
Without reaching the due process issues raised by the appellant,
the majority found that the distinction between illegitimate fathers and
all other parents34 drawn by the terms of the statute regarding the necessity of consent violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Although appellees had urged that the consent requirement lacked substance and that the controlling factor was a determination of what was in the best interests of the child, the Court found that
such a contention lacked support in New York case law. Indeed, in
looking at the case at hand, the Court found that the element of consent
rather than the best interests of the children had tipped the scales of
justice in favor of Maria's petition for adoption. The Court noted that
because Maria had had the power to withhold her consent, adoption by
Abdiel would effectively never have been possible. Abdiel had had no
corresponding power and thus his only mode of blocking adoption by
Maria was to prove her to be an unfit parent. 6
In seeking to provide adequate justification for the gender-based
distinction, appellees had set forth two primary arguments. First, they
asserted that the "fundamental difference between maternal and paternal relations" justified the distinction.3 7 The Court, however, explicitly
rejected this argument, ruling that "[e]ven if unwed mothers as a class
were closer than unwed fathers to their newborn infants, this generalization concerning parent-child relations would become less acceptable
38
as a basis for legislative distinctions as the age of the child increased."
Further, the Court found that "an unwed father may have a relationship with his children fully comparable to that of the mother." 3 9 The

33. Appellant contended that under the Court's decision in Quilloin v. Walcott, 434
U.S. 246 (1978), natural fathers have a due process right, unless they are adjudged unfit, to
continue their parental relationship with their child. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,
385 (1979). The Court declined, however, to decide "whether a state is constitutionally
barred from ordering adoption in the absence of a determination that the parent whose
rights are being terminated is unfit." Id. at 394 n.16.
34. Appellant Caban also challenged the constitutionality of the distinction made by
section 111 with regard to married fathers versus unmarried fathers. The Court, however,
did not reach this issue, having invalidated the statute on equal protection grounds. 441
U.S. at 394 n.16.
35. Id. at 387.
36. Id. at 387-88.
37. Id. at 388. "'[A] natural mother, absent special circumstances, bears a closer relationship with her child.., than a father does.'" Id. (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument
at 41).
38. 441 U.S. at 389. In the present action the children had lived as a family unit with
both parents and were ages four and six when adoption proceedings were instituted.
39. Id.
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Court went on to find that in the instant case, there was no reason to
to the children differed signifibelieve that the mother's relationship
40
cantly from that of the father.
Appellees next contended that the challenged statute was "substantially related to the State's interest in promoting the adoption of
illegitimate children,"'4 ' an argument to which the New York Court of
Appeals decision of In re Malpica-Orsinilent considerable support. In
examining that decision the Court acknowledged the important interest
of the state in providing for the welfare of such children. 42 The Court
found, however, that "neither the State nor the appellees have argued
that unwed fathers are more likely to object to the adoption of their
children than are unwed mothers; nor is there any self-evident reason
why as a class they would be."'43 The difficulties foreseen by the New
4 were dismissed by the
York Court of Appeals in In re Mapica-Orsini,
45
Court as pertaining primarily to infants. But where the father had
acknowledged his paternity and had established substantial ties with
his children, as in the instant case, the Court could see no reason for
denying him a voice equal to that of the unwed mother.46 Conversely,
the Court held that "where the father has never come forward to participate in the rearing of his child, nothing in the Equal Protection
Clause precludes the State from withholding from him the privilege of
vetoing the adoption of that child."'4 7
Although the Court conceded, in a footnote, that it was not the
function of a court "'to hypothesize independently on the desirability
or feasibility of any possible alternative[s]' to the statutory scheme formulated by [the State]," 4 8 they noted that alternatives existed other
than the gender-based distinction to serve the asserted state interest.49
The majority concluded by noting the harsh effect of the over-broad,
gender-based restriction contained in the statute on unwed but loving
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 390-91.
43. Id. at 392.
44. One difficulty foreseen by the Court was that of locating the father and establishing
paternity. Id.
45. The Court intimated that a legislative distinction favoring unwed mothers may be
justified at birth; however, because the question was not before them they did not directly
express their view. Id. at 392 & n.l l.
46. Id. at 393.
47. Id. It should also be noted that under the challenged statute, parental consent is not
necessary in adoption proceedings if the parent has abandoned or relinquished his or her
rights to the child. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111(2) (a) & (b) (McKinney 1977).
48. 441 U.S. at 393 n.13 (quoting Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 274 (1978)).
49. ld.
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fathers who had established ties with their children. For all of these
reasons the Court reversed the New York Court of Appeals and held
section 111 of the New York Domestic Relations Law to be unconstitutional.
Justices Stewart, Stevens, Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger all
took exception to the majority's holding. Justice Stewart, in an individual dissent,5 0 would have upheld section 111, citing as his primary reason the strong interest of the state in promoting the welfare of children
in general and of illegitimate children in particular, who were faced by
reason of their birth with "formidible handicaps."' Justice Stewart
noted that in contrast to legitimate children, "[illegitimate children]
typically depend upon the care and economic support of only one parent-usually the mother. 51 2 Adoption provided an avenue for removing such impediments. Because the adoption process was facilitated by
requiring the consent of only one parent, the mother, Justice Stewart
perceived a "substantial relationship" between the maternal consent requirement and the state objective to be served by adoption. 53 Justice
Stewart first addressed the equal protection and due process arguments
levied by the appellant with regard to the statutory distinction between
unwed fathers and all other parents.5 4
Having concurred with the majority in Stanley n:Illinois55 in striking down a statutory presumption that unwed fathers were not fit parents,56 Justice Stewart denounced appellant's reliance on that case,
noting that the present situation was distinguishable from Stanley.
First, he noted that in the present case the unwed mother was alive and
indeed sought full control of the children; second, in Stanley the father
had not even been afforded a hearing whereas Caban had actively participated in the adoption proceeding.5 7
Regarding the distinction between parental classes, Justice Stewart
stated: "Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological
50. 441 U.S. at 394 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 395.
52. Id.

53. Id.
54. Id. at 395-97.
55. 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (Justices White, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall and Douglas comprised the majority; Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun dissented; Justices Powell
and Rehnquist did not take part in the consideration or decision).
56. In Stanley, the state, upon death of the mother, removed the children from the custody of their father, without benefit of a hearing on his fitness as a parent. This occurred
because the parents had not been married, despite the fact that they had lived as husband
and wife for over 18 years. Id.
57. 441 U.S. at 396 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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connection between parent and child. They require relationships more
enduring. ' ' 58 While commenting that the mother's parental relationship was clearer due t6 the physiological ties,5 9 he also observed, "The
Constitution does not require that an unmarried father's substantive
parental rights must always be coextensive with those afforded to the
fathers of legitimate children. ... [T]he absence of a legal tie with the
60
mother provides a constitutionally valid ground for distinction.
Stewart conceded, however, that in "some circumstances the actual relationship between the father and the child may suffice to create in the
unwed father parental interests comparable to those of the married father."' 6 1 Similarly, Justice Stewart pointed out that if the father had
of the child, his consent would have been necessary under
legal custody
62
statute.
the
Appellant's equal protection challenge, predicated on alleged gender-based discrimination under the statute, was regarded by Justice
Stewart as more substantial and by its very nature deserving of "careful
constitutional examination. 63 Justice Stewart noted, however, that
gender-based classifications were not invalid when men and women
were not in fact similarly situated.64
Because an unwed mother, unlike the majority of unwed fathers,
was an identifiable figure in the child's life, common law and statutory
rules had given her the ability to confer or withhold consent in adoption proceedings. 5 Such a preference was based, according to Justice
Stewart, not on gender alone, but rather on the mother's total physical
and social relationship to the child.66 Were the Court dealing with a
58. Id. at 397.
59. Id. See also notes 90-94 and accompanying text infra for Justice Stewart's discussion concerning alleged discrimination on the basis of gender.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 395. Subsection l(d) of section 111 of the New York Domestic Relations Law
requires the consent of "any person. . . having lawful custody of the adoptive child." N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (1)(d) (McKinney 1977).
63. 441 U.S. at 398 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Such classifications are carefully scrutinized because of their tendency to be invidious and because "they may reflect or operate to
perpetuate mythical or stereotyped assumptions about the proper roles and the relative capabilities of men and women that are unrelated to any inherent differences between sexes."
.d.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 398-99.
66. Id. at 399: "[C]ommon and statutory rules of law reflect the physical reality that
only the mother carries and gives birth to the child, as well as the undeniable social reality
that the unwed mother is always an identifiable parent and the custodian of the child. ...
An unwed father who has not come forward and who has established no relationship with
the child is plainly not in a situation similar to the mother's. New York's consent distinc-
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situation where the unwed father had not established a relationship
with the child, the validity of the statutory distinction would have been
more apparent.6 7 While noting that Caban had established a paternal
relationship, Justice Stewart expressed his concurrence with the arguments set forth in Justice Stevens' dissent6 8 that because the statute was
constitutional as per the norm, it should not be invalidated to meet
such exceptional circumstances. 69 Justice Stewart went beyond this rationale, however, and inquired "whether the decision to select the unwed mother as the parent entitled to give or withhold consent and to
apply that rule even when the unwed father in fact has a paternal relationship with his children constitutes invidious sex-based discrimination. ' 70 In answering this question in the negative, Justice Stewart
considered what would best serve the interests of the child. Because
Caban was given the opportunity to show that the proposed adoption
by Maria and Kazim Mohammed would not be in the best interests of
the children, Justice Stewart contended that the Court was bound by
the implication contained in the lower court decision that adoption by
the Mohammeds was in the best interests of the children. 7 '
Justice Stevens authored a separate dissent and was joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist.7 2 Although Justice Stevens viewed appellant's primary objection to be the due process challenge, he accorded it minimal attention. Justice Stevens advocated an
extention of the language found in Stanley v. Illinois,7 3 which had indicated the Court's approval of the termination upon adoption of the parental rights of a father who had abandoned or mistreated his child, to
include situations where it is determined that the best interests of the
child will be served by adoption.7 4 In a situation such as that presented
by Caban v. Mohammed, where the natural family unit had been destroyed and the unwed father had not attempted previously to legitimate the children, such a termination would have been especially
tions have clearly been made on this basis, and in my view they do not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
67. Id.
68. See notes 100-18 and accompanying text infra.
69. 441 U.S. at 399-400 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 400.
71. Id. "Implicit in the finding made by the New York courts is the judgment that
termination of his relationship with the children will in fact promote their well-being.
Id.
72. Id. at 401 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist).
73. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
74. 441 U.S. at 414-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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beneficial. According to Justice Stevens, to require a showing of unfitness on the part of the father would only have dimmed the children's
chances of being legitimated.
In addressing the equal protection challenge, Justice Stevens noted

that elevated scrutiny was essential to any analysis of the challenged
statute. While not all males fell into the disadvantaged class, the statu-

tory distinction was still predicated on gender.76
Beginning with the premise that "[t]he state interest in facilitating
adoption in appropriate cases is strong-perhaps even 'compelling,' ,77
Justice Stevens sought to discern whether or not differences existed between the two classes which would have provided a justification for the
varied treatment under the statute.78 In line with this objective, Justice

Stevens focused on the relationship of both parents to a newborn 79 and
resolved that although "[b]oth parents are equally responsible for the
conception," from that point on the significance of the unwed mother's
role in the child's destiny far outweighed that of the unwed father.8 ° In

support of this contention, Justice Stewart made reference to sociological and anthropological research that indicated that both physical and
psychological bonds developed between the mother and child as a result of their symbiotic relationship and close contact during pregnancy
and immediately thereafter.8 Further, he noted that the identity of the
unwed father could be uncertain and should the mother have chosen

not to inform him of the anticipated birth, it was conceivable that the
unwed father might not be aware that he had sired a child." Because
of such "natural" differences, Justice Stevens drew the conclusion that
75. Id. at 415.
76. Id. at 403 n.4. The test for determining whether a distinction is gender-based is
whether "but for their gender the members of the class would not be disadvantaged." Id.
77. Id. at 402 (footnote omitted). Justice Stevens pointed out that he intentionally limited the word "compelling" by the word "perhaps" to convey not that any statute which
furthers the state interest is constitutional, but rather to suggest that, due to the important
state interest involved, courts should be compelled to give the statute careful thought before
ruling on its constitutionality. Id. at 402 n.3.
78. Id. at 403. "That determination requires more then merely recognizing that society
has traditionally treated the two classes differently. But it also requires analysis that goes
beyond a merely reflexive rejection of gender-based distinctions." Id. (footnote omitted).
79. Id. at 404. Justice Stevens' rationale for focusing on this early period was that
"most adoptions involve newborn infants or very young children." Id. (footnote omitted).
80. Id. In particular, Justice Stevens noted that the decision of whether or not to bear
the child, once conceived, rests with the mother. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 67-75 (1976).
81. Id. at 405 n.10. See also I & 2 J. BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND Loss (1969, 1973);
M. MAHLER, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BIRTH OF THE HUMAN INFANT (1975).
82. 441 U.S. at 404-05. The difficulty of proving paternity has frequently been noted by
the Court. See, e.g., Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259
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it was "probable that the mother, and not the father or both parents,
will have custody of the newborn infant." 3 Justice Stevens further
concluded that such "differences justify a rule that gives the mother of
a newborn infant the exclusive right to consent to its adoption."8 4 The
benefits deemed by Justice Stevens to flow from such a rule were : 1)
the rule allows the mother maximum flexibility in providing for the
welfare of the child; 2) it provides the unwed father with incentive to
marry the mother of his child; 3) it does not adversely affect the disinterested father; and, 4) it allows the child to be assimilated into the
adoptive home as quickly as is feasible.8 5 To strengthen his arguments,
Justice Stevens related several negative aspects of requiring the consent
of both parents-a rule that he contended would "complicate and delay
the adoptive process. '8 6 First, such a rule would remove the mother's
freedom of choice without concurrently decreasing her responsibility
for the child. Second, an invasion of the mother's privacy might be
required in order to give the unwed father notice.87 Finally, adoption
costs-in both the monetary and emotional senses-would necessarily
be increased.88 While a state could have deemed these factors a necessary burden to be borne by the mother in order to protect the interests
of an unwed father, such factors could also be viewed as providing justification for some gender-based distinctions.8 9
Justice Stevens also took issue with the majority's approach to
equal protection analysis. "[T]he mere fact that the statute draws a
'gender-based distinction,' . . . should not, . . . give rise to any presumption that the impartiality principle embodied in the Equal Protection Clause has been violated." 9 Rather, Justice Stevens would
require a demonstration that the unfairness had occurred in a significant number of situations before holding the statute to be in violation
of the equal protection clause.9 ' The dissents voiced doubt as to both
(1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770-71 (1977); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538
(1973).
83. 441 U.S. at 405 (footnote omitted).
84. Id. at 407.
85. Id. at 407-08. "Put most simply, it permits the maximum participation of interested
natural parents without so burdening the adoption process that its attractiveness to potential
adoptive parents is destroyed." Id. at 408.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 408-09.
89. Id. at 409.
90. Id. at 409-10 (footnote omitted).
91. Id. at 411-12. "The mere fact that an otherwise valid general classification appears
arbitrary in an isolated case is not a sufficient reason for invalidating the entire rule. Nor,
indeed, is it a sufficient reason for concluding that the application of a valid rule in a hard
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the wisdom and necessity of invalidating a rule which was pertinent in
the vast majority of adoptions while at the same time devising a special
rule to handle exceptional adoption circumstances, such as those
presented in Caban v. Mohammed.
Justice Stevens contended that the Court had limited, by its wording, the application of its decision to cases similar to the present one,
where paternity had been admitted and the unwed father had actively

participated in the development and support of the child.92 With this
limitation in mind, Justice Stevens warned that the holding of the
Court should be narrowly construed and should have no retroactive
application. 93 While he viewed the Court as having crossed "a new
constitutional frontier" he predicted that the decision would not affect
most future adoptions.94 He also noted that state legislatures were

likely to revise their adoption statutes to comply with the Supreme
Court's ruling; in the interim, however, he asserted that the existing
statutes could be enforced except when situations arise such as those
presented in the instant case.95
Analysis
The majority as well as the dissenting justices recognized the important state interest inherent in furthering the adoption process.9 6
They disagreed, however, on two distinct issues: first, the propriety of a

gender-based distinction which requires the consent of the mother but
not of the father; 97 and second, whether a statute need provide for excase constitutes a violation of equal protection principles. We cannot test the conformance
of rules to the principle of equality simply by reference to exceptional cases." Id. (footnotes
omitted).
92. Id. at 416.
93. Id. at 415-16.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 416. "In short, this is an exceptional case that should have no effect on the
typical adoption proceeding. Indeed, I suspect that it will affect only a tiny fraction of the
cases covered by the statutes that must now be rewritten. Accordingly, although my disagreement with the Court is as profound as that fraction is small, I am confident that the
wisdom of judges will forestall any widespread harm." Id. at 416-17.
96. Id. at 391 (majority opinion); 395 & 402 (dissenting opinions). The majority stated:
"The State's interest in providing for the well-being of illegitimate children is an important
one." Id. at 391. Justice Stewart stated: 'The State's interest in promoting the welfare of
illegitimate children is of far greater importance than the opinion of the Court would suggest." Id. at 395 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Finally, Justice Stevens stated: "The state interest
in facilitating adoption in appropriate cases is strong-perhaps even 'compelling."' Id. at
402 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(footnote omitted).
97. Id. at 391 (majority opinion); 398 (dissenting opinion). The majority stated: "[Tihe
unquestioned right of the State to further [the well-being of illegitimate children] is not in
itself sufficient to justify the gender-based distinction of § 11I." Id. at 391. Justice Stewart,
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ceptional situations such as the one presented by Caban, or merely be
suited to the needs of more traditional adoptions. 98
Finding no substantial relationship to link the distinction made
between unwed fathers and unwed mothers with the asserted state interests, the majority struck down the challenged statute. While acknowledging that unwed mothers may have closer ties with infant
children, the Court noted that "this generalization concerning parentchild relations would become less acceptable as a basis for legislative
distinctions as the age of the child increased." 99 The majority thus
found wanting appellees' argument that the distinction was justified by
the "fundamental difference between maternal and paternal relations."' 0 It should be noted, however, that the Court also explicitly
stated, "In those cases where the father never has come forward to participate in the rearing of his child, nothing in the Equal Protection
Clause precludes the State from withholding from him the privilege of
vetoing the adoption of that child."' 01 Indeed the majority viewed the
statute as already having provided for such parental abandonment. 2
The dissenters would have upheld the statute emphasizing the
weighty interest of the state 03 while at the same time asserting that the
dissimidistinction, though gender-based, could be justified due to1 the
4
adoptions.
of
majority
vast
the
in
larity of parental roles
on the other hand, stated: "[G]ender-based classifications are not invariably invalid. When
men and women are not in fact similarly situated in the area covered by the legislation in
question, the Equal Protection Clause is not violated. . . . In my view, the gender-based
distinction drawn by New York falls in this latter category." Id. at 398 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The differences in parental roles are considered by Justice Stevens to be sufficient
justification for the distinctions. Id. at 406-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98. The majority felt that "[t]he effect of New York's classification is to discriminate
against unwed fathers even when their identity is known and they have manifested a significant paternal interest in the child." Id. at 394. The contrary reasoning of the dissenting
Justices, as voiced by Justice Stevens, was that "[t]he mere fact that an otherwise valid general classification appears arbitrary in an isolated case is not a sufficient reason for invalidating the entire rule. Nor, indeed, is it a sufficient reason for concluding that the application of
a valid rule in a hard case constitutes a violation of equal protection principles." Id. at 41112 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
99. Id. at 389.
100. Id. at 388.
101. Id. at 392.
102. Id. "Indeed, under the statute as it now stands the surrogate may proceed in the
absence of consent when the parent whose consent otherwise would be required never has
come forward or has abandoned the child." Id. See also Id. at 392-93 n.13.
103. Id. at 395, 402.
104. Justice Stewart stated: "Our law has given the unwed mother the custody of her
illegitimate children precisely because it is she who bears the child and because the vast
majority of unwed fathers have been unknown, unavailable, or simply uninterested." Id. at
399 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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The Justices also disagreed as to whether such a statute necessarily
should provide for Caban-likesituations which allegedly vary from the
norm. The dissenters, while recognizing the injustice of the Caban situ-

ation, found it to be relatively rare and thus asserted, "The mere fact
that an otherwise valid general classification appears arbitrary in an
isolated case is not a sufficient reason for invalidating the entire
rule." 105 The majority, on the other hand, was concerned with provid-

ing additional protection for Caban-like situations.'06 If a father is not
a recognized figure in the child's life, he is deemed to have abandoned
the child and thus, by statute, his consent need not be obtained. If a

father has developed ties with his child, one may infer that, in the eyes
of the majority, his consent should be a prerequisite to the adoption of

that child.
In view of the foregoing it appears that only minor modifications

of current adoption statutes will be necessary to comply with the
Supreme Court mandate in Caban v. Mohammed. As more couples
have children outside the bonds of marriage, the value of such legisla-

tive modifications will be increasingly tested.
Parham v. Hughes*
Parham v. Hughes' is one of two decisions handed down the same
day involving an equal protection challenge by an unwed father.' The
object of the challenge in Parham was a Georgia statute' which pre-

cluded the father of an illegitimate child who had not legitimated4 the
child from suing for his or her wrongful death. In a plurality opinion,
105. Id. at 411-12 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
106. Id. at 394.
* Commentary by Dale G. Feinstein, member, third-year class.

1. 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
2. The other case is Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
3. GA. CODE ANN. § 105-1307 (1968). The statute provided: "A mother, or, if no
mother, a father, may recover for the homicide of a child, minor or sui juris, unless said
child shall leave a wife, husband or child. The mother or father shall be entitled to recover
the full value of the life of such child. In suits by the mother the illegitimacyofthe childshall
be no bar to a recovery."(emphasis added).
4. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-103 (1973). The statute provided: "A father of an illegitimate
child may render the same legitimate by petitioning the superior court of the county of his
residence, setting forth the name, age, and sex of such child, and also the name of the
mother, and if he desires the name changed, stating the new name, and praying the legitimation of such child. Of this application the mother, if alive, shall have notice. Upon such
application, presented and filed, the court may pass an order declaring said child to be legitimate, and capable of inheriting from the father in the same manner as if born in lawful
wedlock, and the name by which he or she shall be known."
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Justice Stewart, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist
and Stevens, held that the statute did not invidiously discriminate
against a class founded upon either illegitimacy or gender and that the
classification was rationally related to the permissible state objective of
avoiding fraudulent claims of paternity in the context of wrongful
death actions. Justice Powell, although concurring in the judgment,
claimed that there was a gender-based distinction. Applying the standard that the distinction must "serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives," 5 he found that the statute was indeed substantially related
to the state's objective of avoiding difficult problems of proof of paternity. Justices White, Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun, joining in a
dissent, found that there was gender-based discrimination under the
statute and that none of the interests advanced by the state warranted
that discrimination.
The Lower Court Decisions
Curtis Parham was the biological father of Lemeul Parham, a minor child who, along with his mother, Cassandria Moreen, was killed in
an automobile collision. Although Parham and Moreen were never
married and Parham did not legitimate his son, 6 he did execute the
child's birth certificate acknowledging paternity, contributed to his support7 and visited him daily. Following the accident, Parham sued the
driver of the other automobile charging that the defendant's negligence
caused the child's wrongful death. A similar suit was brought by the
child's maternal grandmother, acting as administratrix of his estate.'
The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that
Parham was precluded from recovering under section 105-1307 of the
Georgia Wrongful Death Act.9 The trial court denied defendant's motion, holding that the Georgia statute violated both the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
5. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
6. See note 4 supra.
7. Section 74-202 of the Georgia Code provided that "a father is required to support
an illegitimate child until the child reaches 18, marries, or becomes self-supporting, whichever occurs first." GA. CODE ANN. § 74-202 (1973).
8. Where there is no other person entitled to sue under the Georgia Wrongful Death
Act, the Act provides that the executor or administrator may sue and hold the recovery for
the benefit of the next of kin. GA. CODE ANN. § 105-1309 (Supp. 1979). See 441 U.S. at 350
n.4.
9. See note 3 supra.
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ruling.' 0 It assumed that the lower court had found a violation of equal

protection in a classification based upon illegitimacy." The high court
defined the equal protection test which the lower court applied as focusing on "whether the 'ends' to be reached by the governmental classification are legitimate and whether the means employed to achieve
"I2 The supreme
those ends are substantially related to them ... .

court identified the means as the denial by the Georgia General Assembly of an action for wrongful death to the father of an illegitimate
child. It then articulated four possible ends: 1) promoting a legitimate
family unit, 2) forestalling potential problems of proof of paternity in
wrongful death actions, 3) avoiding compensation for one who has suffered no real loss, 13 and 4) setting a standard of morality by refusing to
allow a natural father, who has not comported with the General Assembly's idea that society needs a legitimate family unit, to sue for
wrongful death benefits. 14 The court considered the proper standard of

scrutiny and concluded that an ordinary level should be employed
when the object of the classification is the parent of an illegitimate
child rather than the child himself. 5 The court concluded that the statutory classification was not rationally related to the legitimate state interests that the legislation sought to promote and hence the statute was
10. Hughes v. Parham, 241 Ga. 198, 243 S.E.2d 867 (1978).
11. Id. at 199, 243 S.E.2d at 869.
12. Id. at 200, 243 S.E.2d at 869.
13. The Georgia General Assembly had concluded that, more often than not, the father
of an illegitimate child who has elected neither to marry the mother nor to legitimate the
child suffers no real loss from the mother's wrongful death.
14. Id., 243 S.E.2d at 869-70. See also 441 U.S. at 350. Justice Stewart, in summarizing
the Georgia Supreme Court opinion, claimed that the state court had found that the classification was rationally related to three state interests: I) proof of paternity in wrongful death
actions; 2) promotion of a legitimate family unit; and 3) setting a standard of morality. Id.
The Georgia court opinion, however, stated: "All of thefour ends proffered by this court as
reasons for the legislative classification are legitimate state interests." (emphasis added) 241
Ga. at 201,243 S.E.2d at 870. Justice White's dissent also referred to four interests. 441 U.S.
at 362-68. (White, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.).
15. In arriving at this conclusion, the court examined United States Supreme Court
cases in which a classification based upon illegitimacy had been challenged. The court
found that all the cases in which a stricter level of scrutiny had been employed involved
discrimination suffered by illegitimate children because of their status--something over
which they had no control. The court distinguished two cases, Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
246 (1978) and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), which did involve fathers of illegitimate children who were faced with the forced loss of parental rights by state proceedings, on
the basis that these cases "rested not with any traditional discrimination against fathers of
illegitimate children, but rather, with the potential state infringement without proper hearing upon the fundamental right of an individual to raise a family." 241 Ga. at 201, 243
S.E.2d at 870 (1978).
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unconstitutional. 16
The United States Supreme Court Decision

Justice Stewart began his analysis by noting that state laws are
generally entitled to a presumption of validity against attack under the
equal protection clause. He qualified his statement by asserting that
the presumption may, however, be weakened when the state has enacted legislation creating classes based upon certain immutable human
attributes, among which are illegitimacy 7 and gender.' Thus the
threshold question considered by Justice Stewart was whether the
Georgia statute discriminated against a class based on either of these
characteristics.
In considering state legislative classifications based upon illegitimacy, Justice Stewart explained the rationale for declaring that classifications that differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate children
violate the equal protection guarantee: "it is unjust and ineffective for
society to express its condemnation of procreation outside the marital
'relationship by punishing the illegitimate child who is in no way responsible for his situation and is unable to change it."' 9 In applying
that rationale to the Georgia statute, Justice Stewart found that the
statute did not impose differing burdens upon legitimate and illegitimate children. Parham was responsible for conceiving the child and
failing to legitimate him; hence, it was "neither illogical nor unjust for
society to express its 'condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond
the bounds of marriage' by not conferring upon a biological father the
statutory right to sue for the wrongful death of his illegitimate child."2
16. The court asserted that if Parham's affidavit were true and he did suffer a loss, his
remedy lay with the Georgia General Assembly, not the court. It suggested that the General
Assembly could amend the statute to allow fathers of illegitimate children to bring wrongful
death actions. Id. at 203, 243 S.E.2d at 871. In fact, the General Assembly went a bit further, repealing section 105-1307 effective April 4, 1979. GA. CODE Am. § 105-1203
(Supp.1979) (repealed). The editorial note accompanying the legislation stated: "It is the
intent of this Act to revise and modernize certain laws of this State which relate to intrafamilial duties, rights, and obligations, including laws relating to divorce, alimony, support of minors, husband and wife, parent and child, enforcement of support, and related
matters so as to comply with those standards of equal protection under the law announced in
the United States Supreme Court decision in the case of Orrv. Orr,decided March 5, 1979.
This Act and the provisions hereof shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purposes of
this Act." Editorial Note to GA. CODE ANN. § 105-1203 (Supp.1979).
17. See, e.g., Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
18. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
19. 441 U.S. at 352. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Weber v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
20. 441 U.S. at 353.
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Having thus disposed of the illegitimacy argument, Justice Stewart
considered whether the statute invidiously discriminated on the basis of
gender. He began this phase of his analysis by articulating the basic
principle underlying decisions in which the Court has held certain classifications based upon gender invalid under the equal protection
clause:2 ' "A State is not free to make overbroad generalizations based
on sex which are entirely unrelated to any differences between men and
women or which demean the ability or social status of the affected
class."2 2 Thus in Reed v. Reed,23 the Court held that an Idaho probate
code provision which gave men a mandatory preference over women in
the administration of a decedent's estate violated the equal protection
clause by providing dissimilar treatment for men and women who were
similarly situated. Similarly, in Frontierov. Richardson,24 the Court invalidated federal armed services benefit statutes that were based upon
the assumption that female spouses of servicemen were financially dependent whereas similarly situated male spouses of servicewomen were
2 6 in which the
not.25 In contrast to these cases is Schlesinger v. Ballard,
Court upheld the constitutionality of a federal statute which provided
that male naval officers who were not promoted within a certain time
were subject to mandatory discharge whereas female naval officers not
promoted within that same length of time were permitted to continue in
service. The Court determined that the men and women were not similarly situated since there were restrictions on the women's seagoing
service that limited their opportunities to compile records entitling
them to promotion. The Court distinguished Schlesinger from Reed
and Frontieroby claiming that while the gender-based classifications in
the latter cases were based solely on administrative convenience and
outworn cliches, the different treatment in Schlesinger reflected "not
archaic and overbroad generalizations, but, instead, the demonstrable
fact that male and female line officers in the Navy are not similarly
situated with respect to opportunities for professional service." 27
With the principle reflected in these cases in mind, Justice Stewart
21. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975);
Frontifero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
22. 441 U.S. at 354.
23. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
24. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
25. See also Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (Utah statute providing that males
had to reach a greater age than females to attain majority status held unconstitutional); Orr
v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (Alabama statutory scheme providing that husbands but not
wives may be required to pay alimony held violative of equal protection).
26. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
27. .d. at 508.
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determined that the Georgia statute did not invidiously discriminate
against Parham because of his gender. 2 He found that under Georgia
law, mothers and fathers of illegitimate children are not similarly situ-

ated as only a father can by voluntary unilateral action legitimate an
illegitimate child. 29 Further, Stewart pointed out that while the identity
of the mother of an illegitimate child can rarely be in doubt, the identity of the father will often be unknown. 30 Section 74-103 of the Georgia Code therefore provided a means by which a father could both
establish his identity and legitimate his child.
The natural father of an illegitimate child, who has legitimated the
child, can sue for wrongful death benefits in the same way as the father
of a legitimate child. Accordingly, Justice Stewart found that the Geor-

gia statute did not make an overbroad generalization about men as a
class but instead distinguished between fathers who have legitimated

their children and those who have not. On this basis, Justice Stewart
31
distinguished Glona v. American Guarantee& Liabiliti'Insurance Co.,
which held that a Louisiana statute that did not allow the natural

mother of an illegitimate child to sue for his or her wrongful death
violated the equal protection clause. The statute struck down in Glona
excluded every mother of an illegitimate child from suing for wrongful
death whereas the Georgia statute excluded only those fathers who did

not legitimate their children.32
28. 441 U.S. at 355.
29. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-103 (1973). See note 4 supra.
30. As authority for this assertion, Justice Stewart cited the plurality opinion in Lalli v.
Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 268-69 (1978) (Powell, J., announced the judgment of the Court, joined
by Burger, C.J., and Stewart, J.): "'That the child is the child of a particular woman is
rarely difficult to prove. Proof of paternity, by contrast, frequently is difficult when the father
is not part of a formal family unit. The putative father often goes his way unconscious of the
birth of a child. Even if conscious, he is very often totally unconcerned because of the
absence of any ties to the mother. Indeed the mother may not know who is responsible for
her pregnancy.'" 441 U.S. at 355 n.7 (citations omitted).
31. 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
32. 441 U.S. at 355-56 n.7. Justice Stewart viewed the Georgia statute as adopting the
"middle ground between the extremes of complete exclusion and case-by-case determination
of paternity" advocated in Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 771 (1977).
In Trimble the Court struck down section 12 of the Illinois Probate Act, which allowed
illegitimate children to inherit by intestate succession only from their mothers. The Court
recognized that the problems involved in proving paternity might justify a more demanding
standard for illegitimate children claiming under their fathers' estates, but found that the
Illinois statute failed to recognize that for some illegitimate children of intestate men, inheritance rights could be recognized without jeopardizing the orderly settlement of estates. The
Court therefore posed a "middle ground" approach. In considering what would be sufficient
proof of paternity under varied circumstances, the Court stated: "Evidence of paternity may
take a variety of forms, some creating more significant problems of inaccuracy and inefficiency than others. The States, of course, are free to recognize these differences in fashion-
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33
Similarly, Justice Stewart distinguished Caban v. Mohammed,
decided the same day as Parham. In Caban, the Court struck down a
New York statute which permitted an unwed mother, but not an unwed
father, to block the adoption of a child by withholding consent. The
Court held the gender-based distinction created by the statute violative
of equal protection. Justice Stewart pointed out that the Georgia legitimation statute enabled the father of an illegitimate child to change his
status for purposes of the Georgia wrongful death statute whereas in
Caban, the father could change neither his child's status nor his own
for purposes of the New York adoption statute.3 4 Justice Stewart concluded that the classification in Parhamwas unlike those condemned in
Reed and Frontiero, which were premised upon overbroad generalizations and excluded all members of one gender even though they were
3
similarly situated with respect to members of the opposite sexy.
Having determined that the Georgia statute did not invidiously
discriminate against any class, Justice Stewart considered whether the
statutory classification was rationally related to a permissible state objective. He concluded that it was. Justice Stewart began by noting that
the Court had recognized that a state has a legitimate interest in the
maintenance of an accurate system for the disposition of property at
death 36 and that the existence of some mechanism for dealing with the
proof of paternity of illegitimate children and the related danger of
37
spurious claims against an estate are of particular concern to the state.
Justice Stewart then extrapolated this state interest in avoiding fraudulent claims of paternity from the context of property disposition upon
death and applied it to actions for wrongful death.3 8 He reasoned that
if paternity were not established prior to the commencement of a
wrongful death action, the defendant could be faced with multiple lawsuits by individuals all claiming to be the father of the decedent. Justice Stewart concluded that section 105-1307 of the Georgia Code, the
means by which the Georgia legislature chose to combat the problem,

ing their requirements of proof. Our holding today goes only to those forms of proof which
do not compromise the States' interests. This clearly would be the case, for example, where
there is a prior adjudication or formal acknowledgment of paternity. Thus, we wouldhave a
different case f/the state statute were carefully tailoredto eliminate imprecise andunduly burdensome methods of establishingpaterniy."Id. at 772 n.14 (emphasis added).
33. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
34. 441 U.S. 356 n.9.
35. Id. at 356-57.
36. Eg., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977);
Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
37. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
38. 441 U.S. at 357.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 7.315

was not irrational.39
In response to Parham's argument that there was no question in
this case that he was the father of the child, Stewart claimed that this
argument misconceived the basic principle of the equal protection
clause:
The function of [the Equal Protection Clause] of the Constitution
is to measure the validity of classifications created by state laws.
Since we have concluded that the classification created by the
Georgia statute is a rational means for dealing with the problem
of proving paternity, it is constitutionally irrelevant that the appellant may be able to prove paternity in another manner.'n
Finally, Justice Stewart disposed of Parham's argument that the
Georgia statute violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Parham had failed to explain how due process was implicated in his claim. The only Supreme Court decision which he cited in
this regard was Stanley v. Illinois4 1 and that case was readily distinguishable. In Stanley the Court held that the father of illegitimate children was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before the state
could take the children away from him. The Stanlei' Court weighed
the interest in the integrity of the family against state interference and
the freedom of a father to raise his children. By contrast, Parham involved only an asserted right to sue for money damages.4 2
Justice Powell concurred in the judgment of the Court but arrived
at his conclusion by a somewhat different analysis. Justice Powell did
not consider whether or not gender-based discrimination existed under
the circumstances of the case but began by defining the standard of
scrutiny: gender-based distinctions must "serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives" to withstand judicial scrutiny under the equal protection
clause. 43 He determined that the state objective at issue was the avoidance of problems in proving paternity after the death of an illegitimate
child.
Powell then considered whether the statute was substantially related to this objective. He pointed out that by following the legitima39. Id. at 357-58. Justice Stewart did not consider whether section 105-1307 was rationally related to the state's interests in promoting the traditional family unit or in setting a
standard of morality. Id. at 358 n. 11.
40. Id. at 358 (footnote omitted).
41. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
42. 441 U.S. at 358-59.
43. Id. at 359 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976)).

Winter 1980]

SUPREME COURT REVIEW

tion procedure provided under Georgia law,'

the father of an

illegitimate child could remove himself from the disability that only he

would suffer. Although the statute placed a "marginally greater burden" on the father than on the mother, this was justified by the

"marked difference between proving paternity and proving maternity"
that the Court had "recognized repeatedly."4 5 Since the Georgia statute was unlike statutes in prior cases which provided no means for the
plaintiff to remove himself from the statutory burden,4 6 Justice Powell
concluded that it was substantially related to the state's objective in

avoiding problems in proving paternity.
The dissent, authored by Justice White, argued that the statute discriminated between unmarried mothers and unmarried fathers.47 Ac-

cording to White, the appropriate standard of scrutiny, in light of this
gender-based discrimination, was that the classification "'must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives.' "48 The dissent concluded that since
none of the interests urged by the state warranted the discrimination,
the judgment of the Georgia Supreme Court should have been reversed.

Two of the asserted interests were the promotion of the legitimate
family unit and the setting of a standard of morality. Justice White
believed that the actual relationship between these interests and the

classification was "far too tenuous to justify the sex discrimination involved."4 9 Further, unmarried mothers and fathers who legitimate

their children but remain unmarried also defy these state interests; yet
each has the right to bring an action for the wrongful death of a child

under the Georgia statutory scheme. Finally, in Glona v. American
44. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-103 (1973). See note 4 supra.
45. 441 U.S. 360. See, e.g. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
46. E.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762
(1977). See notes 32-34 and accompanying text supra.
47. 441 U.S. at 362 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun,
JJ.). Justice White noted that Georgia's wrongful death scheme also discriminated between
married mothers and married fathers. Id. He pointed out that while the plurality had emphasized that Parham never legitimated the child, it was only the death of the mother that
even made legitimacy relevant. Under the Georgia Statute, in the case of the wrongful death
of a legitimate child, "only the mother may sue if she is alive; the father is allowed to sue
only 'if [there is] no mother.'" Id. n.4 (citing Ga. Code § 105-1307) (1978). See also note 3
supra.
48. 441 U.S. at 362 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
49. Id. at 363. Cf.Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 768 (1977) (the promotion of
legitimate family relationships deemed unrelated to the goal of the Illinois legislature making the intestate succession law more just to illegitimate children).
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Guarantee& Liability Insurance Co., ° the Court found it impermissible to prevent an unmarried mother from recovering for the death of
her child. Justice White asserted that what the Court held in Glona
pertained equally to unmarried fathers.5 '
Another interest asserted by the Georgia court was the avoidance
of problems in proving paternity. White concluded that whatever evidentiary problems might be involved in proof of paternity, as opposed
to proof of maternity, they surely do not justify gender-based discrimination."2 He distinguished Lalli v. Lalli 3 and Trimble v. Gordon,5 4 relied on by the five Justices in the majority55 by noting that the
recognized state interest in effectuating a sound system of inheritance
was far more substantial than the interest in protecting a tortfeasor
from possible spurious claims. 6 The plaintiff always has the burden of
proving his parenthood. The Georgia legitimation requirement was,
however, an absolute prerequisite to recovery, not merely a rule of evidence; thus, the statute barred from recovery many such as Parham
who were capable of proving their paternity. Justice White asserted
that:
it denigrates the judicial process, as well as the interest in foreclosing gender-based discriminations, to hold that the possibility
of erroneous determinations of paternity in an unknown number
of cases, likely to be few, is sufficient reason to forbid all natural,
unmarried fathers who have not legitimated their children from
seeking to prove their parenthood and recovering in damages for
the tort that has been committed. 7
The dissent concluded that the fourth and final interest suggested
the
Georgia Supreme Court, that "more often than not the father of
by
an illegitimate child who has elected neither to marry the mother nor to
50. 391 U.S. 73 (1968) See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
51. 441 U.S. at 363 (White, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 364.
53. 439 U.S. 259 (1978). See note 30 supra.
54. 430 U.S. 762 (1977). See note 32 supra.
55. See 441 U.S. at 355 (plurality opinion), 359 (concurring opinion).
56. Id. at 364 (White, J., dissenting). In Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164
(1972), the Court was faced with the question of whether illegitimate children could collect
workmen's compensation benefits for a deceased parent. In determining that they could, the
Court analogized the state interest in deciding who may collect workmen's compensation to
the interest in deciding who may sue for wrongful death. The Court rejected the contention
that the interest in the former was as substantial as that in intestacy succession: "[The
substantial state interest in providing for 'the stability of... land titles and in the prompt
and definitive determination of the valid ownership of property left by decedents,' is absent
in the case at hand." 406 U.S. at 170 (quoting Labine v. Vincent, 229 So.2d 449, 452 (La.
App. 1969)).
57. 441 U.S. at 365 (footnote omitted).

Winter 19801

SUPREME COURT REVIEW

legitimate the child pursuant to proper legal proceedings suffers no real
loss from the child's wrongful death,"5 8 was an unacceptable basis for5 a9
blanket discrimination against all fathers of illegitimate children.
The Court had recognized in prior cases that some unmarried fathers
maintain as close a relationship to their children as do unmarried
mothers.6' Further, despite a lack of affection, a father can still legitimate his children under the statute and thereby become eligible to recover for the wrongful death of his children. Additionally, White
argued that in light of the facts in Parham it was unrealistic to presume
that unmarried fathers who have a real interest in their children and
who suffer an actual loss upon their deaths will have legitimated their
children. 6 ' Finally, White asserted that underlying the statute was the
"incredible presumption" that fathers are less deserving of recovery
than mothers and that fathers of illegitimate children suffer no injury
when they lose their children. He concluded by stating that if Georgia
wished to base the recovery in a wrongful death action for the loss of a
child on the amount of anguish and loss suffered by the parent rather
than on the full value of the life of the child, it should amend its statute62 accordingly, rather than categorically bar on the basis of sex any
recovery by parents it deemed uninjured or undeserving.6 3
Analysis
The opinions in this case reveal certain basic differences in approach toward equal protection cases. The plurality found that there
was no discrimination based on illegitimacy or gender but distinguished between fathers who have legitimated their children and those
who have not. Hence, the plurality applied a deferential rational relation test to the legislation. In his concurrence, Justice Powell assumed
that there was gender-based discrimination and therefore applied the
58. 241 Ga. at 200, 243 S.E.2d at 870.

59. 441 U.S. at 366 (White, J., dissenting).
60. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 411 U.S. 380, 389 (1979).
61. 441 U.S. at 367 (White, J., dissenting). See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978),
where the Court dismissed the contention that an unmarried father had no actual interest in
his son because he failed to legitimate him under the Georgia statutory scheme. Id. at 254.
This case is discussed at length in Constitutional Review.- Supreme Court, October 1977
Term, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 19, 171-80 (1978).
62. The statute provided the measure of recovery in wrongful death: "The full value of
life of the decedent, as shown by the evidence, is the full value of the life of the decedent
without deduction for necessary or other personal expenses of the decedent had he lived."
GA. CODE ANN. § 105-1308 (1968).
63. 441 U.S. at 368 (White, J., dissenting).
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middle-tiered standard prescribed in Craig v. Boren.64 The four dissenters expressly found gender-based discrimination implicated in the
Georgia statutory scheme and applied the same standard as did Justice
Powell. Thus a majority of the Court determined that the Georgia statute discriminated on the basis of gender and applied the test enunciated in Craig v. Boren to the statute.
Of the four possible state interests advanced by the Georgia
Supreme Court, the plurality as well as Justice Powell focused upon
only one, that of avoiding problems in the proof of paternity. Since the
five Justices found that this interest survived judicial scrutiny-even
the elevated standard applied by Justice Powell-Parham was precluded from recovery. This result was a departure from past decisions
which had distinguished between the interest in protecting a tortfeasor
and the interest in assuring the orderly administration of decedents'
estates.6 5 Only statutory schemes which protected the latter interest
were upheld against claims of discrimination based upon gender or illegitimacy.6 6 The Court's decision in Parham suggests a departure from
this distinction.
Thus, the Court demonstrated opposing tendencies in deciding this
case. On the one hand, a majority of the Court took a broader approach to the issue of whether a statutory scheme discriminates on the
basis of gender and, upon a finding of such discrimination, applied the
elevated standard of scrutiny set out in Craig v. Boren. On the other
hand, a different majority was deferential to the state legislature's judgment to the point that it was willing to uphold a statutory burden on
the basis of an asserted state interest which prior cases had held insufficient to justify discriminatory statutes. Which of these directions the
Court will follow in future gender-based discrimination cases remains
to be seen.

Lali v. Lali*
The Supreme Court in La/li v. La/li' upheld against an equal pro64.
65.
sation);
death);
66.

429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (workmen's compenGlona v. American Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (wrongful
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968)(wrongful death).
See note 56 supra.

* Commentary by Peter T. Harding, member, third-year class.
1. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
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tection challenge a New York statute2 allowing an illegitimate child to
inherit from his or her intestate father only if a court of competent
jurisdiction had entered an order declaring paternity during the father's
lifetime. Legitimate children are not subject to the same requirement.
Appellant Robert Lalli was the illegitimate son of Mario Lalli who
died intestate in the state of New York in 1973. Appellant's mother,
who had died in 1968, was never married to Mario. After Mario's

widow was appointed administratrix of her husband's estate, appellant
petitioned the surrogate court for a compulsory accounting, claiming
that he and his sister were entitled to inherit from Mario as his chil-

dren. Mario's widow opposed the petition, contending that even if appellants were Mario's children, they were not lawful distributees of the

estate because they had failed to comply with section 4-1.2 of the New
York Estate, Powers and Trusts Law, which provides in part:
An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his father so that he
and his issue inherit from his father if a court of competent jurisdiction has, during the lifetime of the father, made an order of
filiation declaring paternity in a proceeding instituted during the
pregnancy of the mother or within two years from the birth of the
child.3
There was no dispute as to the facts. All parties conceded that
appellant, Robert Lalli, was the son of Mario Lalli. Mario Lalli had
supported Robert Lalli during his youth and acknowledged him as his
2. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW (McKinney Supp. 1979) (originally enacted as
1965 N.Y. Laws, ch. 958, § 1). The statute was initially codified as section 83-a of the New
York Decedent Estates Law (1965). In 1966 it was recodified without material change as
section 4-1.2 of the Estates, Powers and Trusts Law. 1966 N.Y. Laws, ch. 952. Further
nonsubstantive amendments were made the next year. 1967 N.Y. Laws, ch. 686, §§ 28, 29
(1967).
3. Section 4-1.2 provides in its entirety: "(a) For the purposes of this article:
"(1) An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his mother so that he and his issue
inherit from his mother and from his maternal kindred.
"(2) An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his father so that he and his issue
inherit from his father if a court of competent jurisdiction has, during the lifetime of the
father, made an order of filiation declaring paternity in a proceeding instituted during the
pregnancy of the mother or within two years from the birth of the child.
"(3) The existence of an agreement obligating the father to support the illegitimate child
does not qualify such child or his issue to inherit from the father in the absence of an order
of filiation made as prescribed by subparagraph (2).
"(4) A motion for relief from an order of filiation may be made only by the father, and
such motion must be made within one year from the entry of such order.
"(b) If an illegitimate child dies, his surviving spouse, issue, mother, maternal kindred
and father inherit and are entitled to letters of administration as if the decedent were legitimate, provided that the father may inherit or obtain such letters only if an order of filiation
has been made in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph (2)."
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son.4 Robert Lall, however, had not obtained an order of filiation dur-

ing his putative father's lifetime. He argued that, through the imposition of the filiation requirement, section 4-1.2 discriminated against

him on the basis of his illegitimate birth in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Lower Court Decisions
The Surrogate Court noted that section 4-1.2 had previously and
unsuccesfully been attacked on the same grounds, 5 and after a review
of recent United States Supreme Court decisions, particularly Labine v.

Vincent,6 concluded that the "appellant [had been] properly excluded
as a distributee and therefore lacked status to petition for a compulsory
accounting." 7 On direct appeal, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the state had met the test established in Labine

which looks to whether "there is a rational basis for the means chosen
by the Legislature for the accomplishment of a permissible State objective."8 After discussing the problems of proof involved in establishing
paternity, as opposed to maternity, the New York court concluded that
it could not say that the condition precedent of requiring that the order
of filiation be made during the lifetime of the father was irrational, so

as to render it constitutionally infirm.
Appellant then appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
While the case was pending, the Court decided Trimble v. Gordon,9 and
because the issues in the two cases were similar in some respects, the
Court vacated and remanded to permit further consideration in light of
Trimble. On remand, the New York Court of Appeals confirmed its
4. 439 U.S. at 259-262.
5. Id. at 263.
6. 401 U.S. 532 (1971). In Labine, the Court upheld, against equal protection challenge, Louisiana's laws of intestate succession which provided that collateral relatives took
the intestate father's property to the exclusion of acknowledged, but not legitimated, illegitimate children. The Court, per Justice Black, concluded that the Constitution gives the states
the power to make rules to "establish, protect and strengthen family life as well as to regulate the disposition of property. . . ." Id at 538. Stressing that the Louisiana scheme may
not have been perfect, Justice Black nonetheless concluded that "[t]he Federal Constitution
does not give this Court the power to overturn the State's choice under the guise of constitutional interpretation because the Justices of this Court believe that they can provide better
rules." Id at 537. He stressed that the statutory scheme did not create an insurmountable
barrier to illegitimate children.
7. 439 U.S. at 263.
8. Id (quoting In re Lalli, 38 N.Y.2d 77, 81, 340 N.E.2d 721, 723, 378 N.Y.S.2d 351,
354 (1975).
9. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
10. Lalli v. Lalli, 431 U.S. 911 (1977).
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former disposition."I It noted that Trimble established that although a
classification based on illegitimacy is not suspect so as to require strict
scrutiny, it does require more than a "mere finding of some remote
rational relationship between the statute and a legitimate State purpose."'" The court found the statute to be significantly and determinatively different from the Illinois statute before the Court in Trimble and
concluded that section 4-1.2 was sufficiently related to the state's interest in "the orderly settlement of estates and the dependability of titles
to property passing under intestacy laws" to meet equal protection re-

quirements. '3"
The United States Supreme Court Decision
Appellant again sought review in the Supreme Court. 14 The Court
affirmed in a plurality decision. 5 Justice Powell announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart joined.' 6
Justice Powell began his analysis with a review of Trimble."' "At
issue in that case was the constitutionality of an Illinois statute providing that a child born out of wedlock could inherit from his intestate
father only if the father had 'acknowledged' the child and the child had
been legitimated by the intermarrying of the parents."' 8 As in the
present case, the appellant in Trimble had been born out of wedlock,
had been acknowledged by her father and her parents had not intermarried.' 9 Unlike the situation in LaNi, however, the father had been
found to be her father in a judicial decree ordering him to contribute to
her support.2 0 When her father died intestate, appellant was excluded
as a distributee because the statutory requirements for inheritance had
not been met.2 '
11. In re Lalli, 43 N.Y.2d 65, 371 N.E.2d 481, 400 N.Y.S.2d 761 (1977).
12. Id at 67, 371 N.E.2d at 482, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 762.
13. Id at 67, 69-70, 371 N.E.2d at 482-83, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 762-64 (citing Trimble v.
Gordon, 430 U.S. at 771).
14. Lalli v. Lalli, 435 U.S. 921 (1978).
15. 439 U.S. at 259.
16. Justice Stewart filed a concurring opinion. Justice Rehnquist, for the reasons stated
in his dissent to Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. at 777, concurred. Justice Blackmun filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment, disagreeing only in that he would overrule, rather than
distinguish, Trimble. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices White,
Marshall and Stevens joined.
17. 439 U.S. at 264.
18. Id at 263.
19. 430 U.S. at 763-64.
20. Id at 764.
21. Id at 764-65.
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The Trimble Court affirmed the conclusion reached in Mathews v.

Lucas22 that although classifications based upon illegitimacy are not
subject to "strict scrutiny," they are nevertheless invalid if they are not

substantially related to permissible state interests.23 Applying this standard to the Illinois statute, the Trimble Court found that the test had
not been met.24

Two state interests had been asserted by the State of Illinois in
Trimble: "the encouragement of legitimate family relationships and
the maintenance of an accurate and efficient method of disposing of an
intestate decedent's property. ' 25 While acknowledging that the state
was appropriately concerned with the integrity of the family unit, the
Trimble Court, citing Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 26 rejected
the argument that "persons will shun illicit relations because the off-

spring may not one day reap the benefits" that would accrue were they
legitimate.2 The statute thus bore "only the most attenuated relationship to the asserted goal" of encouraging legitimate family relationships.

28

The Trimble Court found the state interest in safeguarding the orderly disposition of property at death more relevant to the statutory

classification.
The orderly disposition of property at death requires an appropriate legal framework, the structuring of which is a matter particularly within the competence of the individual States. In
exercising this responsibility, a State necessarily must enact laws
governing both the procedure and substance of intestate succession. Absent infringement of a constitutional right, the federal
courts have no role here, and even when constitutional violations
are alleged, those courts should accord substantial deference to a
22. 427 U.S. 495 (1976). See notes 78-86 and accompanying text infra.
23. 430 U.S. at 767.
24. Id at 766.
25. 439 U.S. at 265 (citing Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. at 766).
26. 406 U.S. 164 (1972). In Weber, the Court struck down Louisiana's workers' compensation laws under which unacknowledged illegitimate children were not within the class
of "children," and were relegated to the lesser status of "other dependents," and thus recovered only if there were not enough surviving dependents in the preceding classes to exhaust
the maximum benefits. The Court determined the validity of the state statutes under a standard requir~ag that, at a minimum, a statutory classification bear some rational relationship
to a legitimate state purpose. It held that the inferior classification of dependent unacknowledged illegitimates bore no significant relationship "to those recognized purposes of recovery which workmen's compensation statutes commendably serve." Id at 175.
27. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. at 768-69 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
406 U.S. at 173), quoted in Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. at 265.
28. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. at 768 & n.13.
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State's statutory scheme of inheritance.2 9
The Court found the Illinois statute "constitutionally flawed" be-

cause by requiring not only an acknowledgment by the father but also
the marriage of the parents, it excluded at least some significant categories of illegitimate children. 30 These categories consisted of children
whose inheritance rights could be recognized "without jeopardizing

'the orderly settlement of estates or the dependability of titles to property passing under intestacy laws.' "31 The Court concluded that equal

protection required that a statute which placed exceptional burdens on
illegitimate children in furtherance of proper state objectives be more
"carefully tuned to alternative considerations" 3 2 than was true of the

broad disqualification in the Illinois law.3 3
Having established the standard of review, Justice Powell turned
to the New York statute. 34 He began by distinguishing the two statutes.
The Illinois statute in Trimble had contained two preconditions to in-

heritance by illegitimate children; it required not only the father's ac35
knowledgment of paternity but also the marriage of the parents.
These requirements had eliminated "the possibility of a middle ground

between the extremes of complete exclusion and case-by-case determination of paternity. '36 Under the New York statute, by contrast, the
marital status of the parents was irrelevant; the single requirement at
issue was an evidentiary one that the paternity of the father have been
declared in a judicial proceeding sometime before his death.3 7
29. Id at 771. Justice Powell noted that an important aspect to that framework is a
response to the often difficult problem of proving the paternity of illegitimate children and
the related danger of spurious claims against intestate estates. These difficulties "might justify a more demanding standard for illegitimate children claiming under their fathers' estates than that required either for illegitimate children claiming under their mothers' estates
or for legitimate children generally." Id at 770.
30. 439 U.S. at 266.
31. Id (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. at 771).
32. Id (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. at 772 (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427
U.S. at 513)).
33. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. at 772.
34. See note 3 supra.
35. 430 U.S. at 763 & n.2.
36. Id at 770-71.
37. 439 U.S. at 267. Section 4-1.2 contained an additional requirement that the judicial
proceeding have been commenced "during the pregnancy of the mother or within two years
from the birth of the child." "The New York Court of Appeals [had] declined to rule on the
constitutionality of [this requirement] in both of its [decisions. . .because appellant concededly had never commenced a paternity proceeding .. " Id at 267 n.5. Thus the question
of the constitutionality of the two-year limitation was not before the Court; the Court sustained section 4-1.2 under the equal protection clause "only with respect to [the] requirement
that a judicial order of filiation be issued during the lifetime of the father of an illegitimate
child." Id
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Justice Powell also found differences between the state interests
that the statutes purportedly furthered.3 8 The Illinois law had been defended, in part, as a means of encouraging legitimate family relationships. New York did not offer such a justification, and the New York
Court of Appeals had disclaimed that the purpose of the statute, "even
in small part, was to discourage illegitimacy, to mold human conduct
or to set societal norms."3 9 Both the absence of any requirement in
section 4-1.2 that the parents marry and Justice Powell's analysis of the
legislative history of the statute confirmed the view that section 4-1.2
was not designed to encourage legitimate family relationships.4 °
The question, therefore, became whether the "discrete procedural
demands" that section 4-1.2 placed on illegitimate children bore an
"evident and substantial" relation to the particular state interest the
statute was designed to serve.4 1 The primary interest of section 4-1.2
was to provide for the just and orderly disposition of property at death,
an interest recognized as legitimate in Trimble.42 Justice Powell reviewed the reasons that had led the New York legislature to conclude it
necessary to impose the strictures of section 4-1.2. These were the serious difficulties encountered in the administration of the estates of both
testate and intestate decedents and the peculiar problems of proof involved in paternal inheritance by illegitimate children.43 "'The putative father often goes his way unconscious of the birth of a child. Even
if conscious, he is very often totally unconcerned because of the absence of any ties to the mother. Indeed the mother may not know who
is responsible for her pregnancy.' "4 Additional difficulties included
the administrative problem of service of process in class dispositions to
"issue" of a decedent and the achievement of finality of decree in an
estate.45 The New York legislature, Justice Powell concluded, had an
38. Id at 267.
39. Id at 267-68 (quoting In re Lalli, 43 N.Y.2d at 70, 371 N.E.2d at 483, 400 N.Y.S.2d
at 764).
40. 439 U.S. at 268.
41. Id
42. Id See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. at 771. See also Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 406 U.S. at 170; Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. at 538.
43. 439 U.S. at 268-71. By contrast, Justice Powell felt that establishing maternity was
seldom difficult. "'[Tihe birth of the child is a recorded or registered event usually taking
place in the presence of others. In most cases the child remains with the mother and for a
time is necessarily reared by her."' Id at 268 (quoting In re Ortiz, 60 Misc. 2d 756, 761,303
N.Y.S.2d 806, 812 (Surr. Ct. 1969)).
44. 439 U.S. at 269 (quoting In re Ortiz, 60 Misc. 2d at 761, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 812 (Surr.
Ct. 1969)). Accord, In re Flemm, 85 Misc. 2d 855, 861, 381 N.Y.S.2d 573, 576-77 (Surr. Ct.
1975); In re Hendrix, 68 Misc. 2d at 443, 326 N.Y.S.2d at 650.
45. 439 U.S. at 269. "'Our procedural statutes and the Due Process Clause mandate
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evident and substantial interest in protecting "'innocent adults and
those rightfully interested in their estates from fraudulent claims of
heirship and harassing litigation instituted by those seeking to establish
themselves as illegitimate heirs.' "46
Finding the state's interests to be substantial, Justice Powell next
considered the means adopted by New York to further these interests.
The requirement of section 4-1.2 was designed to ensure the accurate
resolution of claims of paternity and to minimize the potential for disruption of estate administration. By placing paternity disputes in a judicial forum during the lifetime of the father accuracy was enhanced in
two respects. First, "the 'availability [of the putative father would] be a
substantial factor contributing to the. . . fact-finding process.' " Second, the requirement that "the order be issued during the father's lifetime permit[ted] a man to defend his reputation against 'unjust
accusations in paternity [suits]'. ... ,48 "The administration of an estate will be facilitated, and the possibility of delay and uncertainty minimized, where the entitlement of a illegitimate child to notice and
participation is a matter of judicial record before the administration
49
commences."
Justice Powell rejected the contention that section 4-1.2, like the
Illinois statute in Trimble, excluded significant categories of illegitimate
children who could be allowed to inherit without jeopardizing the orderly settlement of their intestate fathers estates.5" He did acknowledge
that "there [would] be some illegitimate children who would be able to
establish their relationship to their deceased fathers without serious disruption of the administration of estates and that, as applied to such
individuals, section 4-1.2 [appeared] to operate unfairly."'" The
Court's inquiry under the equal protection clause, however, did "not
focus on the abstract 'fairness' of a state law, but on whether the statnotice and opportunity to be heard to all necessary parties. Given the right to intestate
succession, all illegitimates must be served with process. This would be no real problem
with respect to those few estates where there are "known" illegitimates. But it presents an
almost insuperable burden as regards "unknown" illegitimates."' Id at 270 (quoting In re
Flemm, 85 Misc. 2d at 859, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 576).
46. 439 U.S., at 271 (quoting TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON THE MODERNIZATION, REVISION AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE LAW OF ESTATES, FOURTH REPORT, N.Y.
LEGIS. Doc. No. 19 (1965) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT]).

47. 439 U.S. at 271 (quoting In re Lalfi, 38 N.Y.S.2d at 82, 340 N.E.2d at 724, 378
N.Y.S.2d at 355).
48. Id (quoting COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 46, at 266).
49. 439 U.S. at 271.
50. Id at 272 (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. at 771). See notes 17-33 and accompanying text supra.
51. 439 U.S. at 272-73.

-
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ute's relation to the state interests it is intended to promote is so tenuous that it lacks the rationality contemplated by the Fourteenth
Amendment."5 2 In this regard, the Court noted that "few statutory
classifications are entirely free from the criticism that they sometimes
produce inequitable results."53
The New York statute, unlike the statute in Trimble, did not effect
a total statutory disinheritance of illegitimate children who were not
legitimated by the subsequent marriage of the parents. 4 The scope of
the Illinois statute was "far in excess of its justifiable purposes."5 5 The
New York statute's requirement, in contrast, did not "inevitably [disqualify] an unnecessarily large number of children born out of wedlock."5 6 Justice Powell reached this conclusion through an historical
review of the New York courts' application of section 4-1.2, finding
that the statute had been interpreted "liberally and in such a way as to
enhance its utility to both father and child without sacrificing its
strength as a procedural prophylactic." 57 Justice Powell concluded that
section 4-1.2 represented a carefully considered legislative judgment as
how best to balance the desire "to 'grant to illegitimates. . . rights of
inheritance on a par with those [of] legitimate children'" and at the
same time to protect the important state interests involved. "Even if
. . . [section] 4-1.2 could have been written . . . more equitably, it
[was] not the function of a court to 'hypothesize independently on the
desirability or feasibility of any possible alternative[s]' to the formulated statutory scheme. . . ."' "'These matters of practical judgment
and empirical calculation are for [the State] . . . . In the end, the precise accuracy of [the State's] calculations is not a matter of specialized
judicial competence; and we have no basis to question their detail beyond the evident consistency and substantiality.' -60
Without writing a separate opinion, Justice Rehnquist concurred
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id at 273.
Id See note 56 and accompanying text infra.
439 U.S. at 273.
Id

56. Id

57. Id Justice Powell noted that the father can waive his defenses in a paternity proceeding, and that the courts have excused "technical" failures by illegitimate children to
comply with the statute in order to prevent unnecessary injustice. For example, a filiation
order may be signed nunepro tune to relate back to the period prior to the father's death
when the court's factual finding of paternity had been made or a judicial support order may
be treated as "tantamount to an order of filiation," even though paternity was not specifically declared therein. Id at 273-74 (citations omitted).
58. Id at 274 (quoting COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 46, at 265.
59. 439 U.S. at 274 (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. at 515).
60. 439 U.S. at 274 (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. at 515-16).
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in the judgment for the reasons stated in his dissent in Trimble. In that
dissent, he had criticized the nature of the Court's inquiry on two
grounds. First, the majority opinion, in its analysis of the Illinois legislature's purpose, had expanded the normal meaning of the word "purpose" into something more like motive.6 1 Accordingly, litigants
wishing to invalidate a law under the equal protection clause were
faced with a difficult task. "They must first convince this Court that the
legislature had a particular purpose in mind in enacting the law, and
then convince it that the law was not at all suited to the accomplishment of that purpose."6 2
Justice Rehnquist found another and more grave defect in that the
holding in Trimble required the Court to second guess legislative judgment in an area where the Court had no expertise whatever.63 "In
making this judgment it must throw into the judicial hopper the whole
range of factors which were first thrown into the legislative hopper."'
Justice Rehnquist concluded, in words apposite to Lali:
The fact that the Act in question does not alleviate all of the difficulties, or that it might have gone further than it did, is to me
wholly irrelevant under the Equal Protection Clause. The circumstances which justify the distinction between illegitimates
and legitimates contained in § 12 are apparent with no great exercise of imagination; they are stated in the opinion of the Court,
though they are there rejected as constitutionally insufficient.
Since Illinois' distinction is not mindless and patently irrational, I
would affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois.6 5
Justice Blackmun concurred in the Lallijudgment, departing from
the plurality opinion only in that he would overrule, rather than distinguish, Trimble.6 6 He had joined the dissent in Trimble,67 which, in a
short statement, had found the situation in Trimble constitutionally indistinguishable from Labine v. Vincent and thus concluded that the
state statute should have been upheld against constitutional attack.6 8
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall and Stevens,
dissented in Lali, declaring that "the state interest in the accurate and
efficient determination of paternity [could have been] adequately
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
ing).
68.

430 U.S. at 782.
Id at 783.
Id.
Id at 784.
Id at 786.
439 U.S. at 276-77.
430 U.S. at 776 (Burger, C.J., and Stewart, Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ., dissent430 U.S. at 777.
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served by requiring the illegitimate child to offer into evidence a 'formal acknowledgment of paternity.' "69 The dissenters found the New
York scheme inconsistent with this standard because an illegitimate
child could inherit "only if there had been a judicial finding of paternity during the lifetime of the father."' 70 Justice Brennan found no reason to suppose that the injustice of the present case, where all interested
parties conceded that Robert was the son of Mario Lalli, was aberrant.
First, [illegitimate children acknowledged and supported by their
fathers] are unlikely to see the need for. . . adversary proceedings. Second, even if aware of the rule requiring judicial filiation
orders, they are likely to fear provoking disharmony by suing
their fathers. For the same reasons, mothers of such illegitimates
are unlikely to bring proceedings against the fathers. Finally, fathers who do not even bother to make out wills (and thus die
intestate) are unlikely to take the time to bring formal filiation
proceedings.7 1
Justice Brennan concluded that, as a practical matter, section 4-1.2
made it "virtually impossible for the acknowledged and freely supported illegitimate children to inherit intestate. 7 2
The dissent rejected the argument that reliance upon mere formal
public acknowledgment of paternity would open the door to fraudulent
claims of paternity. 73 Justice Brennan asserted that "even if. . . confidence in the accuracy of formal public acknowledgments [is] unfounded, New York [had] available less drastic means of screening out
fraudulent claims. . . .,4 It could have required, for example, an elevated standard of proof, by clear and convincing evidence or even beyond a reasonable doubt, in addition to requiring formal
acknowledgment.7 5
The dissent also rejected the argument that section 4-1.2 protected
estates from belated claims by unknown illegitimates. Publication notice and a short limitations period in which claims against the estate
could be filed would have served the state interest. The dissent concluded that no reason had been advanced to retreat from the decision
in Trimble, as the New York statute, like the Illinois statute in Trimble,
excluded "'forms of proof which do not compromise the State['s] inter69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

439 U.S. at 277 (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. at 772 n.14).
439 U.S. at 277.
Id at 278.
Id
Id
Id at 278-79.
Id at 279.
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ests,' "76 and thus discriminated "against illegitimates through means
to the legitimate interests that the statute purnot substantially related
77
promote."
to
ported
Analysis
The Supreme Court in La/li was not concerned with reconsidering
the middle-tier standard of review. Justice Powell cited as controlling
the decision in Mathews v. Lucas, which had been reaffirmed in Trimble, that classifications based on illegitimacy are not subject to strict
scrutiny. 78 The appropriate standard of review is whether such classifications are substantially related to permissible state interests.7 9
In Mathews, a case involving an equal protection challenge to certain statutory presumptive classifications in the Social Security Act regarding illegitimate children's entitlement to survivor's benefits, the
Court, per Justice Blackmun, acknowledged that "the legal status illegitimacy, however defined, is, like race or national origin, a characteristic determined by causes not within the control of the illegitimate
individual, and it bears no relation to the individual's ability to participate in and contribute to society."' 0 The Mathews Court thus recognized that
visiting condemnation upon the child in order to express society's
disapproval of the parents' liaisons 'is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to
the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear
some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.
Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the
illegitimate child is an ineffectual-as well as unjust-way of deterring the parent.'"1
The Court, however, had "no difficulty in finding the discrimination impermissible on less demanding standards than [strict scrutiny]." 2 Further, it had found that the discrimination against
illegitimates had never approached the severity or pervasiveness of
the historic legal and political discrimination against women and
76. Id (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. at 772 n.14).
77. 439 U.S. at 279.
78. Id at 265.
79. Id.
80. 427 U.S. at 505. Justice Blackmun was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Stewart, White, Powell and Rehnquist.
81. Id (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. at 175 (1972)).
82. 427 U.S. at 505 (citing New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S.
619 (1973); Richardson v. Davis, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972); Richardson v. Griffin, 409 U.S. 1069
(1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68
(1968)).
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blacks.83 Accordingly, "such irrationality in some classifications does
not initself demonstrate that other, possibly rational, distinctions made
in part on the basis of legitimacy are inherently untenable." 84 The Mathews Court thus concluded that classifications based on illegitimacy

do not" 'command extraordinary protection from the majoritorian po8' 5
litical process'. ., which [the] most exacting scrutiny would entail.
In La/li, therefore, the Court was concerned with the application
of an established standard rather than determining the standard itself.
The La/li situation was before the Court as a result of the Court's decision in Trimble. The Court had articulated the applicable level ofjudi-

cial scrutiny in Mathews but its application of this standard in Trimble
was somewhat confusing.
The Court had previously recognized that the encouragement of
legitimate family relationships was a permissible state interest.8 6 In
Trimble, however, the Court, per Justice Powell, 8 7 declaimed that "[i]n
subsequent decisions, we have expressly considered and rejected the
83. 427 U.S. at 506. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-86 (1973) (plurality
opinion). The Court sidestepped justifying its conclusion. It only h) pothesized that this less
than pervasive and severe discrimination in the historic placement of the illegitimate child in
an inferior position in certain circumstances, identified as the area of family law, was "perhaps in part because the roots of the discrimination rest in the conduct of the parents rather
than the child, and perhaps in part because illegitimacy does not carry an obvious badge, as
race or sex do ...." 427 U.S. at 506 (footnote omitted).
84. 427 U.S. at 505.
85. Id. at 506 (footnote omitted) (quoting San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 28 (1973)). See Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 631-34, 636 (1974); Weber v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. at 173, 175-76.
86. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. at 538-39. Labine involved an equal protection challenge to Louisiana's laws of intestate succession which provided that collateral relations took
a deceased intestate father's property to the exclusion of acknowleged, but not legitimated,
illegitimate children. Id at 533-35. The Court, per Justice Black, recognized two permissible state interests: "[T]he power to make rules to establish, protect, and strengthen family
life as well as to regulate the disposition of property left in Louisiana by a man dying there is
committed by the Constitution of the United States and the people of Louisiana to the legislature of that State. Absent a specific constitutional guarantee, it is for that legislature, not
the life-tenured judges of this Court, to select from among possible laws." Id at 538-39
(footnote omitted). Permissible state interests were not at issue in Mathews, as it involved
the Social Security Act. In Mathews, the Court found Congress' purpose in adopting the
statutory presumptions to be administrative convenience. 427 U.S. at 509. Without discussion, the Court assumed this to be a permissible interest and held that the standard of review, although "not a toothless one," required the challengers of the statutory scheme to
demonstrate the insubstantiality of the relation between the statutory classifications and the
likelihood of dependency. The Court found that this burden was not met and that the statutory classifications did not exceed the bounds of substantiality tolerated by the applicable
level of scrutiny because they were "justified as reasonable empincal judgments that are
consistent with a [legitimate] design to qualify entitlement to [survivor] benefits upon a
child's dependency at the time of the parent's death." Id at 509-10.
87. Justice Powell was joined by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Stevens.
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argument that a State may attempt to influence the actions of men and
women by imposing sanctions on the children born of their illegitimate
relationships.""8 The Court did indicate that the "more serious
problems of proving paternity" might justify a more demanding standard for illegitimates claiming under their fathers' estates than that required for children claiming under either their mothers' estates or for
legitimate children generally. 9 The Court went on to find, however,
that the relation between the Illinois statute and the state's proper objective of assuring accuracy and efficiency in the disposition of property
at death was not sufficient to sustain judicial scrutiny.90 The determining factor, according to the majority, was the failure of the statute to be
"carefully tuned to alternative considerations"' I "between the extremes
'92
of complete exclusion and case-by-case determination of paternity.
In La/li, Justice Powell distinguished Trimble and characterized
the failure of the Illinois statute in that case to have been the requirement that the legitimation of the child occur through the intermarriage
'93
of the parents "as an absolute precondition to inheritance.
Although the New York statute also contained the absolute precondition that the paternity of the father be declared in a judicial proceeding sometime before his death, Justice Powell found it
distinguishable from the Illinois statute in two respects. First, Justice
Powell found that the precondition of section 4-1.2 clearly illustrated
the New York legislature's desire "to 'grant to illegitimates in so far as
practicable rights of inheritance on a par with those enjoyed by legitimate children,' ,94 while still protecting the important state interests involved. 95 Section 4-1.2 "represent[ed] a carefully considered legislative
judgment as to how this balance best could be achieved," 96 thus satisfying the Court's inquiry as to whether the statute's relation to the state
interests it was intended to promote was so tenuous that it'97lacked the
"rationality contemplated by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The second, and subsidiary, ground upon which Justice Powell
88. 430 U.S. at 769. Justice Powell did not cite the subsequent decisions. He used the
rationale utilized in Weber to distinguish Labine on other grounds as support for this statement. Id at 769-70.
89. Id at 770.
90. Id at 770-76. See notes 29-33 and accompanying text supra.
91. Id at 772 (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. at 513).
92. Id at 771.
93. 439 U.S. at 266.
94. Id at 274 (emphasis deleted) (quoting COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 46, at 265).
95. 439 U.S. at 274. See notes 47-60 and accompanying text supra.
96. 439 U.S. at 274.
97. Id at 273. As Justice Blackmun stated in his concurring opinion, his "point of
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distinguished Trimble was that the New York courts had given section
4-1.2 a liberal interpretation, even excusing "technical" failures to comply with the statute.9 8 The statute's precondition, therefore, did not in
practice create "significant categories of illegitimate children" who
could have been allowed to inherit "without jeopardizing the orderly
settlement" of their intestate fathers' estates. 99
The Court in Lalli appears to be turning away from the more activist position taken in Trimble. Although again affirming the applicability of the middle-tier standard of review, the future judicial
interpretation of this standard remains uncertain. By distinguishing
rather than overruling Trimble, "the corresponding statutes of other
States will be of questionable validity until [the] Court passes on them,
one by one, as being on the Trimble side of the line, or the Labine-Lalli
side.""' 0
Ambach v. Norwick*
In Ambach v. Norwick,l the Court considered whether a state may
refuse to employ as elementary and secondary school teachers aliens
who are eligible for United States citizenship but who refuse to seek
naturalization. Since 1886, the Court has been confronted with a
number of statutes which allegedly discriminate against aliens in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 Aldeparture ... is at the plurality's valiant struggle to distinguish, rather than overrule, Trimble v. Gordon .... " Id at 276.
98. See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
99. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. at 771.
As Justice Powell acknowleged, there will be some illegitimate children who will be
able to prove "their relationship to their deceased fathers without serious disruption of the
administration of estates. . . ." 439 U.S. at 272-73. He noted in this regard that "few statutory classifications are entirely free from the criticism that they sometimes produce inequitable results. Our inquiry under the Equal Protection Clause does not focus on the abstract
'fairness' of a state law, but on whether the statute's relation to the state interests it is intended to promote is so tenuous that it lacks the rationality contemplated by the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id at 273.
100. 439 U.S. at 277 (Blackmun, J., concurring). This is made evident in a footnote to
the plurality opinion, where Justice Powell states: "In affirming the judgment below, we do
not, of course, restrict a State's freedom to require proof of paternity by means other than a
judicial decree. Thus, a State may prescribe any formal method of proof, whether it be
similar to that provided by § 4-1.2 or some other regularized procedure that would assume
the authenticity of the acknowledgment. As we noted in Trimble, 430 U.S. at 772 n.14, such
a procedure would be sufficient to satisfy the State's interest." Id at 272 n.8.
* Commentary by Stephen Traverse, member, third-year class.
1. 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
2. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), where the Court invalidated a city

Winter 19801

SUPREME COURT REVIEW

though the seminal cases in this area protected an alien's "fight to
work,"3 a distinction was early drawn between "the common occupa-

tions of the community" and activities affected with a "special public
interest."4 During and immediately following World War I, the Court
relied on this distinction in upholding state statutory prohibitions

against an alien's working on public construction projects,5 owning
land for farming purposes6 and operating pool and billiard rooms.7
Perhaps in response to an evolution of social attitudes generally,"
as well as to a desire, expressed by Congress, to comfortably and expeditiously assimilate aliens and other minorities into American society
on the whole,9 later decisions greatly reduced the scope of the "special
public interest" doctrine.'" This trend culminated in Graham v. Richardson," where the Court declared state statutory classifications based
on alienage to be "inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scru-

tiny."'" Since Graham, the Court has invalidated statutes which prevented aliens from entering a state's competitive civil service,' 3 working
as engineers,' 4 receiving state financial aid for higher education 5 and
practicing law. 6 More recently, however, in Foley v. Connelie,'7 a
ordinance which was discriminatorily enforced against aliens in order to prevent Chinese
subjects from operating laundries within the city. These early cases are, in many instances,
also relevant to classifications based on race. See, e.g., id; United States v. Wong Kim Ark,
169 U.S. 649 (1898); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
3. See, e.g., Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915).
4. Compare Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915) (invalidating an Arizona statute
which prohibited employers of more than five persons from hiring any more than 20%
aliens) with People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 161, 108 N.E. 427, 429 (opinion by Cardozo, J.),
afdsub nom. Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915) (upholding a New York statute
which prohibited employment of aliens on public construction projects).
5. Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915); Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915).
6. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923).
7. Ohio ex rel Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927). See also the lower court
cases collected in Note, ConstitutionalityofRestrictionson Allens'Right to Work, 57 COLUM.
L. REV. 1012, 1021-23 (1957).
8. Cf.Fujii v. California, 38 Cal. 2d 718,242 P.2d 617 (1952) (United Nation Charter's
guarantee of human rights and freedoms invoked to invalidate a California statute restricting land ownership by aliens).
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) (formerly 8 U.S.C. § 41), citedin Takahashi v. Fish and
Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948).
10. See, e.g., Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Oyama v.
California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
11. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
12. Id at 372.
13. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
14. Examining Board of Engineers v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976).
15. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
16. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
17. 435 U.S. 291 (1978). This case is discussed at length in Greenberg, Scholz, Hiaring
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state's legitimate interest in excluding aliens from its "democratic political institutions"' 8 was held to justify the requirement that a state's police officers be United States citizens.

9

Thus, where the state's goal

was to "preserve the basic conception of a political community, ' 20 the
Court would require only a rational relationship between the state's
interest and the statute's limiting classification.' I The Court relied primarily on Foley to uphold, in a five to four decision, a state statute

prohibiting the employment 22of aliens as teachers in the state's elementary and secondary schools.
A New York statute forbidding permanent certification as a public
school teacher of any person not a United States citizen, unless that

person has manifested an intention to apply for citizenship,23 was held
in Ambach not to violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 24 The appellees, one British and the other Finnish, had
resided in the United States since 1965 and 1966 respectively and met

the educational requirements set by New York for certification as a
public school teacher.2 5 Both had consistently refused to seek citizenship, however, despite their eligibility to do so, and their applications
for teaching certificates covering nursery school and the elementary
grades were accordingly denied.2 6
& Hart, ConstitutionalReview: Supreme Court, October 1977 Term, 6 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 19, 180-89 (1978).
18. 435 U.S. at 295 (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648 (1973)).
19. 435 U.S. at 300.
20. Id at 296 (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. at 647).
21. Id at 296.
22. 441 U.S. at 69-70.
23. See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3001 (McKinney 1970), which provides: "No person shall
be employed or authorized to teach in the public schools of this state who is. . .[n]ot a
citizen. The provisions of this subdivision shall not apply, however, to an alien teacher now
or hereafter employed, provided such teacher shall make due application to become a citizen
and thereafter within the time prescribed by law shall become a citizen. . . ." The statute
further excepts persons who are ineligible for United States citizenship solely because of an
oversubscribed quota. Id § 3001-a. The Commissioner of Education has authority to create further exemptions from the prohibition. Pursuant to that authority, a regulation has
been promulgated providing for the issuance of a provisional certificate to alien teachers,
even where such teachers have not declared their intention of becoming citizens, if "such
teacher has the appropriate educational qualifications as defined in the regulations and (1)
possesses skills or competencies not readily available among teachers holding citizenship, or
(2) is unable to declare intention of becoming a citizen for valid statutory reasons." 8 N.Y.
CODE OF RULES AND REGULATIONS §

24. 441 U.S. at 71-72.

25. Id at 71.
26. Id

80.2 (i) (1978).
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The Lower Court Decision
One appellee, Norwick, sought to enjoin enforcement of the statute, and the other, Dachinger, obtained leave to intervene as a plaintiff.
A three-judge district court was convened pursuant to title 28, section
2281, of the United States code27 and, applying the Graham "close judicial scrutiny" standard, held the statute discriminatory against aliens in
violation of the equal protection clause.28 The court declared the statute overbroad as excluding all resident aliens from all teaching jobs
and as disregarding the subjects sought to be taught, the alien's nationality, the nature of the alien's relationship to the United States and his
willingness to substitute other representations of loyalty to American
political values. 2 9 The Commissioner of the New York State Department of Education appealed the district court's judgment to the United
States Supreme Court.
The United States Supreme Court Decision
Writing for the majority,30 Justice Powell observed that the
Supreme Court's decisions regarding the permissibility of statutory
classifications based on alienage had not formed "an unwavering line"
over the years. 3 1 Adverting to the "special public interest" cases, Justice Powell noted that the Court's more recent decisions had not entirely abandoned the "general principle that some state functions are so
bound up with the operation of the State as a governmental entity as to
permit the exclusion from those functions of all persons who have not
become part of the process of self-government. '32 He asserted that the
exceptional rule for "governmental functions" rests on the distinction
between citizens and aliens, which is "fundamental to the definition
and government of a State,"' 33 and that "because of [the] special significance of citizenship . . .governmental entities, when exercising the
functions of government, have wider latitude in limiting the participa27. This section provided that an interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the
enforcement, operation or execution of a state statute on grounds of unconstitutionality
could not be granted unless the application was heard by a three-judge district court. The
section was repealed in 1976. Pub. L. 94-381 §§ 1, 2, 90 Stat. 1119.
28. See Norwick v. Nyquist, 417 F. Supp. 913, 917 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
29. Id at 920-21.
30. Justice Powell was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White and
Rehnquist; a dissenting opinion was filed by Justice Blackmun with whom Justices Brennan,
Marshall and Stevens joined.
31. 441 U.S. at 72.
32. Id at 73-74.
33. Id at 75.
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tion of noncitizens. 3 4
In applying Foley to the case, Justice Powell stated that a determination, for equal protection purposes, of whether teaching in public
schools constitutes a "governmental function" requires consideration of
"the role of public education and. . the degree of responsibility and
discretion teachers possess in fulfilling that role." 35 He noted that a
teacher enjoys close personal contact with students, influencing student
perceptions and values by acting as a "role model."' 36 Justice Powell
further observed that since public education "fulfills a most fundamental obligation of government to its constituency" 37 and since the public
schools play an important part both in preparing individuals "for participation as citizens" 38 and in the preservation of the "values on which
our society rests,"3 9 public school teachers may properly be regarded as
performing a function which, under Sugarman v. Dougall,4 ° "go[es] to
the heart of representative government." 4 ' Since all public school
teachers "should help fulfill the broader function of the public school
system,"4 2 such teachers were considered "well within the 'governmental function' principle recognized in Sugarman and Foley." 43 On these
grounds, the Court held that a citizenship requirement for teaching in
state public schools need bear only a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.44 Determining that the New York statute met this
rational relationship standard,4 5 the Court upheld the law.
Four justices dissented from the Court's holding. Writing for
them, Justice Blackmun questioned the applicability of Foley and of
the majority's "governmental function" standard to the challenged statute. 46 He distinguished Foley both by its facts and under the rule in
Sugarman as relevant only to "'important nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial positions' held by 'officers who participate directly
34. Id
35. Id
36. Id at 78.
37. Id at 76 (quoting Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. at 297 (1978)).
38. 441 U.S. at 76.
39. Id
40. 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (invalidating state statute which prevented aliens from entering
state's competitive civil service).
41. 441 U.S. at 74 (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. at 647).
42. 441 U.S. at 79-80.
43. Id at 80.
44. Id
45. Id at 81-82.
46. Id at 83-84 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens,
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in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy.' ",47
Justice Blackmun argued that the "public responsibility" of police protection could constitutionally be confined to citizens of the United
States only because police are authorized to exercise "an almost infinite
variety of discretionary powers that could seriously affect members of
the public," and because of the "special demands of police positions."4 8
However, Blackmun, therefore, viewed Foley as "narrowly isolated"4 9
and inapposite to the facts in 4mbach. Especially relevant to the latter
connection, argued Blackmun, were the appellees' roots in this country
and their exceptional educational qualifications.5 0
Deeming Foley inapplicable to the present case, Justice Blackmun
advanced four reasons for affirming the lower court's invalidation of
the New York statute. First, the law itself refutes the argument that
New York attaches much importance to the issue of alienage within its
general educational scheme: the education of students who attend private schools or who are taught in public schools by alien teachers employable under any of the statute's many exceptions5" "seems not to be
inculcated with something less than what is desirable for citizenship
and what the Court calls an influence 'crucial to the continued good
health of a democracy.' "52 Second, the statute is all-inclusive in its
disqualifying provisions, being" 'neither narrowly confined nor precise
in its application,' nor limited to the accomplishment of substantial
state interests."5 3 Third, the statutory classification is irrational in its
attempt to bring "'diverse and conflicting elements'" together "'on a
broad but common ground,' . . . by disregarding some of the diverse
elements that are available, competent, and contributory to the richness
47. Id at 83 (quoting Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. at 296 (1978) and Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. at 647 (1973)).
48. 441 U.S. at 83 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall and Stevens,
JJ.). Note that Justice Blackmun has avoided the majority's term "governmental function"
in favor of "public responsibility."
49. Id at 84.
50. Id at 84-85. Justice Blackmun noted, in particular, that "[b]oth appellee Norwick
and appellee Dachinger have been in this country for over 12 years. Each is married to a
United States citizen. Each currently meets all the requirements, other than citizenship, that
New York has specified for certification as a public school teacher. . . .Each is willing, if
required, to subscribe to an oath to support the Constitutions of the United States and of
New York. Each lives in an American community, must obey its laws, and must pay all of
the taxes citizens are obligated to pay." Id (footnotes and citation omitted).
51. See note 23 supra.
52. 441 U.S. at 86 (Blackmun, J.,joined by Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, JJ., dissent-

ing) (quoting id. at 79).
53. Id at 87 (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. at 643).
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of our society and of the education it could provide."54 Finally, Justice
Blackmun could perceive no analytical distinction between this case
and In re Grioths," where the Court held that a state could not bar an
alien from qualifying to practice law:
If an attorney has a constitutional right to take a bar examination
and practice law, despite his being a resident alien, it is impossible for me to see why a resident alien, otherwise completely competent and qualified, as these appellees concededly are, is
constitutionally disqualified from teaching in the public schools
of the great State of New York.56
Analysis
It seems clear that in extending the concept of "governmental
function" well beyond limits of Foley and in adopting a more general
standard, based on language in Sugarman, of functions that "go to the
heart of representative government," the Court has substantially modified its position vis-tt-vis the constitutional validity of statutory classifications based on alienage. Foley, following Sugarman, recognized that
a state may constitutionally require that "important nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial positions" be held only by citizens, where
such positions involve direct participation in the "formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy."57 But the Court made no attempt in Ambach to bring public school teachers within the primary
specifications of the Foley-Sugarman standard. Rather, it chose to disregard that standard and looked instead to Foley's secondary considerations of role, responsibility and discretion in reinterpreting Sugarman.
The Court's almost total reliance on Foley made its task easier.
Just as government satisfies, according to Foley, a "most fundamental
obligation '5 8 in exercising the police power, so also is public education
a governmental obligation, at least insofar as it prepares individuals
"for participation as citizens" and contributes to "the preservation of
the values on which our society rests."'59 But this analysis, however
convenient, begs several key questions. The exercise of a general police
power is reserved by state governments to themselves.6 0 Education, on
54. 441 U.S. at 88 (quoting id at 77).
55. 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
56. 441 U.S. at 89.
57. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. at 296; Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. at 647.
58. 441 U.S. at 76 (quoting Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. at 297).
59. 441 U.S. at 76.
60. Cf.N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 140.30 (McKinney Supp. 1971) (restricting lawful arrests by persons other than peace officers to situations where a felony has in fact been committed, or where any other offense has been committed in the presence of the arresting
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the other hand, lies within the legal competence of both governmental
and nongovernmental entities." Does this not render education a less
fundamental governmental obligation than the exercise of the police

power?62 Does not New York's singular requirement forprivate school
teachers, that they be "competent," 63 suggest that a state's obligation to
educate its citizens is limited? Can the principal purpose of education
really be to prepare persons for "participation as citizens," or even to
preserve the "values on which our society rests," if aliens and citizens

may be educated alike in public schools, and if those schools purport to
bring together "diverse and conflicting elements

.

.

on a broad but

common ground"?'
In noting the "critical part" a teacher plays in developing a student's "attitude toward government and understanding of the role of
citizens in our society,"6 5 the Court assumed that teachers, like the state

troopers in Foley, act principally to benefit government. Further, the
Court drew no distinction between a teacher's role in influencing "attiperson). Arrests for misdemeanors may be made under such circumstances only in the
county where the offense was committed. Id Special laws relating to post-arrest procedure
under such circumstances are codified in id at § 140.40 (McKinney Supp. 1979). Cf. also
Note, The Law of Citizen'sArrest,65 COLUM. L. Rnv. 502 (1965) (criticizing the usual imposition of absolute liability for citizen's arrests made in error).
61. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Note that the New York statute does not apply to teachers in private schools. See 441 U.S. at 70, n.l.
In support of its conclusion that education constitutes a "governmental function" under
Sugarman v. Dougall,the Court quoted a passage from Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483, 493 (1954): "Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws andthe great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic
society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even
service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later
professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment." 441 U.S.
at 76-77. The text in Brown continues, however: "In these days, it is doubtful that any child
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the statehas undertaken toprovideit, is a right which must
be made available to all on equal terms." 347 U.S. at 493 (emphasis added).
Therefore, despite the explicit reference in Brown to education as an "important function of state and local governments," that function cannot be considered as comparable to
the function of the constabulary, unless it be also admitted that a state is free not to exercise
the police function, or that nongovernmental entities may exercise that function in a state's
stead if they do so competently.
62. Cf. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973)
(holding that education is not a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the
Constitution).
63. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3204 (2) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
64. 441 U.S. at 76-77.
65. Id at 78.
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tude toward government" and a policeman's role in assuring compliance with the codified criminal law of a particular state. While
focusing, therefore, on the wide discretionary powers that teachers enjoy in communicating course material to students, the Court seems to
bring ordinary classroom lessons within the purview of a state's governmental policy, thus ignoring the palpable differences between a
teacher's discretionary powers and those of a policeman. This omission
is particularly vexing in view of Foley's principal reliance on the "almost infinite variety of discretionary powers" 66 exercised by policemen
in the performance of their official duties.
The Court's analogy between the respective discretionary powers
of teachers and policemen, drawn in order to justify its reliance on Foley, would seem ill-served by the observation that teachers enjoy close
personal contact with students, for whom they serve as role models and
over whose "perceptions and values" they exert "a subtle but important
influence."'67 Clearly, the Court was concerned with the state's responsibility-and manifest power-to protect its young; however, the Court
made no attempt to specify the evils which the New York statute purports to protect the state's young from. The Court noted the opportunity a teacher has "to influence the attitudes of students toward
government, the political process, and a citizen's social responsibilities."' 68 But to the extent a teacher is constitutionally able to exercise
such influence, others are in a similar position, irrespective of their status as teachers or even as citizens. The First Amendment arguably protects citizens and resident aliens alike, without regard to profession or
occupation. 69 In this connection it is difficult to accept the Court's assertion that recognition of First Amendment principles in the present
context "would bar any effort by the State to promote particular values
and attitudes toward government."70 As Justice Blackmun observed in
his dissent, "[t]he State will know how to select its teachers responsibly,
wholly apart from citizenship, and can do so selectively and intelli7
gently.", '

66. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. at 297.
67. 441 U.S. at 78-79.
68. Id at 79.
69. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law. . . abridging
the freedom of speech ..
" Since the amendment's language does not restrict the right of
free speech to citizens, it would appear that the right is enjoyed by citizens and aliens alike.
See Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 233-34 (1954).
70. 441 U.S. at 79 n.10.
71. Id at 87 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, JJ.)
(footnote omitted).
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The Court's focus on the state's responsibilities to its young derived from its own view of public education as fulfilling, under Foley,
"a most fundamental obligation of government to its constituency.' '72
The Court seemed to consider the governmental function of apprehending criminals through the state police force as correlative with the
governmental function of educating the young through the state's public school teachers, in that both functions seek to protect society at
large. In this manner, the Court used Foley's secondary criteria of role,
responsibility and discretion to justify the application of a primary criterion entirely different from that recognized in Foley.7 3 In holding
that a state may constitutionally exclude aliens from its police force,' 4
75
the Court relied primarily on a finding, under Sugarman v. Dougall,
that "[p]olice officers very clearly fall within the category of 'important
nonelective. . . officers who participate directly in the. . . execution
. . . of broad public policy.'"76 In Ambach, however, the Court
viewed Sugarman more narrowly, regarding the factors considered in
Foley as merely derivative of the primary consideration of whether
public school teachers, like policemen, perform "'task[s] 'that [go] to the
heart of representative government.' ,7
Thus, while the Court in Ambach purported to follow Sugarman,
it in fact created a much more general test, under which state statutes
excluding aliens from certain public employment will be upheld where
the employment requires performance of functions that go to the heart
of representative government. Ignoring the primary standards in Foley
and judging public school teachers according to the secondary criteria
of role, responsibility and discretion, the Court found education to constitute one such governmental function. This result is manifestly incompatible with that reached in Sugarman, or indeed in any case
following Sugarman. Baldly declaring education to be a governmental
function going "to the heart of representative government,"7 " the Court
72. Id at 74 (quoting Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. at 297) (emphasis added).
73. See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
74. 435 U.S. at 300.
75. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
76. 435 U.S. at 300 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. at 647).
77. 441 U.S. at 75-76 (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. at 647). The complete
sentence in Sugarman reads: "[a]nd this power and responsibility of the State [to exclude
aliens from certain areas of employment] applies, not only to the qualifications of voters, but
also to persons holding state elective or important nonelective executive, legislative, and
judicial positions, for officers who participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy perform functions that go to the heart of representative government." .d
78. Id at 75-76.
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made no attempt to justify its conclusion vis-A-vis its implication in
Sugarman that members of a state's competitive civil service do not
perform such functions.7 9 Since the Court's holdings in Sugarman and
Foley explicitly condition the constitutionality of similarly discriminatory statutes upon a public employee's directparticopation "in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy,"' 0 it is clear that
the Court in Ambach has asserted a new test. In failing to define the
specifications of this new test, however, the Court has left the continued
vitality of alienage as a suspect classification, at least in public employment contexts, open to serious doubts.
Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa*

In the area of equal protection of the fundamental right to vote,
the Court in Holt Civic Club v.City of TuscaloosaI upheld Alabama

statutes which permitted the extension of limited governmental powers
beyond the electoral constituency of a municipal government. The
challenged statutes created a three-mile extension of conventional police powers beyond the strict geographical borders of a municipality of
6,000 or more inhabitants and a one-and-one-half-mile jurisdiction beyond the corporate limits of cities having less than 6,000 inhabitants.2
Persons residing within these limits were subject to the municipality's
police and safety regulations,3 its business, trade and profession licensing requirements4 and, to some extent, its planning authority.5 Despite
this augmented authority, residents of the adjoining territory subject to
79. See 413 U.S. at 646-47.
80. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. at 296; 413 U.S. at 647.
* Commentary by John Heisse, member third year class.
1. 439 U.S. 60 (1978).
2. The challenged statutes were ALA. CODE tit. 11, 11-40-10 (1975); ALA. CODE tit. 11,
11-51-91 (1975); ALA. CODE tit. 12, 12-14-1 (1975). Title 11, section 11-40-10 of the Alabama Code (1975) provides: "The police jurisdiction in cities having 6,000 or more inhabitants shall cover all adjoining territory within three miles of the corporate limits, and cities
having less than 6,000 inhabitants and in towns, such police jurisdiction shall extend also to
the adjoining territory within a mile and a half of the corporate limits of such city or town.
"Ordinances of a city or town enforcing police or sanitary regulations and prescribing
fines and penalties for violations thereof shall have force and effect in the limits of the city or
town and in the police jurisdiction thereof and on any property or rights-of-way belonging
to the city or town."
3. Id.
4. Title 11, section 11-51-91 of the Alabama Code (1975) provides in pertinent part:
"Any city or town within the state of Alabama may fix and collect licenses for any business,
trade or profession done within the police jurisdiction of such city or town but outside the
corporate limits thereof; provided, that the amount of such licenses shall not be more than
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these powers were not entitled to vote in municipal elections or to initiate or participate in municipal referenda or recall elections. It was to
correct this disparity that the action was brought.
The Lower Court Decisions
The plaintiffs in Holt were a civic organization and seven residents
of Holt, Alabama, an unincorporated community located within the
police jurisdiction of Tuscaloosa.6 In 1973 these plaintiffs brought a
statewide class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama challenging the constitutionality of the aforementioned Alabama statutes. They based their attack on the
Fourteenth Amendment, claiming that Tuscaloosa's extraterritorial exercise of its police powers, absent a concomitant extension of the voting
franchise to police jurisdiction residents, violated their equal protection
and due process rights.7
Upon denial of plaintiffs' request to convene a three-judge court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 22818 and dismissal of the complaint,
plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The
Fifth Circuit found that the challenged statutes had the statewide applicability required by section 2281 and remanded the case to the district
court for the convening of a three-judge court? On remand the plaintiffs' claim fared no better. The district court dismissed the equal protection argument, refusing to hold that extraterritorial regulation was
unconstitutional per se. The plaintiffs' due process claim was rejected
one half the amount charged and collected as a license for like business, trade or profession
done within the corporate limits of such city or town .. "
5. Although title II, section 11-52-30 of the Alabama Code (1975) extended the territorial jurisdiction of municipal planning commissions to include the police jurisdiction area,
the Alabama Supreme Court distinguished planning from zoning and held that municipal
planning commissions cannot zone extraterritorially. Roberson v. City of Montgomery, 285
Ala. 421, 425, 233 So. 2d 69, 72 (1970). The Roberson court defined planning as relating to
the systematic development of a community, while zoning was limited to use regulation of
specific parcels or districts. Id. at 425, 233 So. 2d at 72.
6. Tuscaloosa has a population of 65,700; its surrounding police jurisdiction contains
between 16,000 and 17,000 residents.
7. 439 U.S. at 62-63.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (repealed by Pub. L. No. 94-381, § 1, 90 Stat. 1119 (1976)) required
the empanelling of a three-judge district court to rule on injunctions sought to restrain "the
enforcement, operation or execution of a State statute by restraining the action of any officer
of such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute." In order for section 2281 to
be employed, the challenged statute must have had statewide application or have effectuated
a statewide policy. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Texas Sys. v. New Left Educ. Project,
404 U.S. 541, 543 (1972).
9. Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 525 F.2d 653, 656 (5th Cir. 1975).
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without comment. 10
The United States Supreme Court Decision
On direct appeal the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment of the district court. The majority opinion in the six to three

decision was written by Justice Rehnquist."

Appellants argued that

because the challenged statutes created a classification which infringed

upon their right to participate in municipal elections, the laws could be
sustained only if they were supported by a compelling state interest
which justified Alabama's assertion of state regulatory power without
granting the right to alter such regulations.' 2 In support of this contention, appellants relied on several voting rights cases holding that denial

of the franchise would be sustained only if justified by compelling state
interests.' 3 On the basis of this argument, appellants sought one of two
remedies: that the city's extraterritorial power be nullified by invalidating the authorizing statutes or that the right to vote in municipal elections be extended to residents within the jurisdiction of the regulations.

Prior to ruling on the substantive aspects of appellants' claim, Justice Rehnquist addressed the applicability of section 2281 and the suffi-

ciency of the complaint. With respect to the applicability of section
2281, the court concluded the statutes had the requisite statewide application because they spoke in mandatory terms.'4 Accordingly, convening the three-judge district court was proper. 15 In response to the
appellants' argument that the district court had dismissed their com-

plaint merely because they had failed to seek the proper remedy, the
Court agreed that this would have been an improper reason for dismissal. Nevertheless, the majority felt that regardless of the remedy

sought,, the, appellants' claim was not cognizable under the United
10. The district court did, however, grant leave to plaintiffs to amend their complaint
"to specify particular ordinances of the City of Tuscaloosa which are claimed to deprive
plaintiffs of liberty or property." Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, No. 73-736-W
(N.D. Ala., filed June 7, 1977).
11. Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978). Justice Rehnquist was
joined by Burger, C.J., and Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., with Stevens, J.
filing a concurrence. Brennan, J., dissented, joined by White and Marshall, JJ.
12. 439 U.S. at 66.
13. See, e.g., Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free School
Dist. No. 15, 359 U.S. 621 (1969).
14. Both the language of title 11, section 11-40-10 of the Alabama Code (1975) and
decisions of the Alabama Supreme Court require city ordinances to have force and effect in
the police jurisdictions of all municipalities of the requisite size. See City of Leeds v. Town
of Moody, 294 Ala. 496, 319 So. 2d 242 (1975).
15. 439 U.S. at 65.
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States Constitution. 16
Moving to the merits, Justice Rehnquist rejected appellants' contention that the Alabama laws must be subjected to strict scrutiny. Appellants relied on Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15,l 7
Cipriano v. City of Houma"8 and Evans v. Comman' 9 to support their
contention that the constitutionality of the denial of the franchise to

residents within the jurisdiction of police power regulations hinges on
satisfaction of the strict scrutiny test. The Court distinguished these
cases, finding that the element common to each of them-the fact that
the unfranchised party resided within the geographic boundary of the
governmental entity concerned-was absent in Holt. 20 The Court

therefore declined to extend the principle of "one man, one vote" beyond the geographic confines of the governmental unit.
Citing Dunn v. Blumstein,2 1 Kramer and Cornman, Justice Rehnquist summarized: "our cases have uniformly recognized that a government unit may legitimately restrict the right to participate in its
political processes to those who reside within its borders." 22 Even bona
fide residence does not alone activate the principle of "one man, one
16. Id. at 65-66.
17. 395 U.S. 621 (1969). Kramer involved a New York franchise qualification statute
that imposed requirements on voters in school district elections in addition to traditional age
and citizenship qualifications. Specifically, the statute limited eligible voters to district residents who (1) owned or leased taxable real property located within the district, or (2) were
married to a person owning or leasing such property, or (3) were parents or guardians of
children enrolled in a local district school for a specified time during the preceeding year.
Kramer never addressed the validity of a residency requirement because the Court found
the statute insufficiently tailored to meet the "exacting standard of precision. . . [required]
of statutes which selectively distribute the franchise" since it excluded many bona fide residents who had distinct and direct interests in school board decisions while including many
less interested residents. Id. at 632.
18. 395 U.S. 701 (1969). Decided the same day as Kramer, Ciprianp involved a Louisiana law which provided that only "property taxpayers" could vote in elections called to
approve the issuance of revenue bonds by a municipal utility system. Since property owners
and non-property owners alike were substantially affected by such a bond issue, the restriction of the franchise was held impermissible. Id. at 705-06. See also City of Phoenix v.
Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
19. 398 U.S. 419 (1970). Cornman dealt not with a statute but with a ruling by a state
administrative agency that denied the franchise to residents of a federal enclave located
within the geographical boundaries of the state of Maryland. The agency ruled that the
federal employees were not residents within the meaning of the state constitution. The
Court rejected the contention that Maryland could deny the enclave residents the right to
vote in state elections and found the plaintiffs to be both bona fide residents and sufficiently
interested in the electoral process that they could not be denied equal voting rights. Id. at
422, 424.
20. 439 U.S. at 68.
21. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
22. 439 U.S. at 68-69.
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vote." Suffrage has traditionally been denied minors, aliens and convicts. More particularly, "in the context of special interest elections the
lack the required
State may constitutionally disfranchise residents who 23
election."
the
of
matter
subject
the
in
interest
special
In Dunn the Court had established that "[a]n appropriately defined and uniformly applied requirement of bona fide residence may be
necessary to preserve the basic conception of a political community and
therefore could withstand close constitutional scrutiny." 24 Thus, by relying on a literal interpretation of previous holdings, Justice Rehnquist
obviated the need to apply a strict scrutiny standard in determining the
constitutionality of the challenged statutes.
Justice Rehnquist conceded the "logical appeal" of the plaintiffs'
position. Nevertheless, he noted that the realities of public administration dictate that the "imaginary line defining a city's corporate limits
cannot corral the influence of municipal actions. 25 Justice Rehnquist
reasoned that although purely internal municipal actions often have
indirect extraterritorial effects, these indirect consequences could not
form the basis for a constitutional right to participate in the municipality's political process.26 The majority refused to distinguish "the direct
effects of limited municipal powers over police jurisdiction residents
from the indirect.

. .

extraterritorial effects of purely internal munici-

pal actions[:] it makes little sense to say that one requires the extension
of the franchise while the other does not."27
Having established that Alabama's statutory scheme need not pass
the strict scrutiny test, the majority then addressed itself to whether the
statutes bore a rational relationship to some legitimate state interest.
Although the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit a law" 'merely
because it is special, or limited in its application to a particular geographical or political subdivision of the state,' "28 it will condemn legislation which " 'rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of
the State's objective.' "29 The Court commenced its analysis of Alabama's interest with a discussion of the broad discretion afforded the
states in the area of the allocation of state legislative power. The Court
noted that thirty-five states authorize their municipalities to exercise
23. Id. at 69.
24. 405 U.S. at 343-44 (footnote omitted).
25. 439 U.S. at 69.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 70.
28. Id. at 70-71 (quoting Fort Smith Light and Traction Co. v. Board of Impvmt., 274
U.S. 389, 391 (1927)).
29. Id. at 71 (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961)).
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governmental powers beyond their corporate limits and that several of
these provisions for extraterritorial regulation are more extensive and

intrusive than the Alabama scheme.3" Although the constitutionality of
these other plans was specifically left open, the Court implied that some
of extraterritorial regulation would fail to pass
more extensive schemes
31
muster.
constitutional
In response to the appellants' argument that it would be both con-

stitutionally preferable and more practical to place management of the
police jurisdiction in the hands of county authorities, the Court explained that it was beyond its purview to decide "whether Alabama has

chosen the soundest or most practical form of internal government possible."'32 Once the state legislature has chosen a scheme, the Court's

inquiry "is limited to the question whether 'any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify' Alabama's system of police jurisdictions."33 The Court had no problem answering this inquiry
affirmatively.
The Court found that reasonableness of providing some municipal

control over the police jurisdiction lies in the state legislature's "legitimate interest in seeing that this substantial segment of the population

does not go without basic municipal services such as police, fire, and
health protection." 34 It was also reasonable to require residents of the

police jurisdiction to contribute through license fees to defray the ex-

pense of services provided them by the city.35 Thus, once the Court

applied the "rational relationship" test, it took little more to find that
the Alabama statutes were reasonably justified by valid state objectives.
30. 439 U.S. at 72. See generally R. MADDOX, EXTRATERRITORIAL POWERS OF MUNICIPALITIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1955); Comment, The Constltutionality of the Exercise of
ExtraterritorialPowers by Municopalities,45 U. CHI. L. REv. 151 (1977).
31. 439 U.S. at 73 n.8. It should be noted that the Court specifically menitioned legislative powers not included in the Alabama scheme: "While the burden was on appellants to
establish a difference in treatment violative of the Equal Protection Clause, we are bound to
observe that among the powers not included. . . are the vital and traditional authorities of
cities and towns to levy ad valorem taxes, invoke the power of eminent domain, and zone
property for various types of uses." Id. (emphasis in original). Two of these powers have
been specifically precluded by Alabama Supreme Court decisions. See Roberson v. City of
Montgomery, 285 Ala. 421, 423, 223 So. 2d 69, 70 (1970) (cities may not zone extraterritorially absent specific legislative authority); City of Prichard v. Richardson, 245 Ala. 365, 370,
17 So. 2d 451, 455 (1944) (extraterritorial taxation for revenue is unconstitutional). See also
note 5 supra.
32. 439 U.S. at 73-74.
33. .d. at 74 (quoting Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410
U.S. 719, 732 (1973)).
34. 439 U.S. at 74.
35. Id.
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Appellants, citing UnitedStates v. Texas,3 6 argued that the imposition of government authority absent a concomitant right to vote was a
fundamental violation of the due process clause.3 7 United States v.
Texas prohibited the conditioning of the franchise of otherwise qualified votes upon payment of a poll tax, since such a scheme denied due
process to many Texas voters. The Court in Holt dismissed plaintiffs'
due process attack by reiterating that the right to vote may be conditioned upon actual residence within the geographic boundaries of the
governmental unit concerned. 8 Since the plaintiffs did not reside
within the corporate limits of Tuscaloosa, they were not "qualified voters" within the meaning of UnitedStates v. Texas, and thus were not
entitled to vote in Tuscaloosa's municipal elections. Absent a right to
vote, there could be no violation of the due process clause.39
Although he joined the majority opinion, Justice Stevens wrote
separately to stress the limited scope of the Court's holding.4" According to Justice Stevens, the Court had merely found the Alabama
scheme not to be unconstitutional per se and left open the question of
whether the scheme, or one similar to it, might unconstitutionally deny
the voting franchise to individuals who share the interests of their voting neighbors. 4 Justice Stevens likened the Alabama scheme to a situation where a suburban community contracts with a nearby city to
provide municipal services for its residents.4 2 Although he noted the
difference between a suburb's decision to contract with a nearby city
43
and a decision by the state legislature requiring the suburb to do so,
Justice Stevens recognized that even the contracting suburb could not
consent to a waiver of its residents' constitutional voting rights. If the
residents are qualified voters, the state must ensure them an "equally
effective voice in the election process."'
Justice Stevens then distinguished the plaintiffs' situation from
that of the federal enclave residents in Evans v. Cornman;45 appellants
were not without a voice in the election of their governing officials since
they directly elected state and county officials, through whom "they
36.
(1966).
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

252 F. Supp. 235 (W.D. Tex. 1966) (three-judge district court), a'd, 384 U.S. 155
439 U.S. at 75.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 75 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 78.
Id. at 76.
fd. at 76 n.1.
Id. at 76 (quoting Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 480 (1968)).
398 U.S. 419 (1970).
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participate directly in the process which has created their governmental
relationship with the city.' ' 46 The issue then became, according to Jus-

tice Stevens, "whether by virtue of that relationship created by state
law, the residents of Holt and all other police jurisdictions in the State
are entitled to a voice 'equally effective' with the residents of the municipalities themselves in the election of the officials responsible for
governing the municipalities."'47 Justice Stevens concluded that they
were not.48
This conclusion was grounded on two factors. First, Justice Stevens echoed the majority's view that a state or city is "free under the
Constitution to require that 'all applicants for the vote actually fulfill
the requirements of bona fide residence.' ,49 Second, the challenged
statutes extend to the cities only limited extraterritorial powers, leaving
many traditional municipal powers entrusted to the county government, which is fully representative of, and responsible to, the residents
of Holt.50 Stevens concluded that, absent a showing of unreasonableness either in the drawing of the residency lines or in the cost to the
police jurisdiction for the services provided, the Alabama statutes could
not be found to be unconstitutional on their face. 5
The majority was met by a sharply critical dissent authored by
Justice Brennan and joined by Justices White and Marshall.52 The dissent stressed that legislation such as the contested Alabama statutes had
traditionally been subjected to exacting judicial scrutiny, since "'statutes distributing the franchise constitute the foundation of our representative society.' "' The dissenters noted that when statutes grant the
franchise to some citizens and deny it to others, "'the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling
state interest.' ,,54 Although they recognized that past cases have upheld bona fide residency requirements as valid voter qualifications, 5
46. 439 U.S. at 77 (Stevens, J., concurring).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. (quoting Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965)).
50. 439 U.S. at 77.
51. Id. at 78.
52. Id. at 79.
53. Id. at 80-81 (quoting Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626
(1969)).
54. Id. at 81 (emphasis in original) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Kramer v. Union
Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. at 627 and Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. at 337).
55. 439 U.S. at 81. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343-44 (1972); Evans v.
Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 422 (1970); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91, 96 (1965); Pope v.
Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904).
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the dissenters refused to insulate the Alabama statutes from strict judicial scrutiny. To do so "cedes to geography a talismanic significance
56
contrary to the theory and meaning of. . . past voting-rights cases."1
The dissent argued that the Court had previously exempted from
strict scrutiny only "bona fide residency requirements that were 'appropriately defined and uniformly applied.' ,57 The touchstone for determining the validity of such requirements had been whether they were
aimed at preserving the political community.5 8 However, argued the
dissent, such a political community is based on the notion of a reciprocal relationship between government and its electorate. By mandating
extraterritorial regulation, the challenged statutes "fracture this relationship by severing the connection between the process of government
and those who are governed." 59 This undermines the very purpose
sought to be furthered by traditional residency requirements.6 0
In reponse to the majority's implication that the police jurisdiction
was not "governed enough" to be included within the political community of Tuscaloosa, the dissent contrasted the case at hand with Kramer
and Coriano.61 In neither case, reasoned the dissent, were the unfranchised parties affected by the decisions of the governmental body in
question to the same degree as the residents of Tuscaloosa's police jurisdictions. Indeed, an Alabama municipality may use its police power
over its police jurisdiction to restrict, or even ban, the practice of businesses or professions it finds "'hurtful to public morals, public safety,
productive of disorder or injurious to public good.' "62 The dissent also
criticized the majority for failing to establish standards for determining
when those subject to extraterritorial regulation will have been "governed enough" to trigger the more stringent protections of the equal
protection clause.63
Further, the dissenters characterized Alabama's residency criterion
as "entirely arbitrary."6 4 It should have been immaterial that the appellants resided outside of the physical boundaries of Tuscaloosa, as
long as they "live[d] within the perimeters of the city's 'legislative pow56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

439 U.S. at 81 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 82 (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. at 343).
439 U.S. at 82.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 85.
Id. at 85-86 (quoting Chappell v. Birmingham, 236 Ala. 363, 365 (1938)).
439 U.S. at 86.
Id. at 87.
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ers.' ,,6s Since appellants, like the citizens of Tuscaloosa, were governed by the laws of Tuscaloosa, the dissenters argued that they should
have been entitled to a concomitant extension of the voting franchise.6 6
The dissenters dismissed the majority's argument equating appellants with those indirectly affected by municipal actions as a "simple
non sequitur. ' 67 Such a distinction, argued the dissent, had been recognized by Alabama law68 and was consistent with the political community concept which underlies bona fide residency requirements.
Lastly, the dissent proposed that since no compelling state interest had
been articulated and since Alabama's interest in providing police jurisdiction residents with municipal services was in no way inconsistent
with an extension of voting rights to such residents, the Alabama statutes could not stand in the face of the equal protection clause. Therefore, the dissenters would have reversed the judgment of the district
court and held the challenged statutes to be in violation of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.6 9
Analysis

70

The primary distinction between the approach taken by the majority and that taken by the dissent was the test each employed to determine the constitutionality of the contested statutes. The majority cited
Dunn as authority for the proposition that "a government unit may
legitimately restrict the right to participate in its politicial processes to
those who reside within its borders."'" The dissent on the other hand,
arguing that the Alabama restrictions "undermine the very purposes
which have led this Court in the past to approve the application of
bona fide residency requirements,"7 2 insisted that the contested statutes
be subjected to "'exacting judicial scrutiny.' ,
The reason for this divergence in approaches stems from each
group's interpretation of Dunn. The majority apparently read Dunn as
holding that requirements of residency within the geographic boundaries of the governmental entity are constitutional per se. 7 1 The dissent
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See Roberson v. Montgomery, 285 Ala. 421, 233 So. 2d 69 (1970).
69. 439 U.S. at 88 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
70. For a more detailed discussion of this area, see Comment, The Consttutionalityof
the Exercise of ExtraterritorialPowers by Municofpaliies, 45 U. CH. L. REv. 151 (1977).
71. 439 U.S. at 68-69.
72. Id. at 82 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
73. Id. (quoting Kramer v. Union School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. at 628).
74. 439 U.S. at 68-69.
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construed Dunn as upholding such residential restrictions only when
the purpose of the restriction was "to preserve the basic conception of a
political community."7 5 Since a political community is based on the
notion of a reciprocal relationship between government and its electorate, the dissent would have upheld a residency requirement only if it
encompassed all those within the perimeters of the governmental unit's
legislative powers.
At issue in Dunn was a Tennessee statute imposing a requirement
of one year state residency prior to voting in any elections. In that case,
76
the Court found the durational requirement to be unconstitutional,
but felt that a bonafide residency requirement may be the only adequate means of protecting a state's legitimate interest in preserving a
"political community."7 7 The political community involved in Dunn
was the state of Tennessee. The reasonableness of a bona fide residency requirement therein emanated from the coincidence of the state's
geographic boundaries with the limits of its legislative powers. It was
reasonable to preclude residents of neighboring states from voting in
Tennessee elections, since they were in no way governed directly by the
Tennessee legislature. This logic, however, should not be extended to
the situation presented by Holt where the extraterritorials involved
were subject to the legislative powers of the municipal government.
Once the boundaries of legislative power exceed the geographic limits
of a governmental entity, the "talismanic significance"7 8 of residency
within those geographic limits loses force.
It cannot be denied that the three major voting rights cases distinguished by the majority-Kramer,C&riano and Evans-each involved
the denial of the franchise to persons residing within the geographic
limits of the governmental entity concerned. The importance of this
distinction, however, must be tempered by the concept of the "political
community" discussed above. Indeed, a major emphasis of each case
was the concern of the Court that voter qualifications not be drawn so
as to exclude anyone who is not "substantially less interested or affected than those the statute includes."7 9 The plaintiffs in Holt should
be considered members of Tuscaloosa's "political community," and
thus the extension of the franchise to them would be consistent with
Kramer, Criano and Evans.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 82 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. at 344).
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. at 360.
Id.at 343-44.
Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. at 81 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. at 632.
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On a practical level, however, some degree of extraterritorial regulation is often desirable. Through extraterritorial regulation, the city
can influence the development, health and safety of the area immediately outside its borders. Additionally, extraterritorial government can
provide these outlying areas with essential municipal services such as
police and fire protection. By refusing to require an extension of the
voting franchise beyond the geographic boundaries of the city, the
Court avoided the strict scrutiny test and thus ensured that such desirable extraterritorial regulation will continue so long as it bears "some
rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose"8 and is not overly
oppressive. 81

Columbus BoardofEducation v. Penick, Dayton Boardof Education v.
Brinkman*
The Supreme Court handed down two decisions in its 1978 Term
dealing with the power of federal courts to desegregate public school
systems. Both Columbus Board of Education v. Penick' and Dayton
BoardofEducation v. Brinkman' were class action suits initiated by the
parents of students attending school systems allegedly operated on a
racially discriminatory basis in violation of the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The two decisions considered the factual circumstances which would establish the existence of an intentionally maintained dual system of public education based on race and
which would in turn warrant the imposition of system-wide remedial
measures-including court-ordered busing-to correct segregation
sanctioned by the state.
The United States Supreme Court Decisions
-A. Columbus Boardof Education v. Penick
The District Court for the Southern District of Ohio found that in
1976, the year it completed trial, half of the 172 schools in the Columbus school system had student bodies that were either ninety percent
black or ninety percent white. Approximately seventy percent of the
system's 96,000 students attended schools that were at least eighty per80. 439 U.S. at 70.
81. Id. at 72-73 n.8.
* Commentary by Morgan D.S. Prickett, member third-year class.
1. 99 S. Ct. 2941 (1979).
2. .d. at 2971.
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cent black or eighty percent white, yet only thirty-two percent of the
students enrolled in the district as a whole were black.' In March of
1977, the district court filed an opinion setting forth findings of fact and
conclusions of law. It found, inter alia: (1) that the Columbus school
system was intentionally segregated by race in 1954, the year Brown v.
Board of Education (I)' was decided; (2) that at no time thereafter did
the Board set out to disestablish this dual system; (3) that the Board
had adopted a variety of practices and policies which had maintained
and enhanced this system; and (4) that the Board had rejected sugges5
tions proffered by interested parties to dismantle the dual system.
The district court inferred that these actions were motivated by an
intent to perpetuate segregation throughout the system, and further
found that this animus violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because this course of official conduct had affected the entire system, the district court held that any remedial plan
looking to eradicate this dual system would have to be system-wide in
scope. Such a plan was submitted by the Board and accepted by both
the district court and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.' As a
result, thirty-three schools were closed, the structure of grade levels was
reorganized, faculty and staff were reassigned along with 42,000 of the
system's students, and 37,000 students were ordered bused to new
schools to achieve racial balance.'
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling, stating that
"the Board's conduct at the time of trial and before. . . was animated
by an unconstitutional segregative purpose . . . [which] had current,

segregative impact that was sufficiently system-wide to warrant the
remedy ordered. ..8."' The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Mr. Justice White, writing for himself and four other Justices.9
The Board contended at the outset that the district court could not
properly find that a dual system existed in 1954 because segregated
3. Id. at 2943.
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. 99 S.Ct. at 2944 (summarizing conclusions from Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ.,
429 F. Supp. 229, 260-61 (S.D. Ohio 1977)).
6. Id. at 2944-45. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 583 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1978).
7. 99 S.Ct. at 2952-53 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Powell, J.).
8. Id. at 2945.
9. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens concurred in Justice White's
opinion. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart concurred only in the result. Id. at 2952
(Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment), 2983-88 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment,
joined by Burger, C.J.). Justice Powell dissented in a separate opinion, Id. at 2988-93 (Powell, J., dissenting), and joined Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion. Id. at 2952-71 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Powell, J.).
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schooling was not required by state law. Justice White summarily rejected this position. While such a legislative commandment would ease
the plaintiff's burden of proving a constitutional violation, the majority
held that under Keyes v. School DistrictNo. 1,10 proof of state-imposed
segregation, in whatever form, if it resulted in separate black or white
schools, was prima facie evidence of a dual system and would suffice to
support a finding to that effect. 1'
Justice White then approved the lower courts' finding that since
the second Brown decision in 1955,12 the Columbus School Board had
been under a duty to "'effectuate a transition to a racially non-discriminatory school system.' "13 Every instance of the Board's refusal or failure to discharge this affirmative duty would constitute an independent
violation compounding the original breach. 4 The district court had
reviewed the Board's action since Brown II and had found faculty assignments made on the basis of race, boundary lines gerrymandered in
a manner not explainable except with reference to race, construction
programs undertaken, sites for new facilities selected and optional attendance zones instituted with knowledge that all these acts would have
a segregative effect. Confronted with such evidence, the Supreme
Court held that the district court was warranted in concluding that the
Board had failed to discharge its affirmative duty to disestablish the
dual system.
Justice White noted that the equal protection clause would support
plaintiffs' claims only upon a finding of intentional discrimination and
that proof of discriminatory impact alone was not sufficient to merit the
10. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
11. 99 S.Ct. at 2947. Accord, Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 203 (1973);
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd.of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 18 (1971).
The Court in Columbus rejected the contention that Dayton Board of Education v.
Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977), had cast doubt on the continued validity of parts of the
Keyes and Swann opinions which had approved the drawing of inferences of system-wide,
purposeful discrimination which resulted in dual systems. 99 S. Ct. at 2947 n.7. The holding
of that Dayton case concerned the scope of remedies, not the propriety of inferences going to
create the factual predicate for liability. On the same day Columbus was decided, the Court
approved use of this inference within the context of the Dayton litigation. See Dayton Bd.
of Educ. v. Brinkman, 99 S.Ct. at 2978.
12. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
13. 99 S.Ct. at 2947 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955)). Accord,
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1971); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 41 (1971); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
14. 99 S.Ct. at 2947. See also Dayton Bd.of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 413-14
(1977); Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 460 (1972); United States v.
Scotland Neck City Bd.of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972).
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invocation of judicial authority. 5 Since the lower courts had taken account of this and applied the correct legal standard, their decisions
properly reflected the general rule that "actions having forseeable and
anticipated disparate impact are relevant evidence . . . 'as one of the
several kinds of proof from which an inference of segregative intent
may be properly drawn.'"16
Justice White noted that the case presented a situation where: (1)
the Board had a duty to dissolve its segregated system; (2) this duty,
having existed for twenty years, had repeatedly and ineffectually been
brought to the Board's attention;"7 (3) the Board had pursued a course
of conduct with knowledge that its actions would forseeably result in
perpetuating racial imbalance in the public schools; and (4) the Board
had purposefully maintained segregation in a substantial part of the
system, thus furnishing a sufficient basis for a rebuttable presumption
of system-wide discriminatory intent.'" Accordingly, the district court
was entitled to treat the conjunctive effect of all these factors as prima
facie proof of a system-wide discriminatory intent. Particular mention
was made of the Board's opportunity to rebut this evidence of segregative purpose and current system-wide impact. It had not done so to the
satisfaction of either the district court or the court of appeals, and the
Supreme Court found "no apparent reason to disturb the factual findings and conclusions" made by tribunals closer to the evidence.1 9
Justice White noted that because the segregative impact affected
the entire district, the trial court's order imposing a system-wide remedy was not improper. The majority did not believe the district court
had seized upon isolated instances of unusual discriminatory impact;
rather it had moved to correct a twenty-year history of incrementally
segregative.decisions whose cumulative discriminatory impact had, at
the time of judgment, infected the warp and woof of education
throughout the entire system. Finding no prejudicial erros of fact or
law, the Supreme Court was not persuaded to upset the district court's
decision.2"
15. 99 S.Ct. at 2950. See generally Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
16. 99 S. Ct. at 2950 (quoting Penick v. Columbus Bd.of Educ.. 429 F. Supp. 229, 255
(S.D. Ohio 1977)).
17. Id. at 2949 n.11.
18. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973).
19. 99 S.Ct. at 2950.
20. Id. at 2952.
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B. Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman
In Dayton, the district court had originally found a violation of the
equal protection clause,2 1 but after protracted litigation 22 eventually

dismissed the complaint for plaintiffs failure to show that existing patterns of segregation had been caused by the Board's purposefully dis-

criminatory conduct. 23 The district court had found that in 1972, when
the original complaint was filed, fifty-one of the system's sixty-nine
schools were virtually all white or all black. Forty-three percent of the

students were black, but seventy-six percent of them had been assigned
to the twenty-one predominantly black schools. This pattern had continued for at least twenty years.24 The district court had also found that

the Board operated a district-wide black high school with a black principal and an all-black faculty, and that several elementary schools were

created and maintained on a similar basis. 25 The district court had further found that in 1950 the faculties of various schools were completely

segregated to reflect the predominant racial composition of student enrollments: one hundred percent black schools had totally black faculties, while the faculties of other schools were one hundred percent
white.2 6
21. This violation was composed of three elements: (1) the pronounced racial segregation patterns which existed in the district and which the Board had made no attempt to alter,
(2) the Board's adoption of optional attendance zones which had a racial motivation and a
significant effect in certain school areas; and (3) the Board's repeal of resolutions by which
an earlier Board recognized its responsibility for the existing pattern of racial segregation
and its duty to alleviate the condition. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 99 S. Ct. at 2975
n.3.
22. The suit was filed in April, 1972. The district court ordered the school board to
formulate a desegregation plan in February, 1973, and approved a plan submitted by the
Board in July, 1973. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
district court's findings of fact, but reversed and remanded as to the remedial plan. Brinkman v. Gilligan, 503 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1974). On remand, the district court accepted a
modified plan submitted by the Board in March, 1975. The court of appeals again reversed
as to the remedy proposed and directed the district court to adopt a system-wide plan for the
1976-1977 school year that would approximate the system-wide ratio of black and white
students. 518 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1975). The district court then adopted a plan which employed a variety of desgregation techniques, including student exchange programs between
"paired" schools and a redistricting of attendance zones. This plan was approved by the
court of appeals. 539 F.2d 1084 (6th Cir. 1976), but was disapproved by the Supreme Court
because the system-wide remedy was not based on a finding that the segregation patterns
resulted from intentional action by the Board. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S.
406 (1977).
23. Brinkman v. Gilligan, 446 F. Supp. 1232 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
24. 99 S. Ct. at 2975 n.l. The figures are from Brinkman v. Gilligan, 503 F.2d at 69495.
25. Brinkman v. Gilligan, 446 F. Supp. 1232, 1246 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
26. Brinkman v. Gilligan, 583 F.2d at 248-49.
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Nevertheless, the district court held that the plaintiff had failed to
establish the Board's intent to operate a dual system. This conclusion
was overturned by the court of appeals as clearly erroneous. The court
of appeals, reviewing the evidence, found that the district court had
misapplied controlling principles of law insofar as it had ignored (1)
the "purposeful segregation in faculty assignments. . . [which was] 'inextricably tied to racially motivated student assignment practices,' "27
and (2) the "intentional maintenance of a substantial number of black
schools in the system at the time of Brown I. ' ' 8 The legal import of
these and other factors, the court of appeals held, made it clear that the
Board was operating a dual system which had existed at the time of
Brown I, that it had failed to disestablish that system, that the "Board's
'intentional segregation practices [could not] be confined in one distinct
area,'" that this had warranted an inference of purposeful segregation
in other parts of the system, and that the Board had not produced evidence sufficient to rebut the inference that the Board's actions since
Brown I had been taken to create or perpetuate segregation. The court
of appeals concluded that since the inferences of segregative intent and
system-wide impact had gone unchallenged, the district court would
have been justified in imposing a system-wide remedy. 9
The Supreme Court, again per Justice White, noted that the factual predicate for finding a dual system in Dayton was similar to that
established in Columbus. As in Columbus, Justice White was disinclined to overturn the factual findings of the lower courts. Accordingly,
he found "no reason. . to upset the judgment of the Court of Appeals."3 °
Following the analytical sequence used in Columbus, Justice
White held that once it was established that the Dayton Board had
operated an intentionally segregated dual system in 1954, the Board
would be judged in light of its affirmative duty "to eradicate the effects
of that system," a part of this duty being "the obligation not to take any
action that would impede the process of disestablishing the dual system
27. 99 S. Ct. 2978-79 (quoting Brinkman v. Gilligan, 583 F.2d at 248). Speaking of the
importance of racially motivated assignment of teachers, the Court in Swam v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education had said: "Independent of student assignment, where it is
possible to identify a 'white school' or a 'Negro school' simply by reference to the racial
composition of teachers and staff. . . aprimafaciecase of violation of substantive constitutional rights under the Equal Protection Clause is shown." 402 U.S. 1, 18 (1971).
28. 99 S. Ct. at 2978.
29. Brinkman v. Gilligan, 583 F.2d at 247, 253.
30. 99 S. Ct. at 2977-78 n.8.
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and its effects."' I This duty required the Board to do more than simply
abandon prior discriminatory practices, 32 or to adopt plans for desegregation which on their face were racially neutral.3 3 The duty "to eradicate the effects of [a dual] system" obliges the Board to formulate and
implement positive techniques to dismantle the segregated system.
Courts will review these actions, not for their ostensible purpose, but
for their "effectiveness. . . in decreasing or increasing the segregation
caused by the dual system."34
The Supreme Court affirmed the holdings of the court of appeals
not only that the Board had failed to adopt measures to extirpate the
dual system, but that it had also taken numerous actions since 1954
which had exacerbated the original constitutional violation. Among
these incidents of aggravation were the continued assignment of students and faculty by race, the operation of segregated schools, the
adoption of racially discriminatory optional attendance zones, and a
pattern of school construction and site selection which perpetuated racial segregation throughout the system. The court of appeals found
that these actions showed that the Board had failed to discharge its
affirmative duty. As in Columbus, the majority in Dayton affirmed,
after finding that the lower court had committed "no prejudicial errors
36
of fact or law."
C. Separate Opinions
Justice White's opinions in Columbus and Dayton spoke for a bare
majority of the Court. Four Justices wrote separate opinions, each varying in length and focus. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart
concurred in Columbus but dissented in Dayton. Justices Powell and
Rehnquist dissented in both cases.
Chief Justice Burger wrote a short opinion expressing his agreement with various points developed by other Justices. The Chief Justice agreed with Justice Stewart that the complex nature of
desgregation suits placed a premium on appellate court deference to
31. Id. at 2979. Accord, Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972);
United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972). See generally Green
v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
32. 99 S. Ct. at 2979. The Court at this point referred to Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,
413 U.S. 189, 200-01 n.ll (1973), which in turn cites Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S.
430, 437-38 (1968).
33. Swarm v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971).
34. 99 S. Ct. at 2979. Accord, Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 460,
462 (1972); Davis v. Comm'rs of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971).
35. Brinkman v. Gilligan, 583 F.2d at 258.
36. 99 S. Ct. at 2981.
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the findings and conclusions of lower courts unless clearly erroneous.
Thus he, like Justice Stewart, voted to affirm in Columbus and reverse
in Dayton.3 7 The Chief Justice joined Justice Rehnquist's detailed criticisms of the Court's "novel legal standard" regarding the affirmative
duty of school boards to desegregate their systems upon a judicial finding that a dual system existed at the time of Brown 1.38 Chief Justice
Burger shared Justice Powell's concern that federal court supervision of
local desegregation efforts would have undesirable implications for local government. The Chief Justice thought it "increasingly doubtful"
that busing would promote racial harmony, but he made no move to
reopen the issue.39 Apparently, he was of the opinion that development
of this point would only add further uncertainty to the already confused body of desegration decisions.
Justice Stewart, joined by the Chief Justice, concurred specially in
Columbus and dissented in Dayton.4 0 This seeming contradiction was
explainable in terms of the deference Justice Stewart believed appellate
courts should extend to the findings and conclusions of the district
courts. Those lower tribunals, Justice Stewart felt, were "uniquely situated . . . to appraise the societal forces at work in the communities
where they sit" and to evaluate the subtle and intricate factors that
could substantiate a finding of intentional segregation. 4 ' Justice Stewart therefore accepted the district court's finding of intentional segregation in Columbus, while voting to preserve the original decision in
Dayton.
Justice Stewart was disturbed that the majority would shift to a
school board the burden of rebutting a presumption of current, authorized segregation upon a showing that a dual system existed in 1954. He
felt that the likelihood that an invidious intent to discriminate might be
presumed to exist twenty years later, or that the effects of such a violation would have major effects on a current system, was too tenuous to
justify creation of such a presumption. Even if this presumption is rebuttable, he argued, it fails to take sufficient account of the pervasive
and dynamic changes wrought in racial relationships over the twentyfive years since Brown I was decided.42
These considerations persuaded Justice Stewart that the district
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 2952 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
See notes 89-91 and accompanying text supra.
99 S. Ct. at 2952 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 2983-88 (Stewart, J., and Burger, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
Id. at 2983.
Id.
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court in Dayton had reached the currect result.4 3 Convinced that the
court of appeals had been "wholly unjustified" in shifting the burden of
proof approved by the majority and that such action might decisively
affect litigation involving such elusive issues as the collective intent attributable to decision-making bodies of earlier years, Justice Stewart
deemed it "a serious mistake to upset the District Court's findings.""
Within the context of Columbus, Justice Stewart believed the district court had discovered "relatively strong"45 evidence of recent discriminatory intent.46 The lower court's finding that a substantial part
of the Columbus system was operated on a segregated basis justified
the district court in activating a presumption shifting to the school authorities the burden of disproving the inference that the entire system
was maintained on an unconstitutional design to discriminate. 47 The
Columbus Board did not rebut this presumption, a fact which, in Justice Stewart's opinion, supported the finding that the system was operated on a segregated basis, as well as the District Court's imposition of
a system-wide remedy to rectify this state of affairs.
Justice Powell dissented in both Columbus and Dayton.4 8 The
thrust of his opinion was that the Supreme Court should reexamine
and reevaluate the calculus of judicial efforts to desegregate the nation's public schools. 49 Justice Powell agreed that integration was the
basic goal and that the judiciary should participate in the realization of
that goal: "Proved discrimination by state or local authorities should
never be tolerated. ' 50 "Courts," he felt, "should confront discrimination whereever it is found to exist."5 Justice Powell, however, did
doubt whether the courts' "single-minded pursuit of racial balance"
best served this goal when mathematical ratios are exalted to the exclusion of equally important but more ephemeral values.5 2 According to
Justice Powell, the judicial supervision of educational systems implicates both institutional and philosophical values. Speaking to the former, Justice Powell believed courts were the "least competent" branch
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
support
48.
49.
50.
5I.
52.

Id.
Id. at 2985.
Id. at 2986.
Id.
Id. Justice Stewart cited Keyes v. School District No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973), to
this proposition.
Id. at 2988-93 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2992.
Id.
Id. at 2993.
Id. at 2990-9 1.
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of government to undertake the day-to-day running of schools,5 3 yet
judicial supervision was the trend of recent decisions. Although "there
is reason to believe that some legislative bodies have welcomed judicial
activism with respect to a subject so inherently difficult and so politically sensitive," Justice Powell felt courts should recognize the impropriety of "social engineering."54 It is also likely to prove futile, he
argued, because the philosophical limitations of a democratic society
effectively restrain the quantum and quality of judicial activism.55
Justice Powell, the only member of the Court who had served on a
school board, believed parents would resent and resist judicial supervision of education, and would interpret such action as an intrusion on
their authority to direct their children's education.56 Rather than
tamely submit to this displacement of their authority, he felt that parents, especially white parents, would react by withdrawing their children from the public schools:57 "the demonstrated effect of compulsory
integration is a substantial exodus of whites from the system."5 " Thus
begins, it was argued, a snowball effect whereby all parents of all races
would be inclined to place their children in private schools. Deprived
of vast segments of community support, the public schools eventually
would contain only the children of the destitute or the indifferent.59
This deterioration of a vital institution would ill-serve the racial harmony promoted when children attend schools with heterogeneous student bodies.60
Justice Powell found "profoundly disturbing" the majority's backhanded endorsement of judicial authority to reorder an entire school
system without a showing that intentional discrimination had segregated the schools throughout the district.61 He further criticized the
lower courts for "stringing together. . . a chain of 'presumptions,' not
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 2992.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2990-91.
Id.
Id. at 2990. Justice Powell drew this conclusion from J.COLEMAN, S. KELLY & J.
MOORE, TRENDS IN SCHOOL SEGREGATION 1968-1973 at 66, 76-77 (1975).
59. 99 S.Ct. at 2991 (Powell, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 2991 n.5. Justice Powell referred to the controversy in academe about
whether integration has education benefits, although he deemed much of the dispute "beside
the point." 99 S.Ct. at 2991 n.5. See R. CRAIN & R. MAHARD, THE INFLUENCE OF HIGH
SCHOOL RACIAL COMPOSITION ON BLACK COLLEGE ATTENDANCE AND TEST PERFORMANCE (1978); Coleman, New Incentivesfor Desegregation, 7 HUMAN RIGHTS 10 (1978);

Weinberg, The Relationshp Between School Desegregation and .4cademic Achievement, 4
Review ofthe Research, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 240 (1975).
61. 99 S.Ct. at 2988 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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one of which is close enough to reality to be reasonable."6 Intentional
segregation in some schools did not warrant the prescription of systemwide remedies without a "principled basis." To Justice Powell, this
meant calibrating the remedy to correct only those effects attributable
to de jure segregation. 63 If federal courts hold school boards responsible for the eradication of de facto segregation, he argued, they will be
overreaching themselves and their institutional limits to chase a chimera.' Not all public school discrimination results from official action, and such "judicial coercion" as displaces local and parental
authority will only accelerate resegregation. White flight is, in part, a
or relegated
response to local democratic institutions being "supplanted
6 6
to initiative-stifling roles as minions of the courts."

Justice Powell noted that, given the public's instinctive resentment
of coercion--especially when it encroaches upon the emotionally explosive area of parental authority-judicial control of education would
inevitably meet resistance, and could only adversely affect racial relations in the public schools. 67 Accommodation of these sensibilities calls

for maximum flexibility; yet judicial remedies, from the very nature of
their source, tend to be inflexible. Courts, especially the district courts
on the firing line, tend to employ familiar methods of relief approved
by the higher courts' efforts to desegregate district schools. Experience
with the public's visceral reaction to one such palliative, busing, convinced Justice Powell that remedies which may once have been appropriate and salutary might today prove disruptive and
counterproductive. 68 The institutional constraints on judicial action
and the societal tendency to allow maximum latitude further persuaded
Justice Powell that "[t]he primary and continuing responsibility for
public education.

. .

must be left with school officials and public au-

thorities. 69
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Powell, offered a lengthy dissent in both cases.7" Justice Rehnquist shared Justice Powell's deep
misgivings over the "displacement of local authority by the federal ju62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id. at 2989.
Id.
Id. at 2990.
Id. at 2992.
Id. at 2990.
Id. at 2991 n.6.
Id. at 2993.
dissenting joined by Powell, J.).
Id. at 2952-71, 2981-82 (Rehnquist, J.,
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diciary."' 1 Education was such an integral aspect of the power traditionally accorded local units of government that any judicial
diminution of it "'must be satisfactorily established by factual proof
and justified by a reasoned statement of legal principles.' "72 Justice
Rehnquist believed both of these factors were absent in the Columbus
and Dayton decisions.
Justice Rehnquist's penchant for dramatic language was evident at
the outset: the Court's reasoning mangled precedent, threatened to
make all school systems "captives of a remote and ambiguous past,"
and did so by way of "opinions so Delphic that lower courts will be
hard pressed to fathom their implications."7 3 He hazarded a guess that
the decisions heralded an era where district courts would be given their
head in desegregation litigation, subject to "only the most superficial
scrutiny by appellate courts" using the "clearly erroneous" standard of
review.74 Justice Rehnquist believed the Court was authorizing use of
a presumption which "in honesty must be characterized as . . . irrebutable."'T Thus,
racialimbalance at the time the complaint is filed is sufficient to
support a systemwide, racial balance school busing remedy if the
district court can find some evidence of discriminatory purpose
prior to 1954, without any inquiry into the causal relationship
between thosepre-1954 violations and current segregation in the
school system.
According to Justice Rehnquist, this was a "dramatic reorientation" of the Court's past decisions, and he reviewed the history of desegregation to prove his point.7 7 After striking down segregation
mandated by law,7 8 the Court ordered racially neutral admission policies7 9 and placed on school boards "the affirmative duty to take
whatever steps may be necessary to convert to a unitary system in
which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch."8 "
Justice Rehnquist interpreted the broad language addressing this af71. Id. at 2952.
72. Id. at 2953. Justice Rehnquist was quoting his opinion for the Court in Dayton
Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977).
73. 99 S. Ct. at 2953.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 2954.
76. Id. (emphasis in original).
77. Id. at 2955.
78. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954).
79. See e.g., Griffin v. School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Goss v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S.
683 (1963); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
80. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
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8
firmative duty in Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBoardofEducation 1
and Keyes v. School District No. I82 as applicable only to segregation
compelled by law.83 Unlike the majority,8 4 he did not think an affirmative duty should be imposed upon school boards with a post-1954 pattern of de facto segregation causally unrelated to any legally-imposed
discrimination prior to that date.8 5 Justice Rehnquist saw no reason to
make the year of Brown I a "constitutional Rubicon" justifying a uniform standard of scrutiny for districts with de facto, as opposed to de
jure, segregation, 6 the rationale being that no school board could discover in the Brown decisions an affirmative duty to homogenize its student population.8 7
Justice Rehnquist was most disturbed by the perception that the
majority was turning inside-out the shifting of the burden of proof permitted by Keyes. In Keyes, the Court stated that "where plaintiffs
prove that the school authorities have carried out a systematic program
of segregation affecting a substantial portion of the students, schools,
teachers, and facilities within the school system,"8 8 the burden of proof
shifts to the school board to prove that "its past segregative acts did not
create or contribute to the current segregated condition .. ."89 The
causal nexus between past and present was not automatic: the Keyes
opinion conceded that "at some point in time the relationship between
past segregative acts and present segregation may become so attenuated
as to be incapable of supporting a finding of de jure segregation...
*,90 Justice Rehnquist feared that the Columbus and Dayton opinions
had obliterated the distinction between dejure and de facto segregation
and had thereby loosened the causal nexus between present conditions
and official acts twenty-five years in the past. He believed the majority
opinions were open to the interpretation that if pre-Brown I official acts
had contributed "in some unspecified manner" to post-1954 segregation, a dual system could be presumed, and if a board since then had
failed to exploit every opportunity to promote integration, there arose a
further presumption that every trace of current segregation resulted

81. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
82. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
83. 99 S.Ct. at 2956-57 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Powell, J.).
84. See text accompanying note 10 supra. See also 99 S.Ct. at 2946-47 & n.5.
85. 99 S.Ct. at 2958 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Powell, J.).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 413 U.S. at 201.
89. Id. at 211.
90. Id. at 211-12 (citing Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 3132 (1971)).
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from the breach of this affirmative duty.9
Justice Rehnquist was dismayed over the implication that this affirmative duty obliged school boards to subordinate all other considerations to the policy of" 'integration fiber alles.' "92 For example, within
the context of the Columbus case, this meant that the Board should
have sited and constructed schools without regard for "'community
growth characteristics, educational programs, enrollment projections,
the system's plan of organization, the existing plant, and the financial
ability of the community to pay for new school facilities.' "93
Justice Rehnquist was skeptical whether a finding of intentional
and current discrimination was validly premised on the existence of a
dual system. Factors considered by the district court as indicating a
dual system, such as assignment of teachers by race and gerrymandering of boundary lines, were, to Justice Rehnquist, innocuous manifestations of the Board's neighborhood school policy.94 By themselves, they
did not establish a dual system and thus could not justify shifting the
burden of proof to the Board under Keyes. Because this shifting required the Board to use "increasingly anecdotal" evidence to disprove
the implication that the actions of its predecessors were animated by a
discriminatory intent, the Board's failure to rebut elevated a presumption to the status of positive proof.9 5
The district court's treatment of every post-1954 action by the
Board as a failure to discharge its affirmative duty to disestablish the
dual system troubled Justice Rehnquist. Like Justice Powell, he felt
this analysis failed to focus on the issue of intent and allowed discriminatory impact to be confused with discriminatory purpose. The district
court and the majority accepted that "actions having foreseeable and
anticipated disparate impact were relevant evidence" to prove intent. 96
Justice Rehnquist did not object to this as an abstract principle, but he
felt such actions were used in Columbus as the sole evidence of intent,97
contrary to the teaching of Washington v. Davis9 8 and Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. 99 The validity of this ap91. 99 S. Ct. at 2959 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Powell, J.).
92. Id. at 2964.
93. Id. at 2959 (quoting Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 229, 237-38
(S.D. Ohio 1977)).
94. Id. at 2961 & n.14.
95. Id. at 2961-62.
96. Id. at 2950.
97. Id. at 2965.
98. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
99. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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proach was particularly dubious when considered in conjunction with
the majority's concept of affirmative duty. As a result "the foreseeable
effects of nonracially motivated inaction is probative on [the issue of]
'
segregative intent. '""o
Thus, after reviewing the actions of the Board cited by the district
court as probative of segregative intent, Justice Rehnquist was convinced only that it reflected "the same cavalier approach to causality
and purpose [which] underlies the 1954 affirmative duty."' 1 Since the
burden was on the plaintiffs to show impact and intent, and since they
had failed to introduce evidence to prove or disprove a proffered justification for an action by the Board, Justice Rehmquist felt "the plaintiffs
have failed to establish a violation of their constitutional rights" because here, "foreseeability was not one kind of evidence, but the whole
ball game."102
Justice Rehnquist also disagreed with the majority as to the propriety of the system-wide remedy ordered by the district court in Columbus. The decreed system-wide correctives were tainted by the
district court's failure to apply the correct legal standards on causality
and intent. Substituting "incantation . . .for analysis," the district

court exhumed a myriad of actions with disparate impact and attributed them to the Board, with the result that that hapless body "is called
to task for all the forces beyond their control that shaped residential
segregation."'' 03 Given the small number of students affected by instances of proven discrimination, the district court had indulged in remedial overkill.
Justice Relmquist concluded by recalling that the majority's decisions could be interpreted as communicating to the appellate courts a
"'hands-off' attitude" such that lower court decisions would be less exacting scrutinized in desegregation cases." ° Under such circumstances
he doubted whether the Court could, "like Pilate, wash its hands of
disparate results in cases throughout the country."105 In the meantime,
school boards were more likely than not to end up in involuntary "judicial receivership," in large part because they had not been forced by the
100. Id.at 2965 n.18. (emphasis in original). Justice Rehnquist's comment on this was
perhaps the wittiest bon mot in the opinion: "Thus the interesting proposition, worthy of
Lewis Carroll at his best, that a lack of discriminatorypurosewill not by itself support an
inference of discriminatorypurpose." Id.(emphasis in original).
101. Id.at 2965.
102. Id.at 2967-68.
103. Id.at 2970.
104. Id.at 2970-71. See also id.at 2953.
105. Id.at 2971.
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majority to play with a "'loaded game board.' ,106 This result, Justice
Rehnquist believed, was repugnant to constitutional law and democratic practice.
Analysis
The reasoning employed in Columbus and Dayton broke no new
ground. Indeed, these cases were little more than decisive reaffirmations of a formula developed in prior cases, particularly Keyes v. School
DistrictNo. 1.107
The initial step in a desegregation suit is to prove the existence of a
dual system of education organized along racial lines. In cities such as
Columbus and Dayton, where such a system is not required by law, a
dual system may be established inferentially upon a showing of "purposeful and effective maintenance of a body of separate black schools
in a substantial part of the system."' 0° In Keyes, the Court held that of
the 119 schools in the Denver public school system, the twenty-two
which had white enrollments of less than thirty percent satisfied this
requirement. 10 9 The plaintiffs in Columbus demonstrated that half of
the system's 172 schools were either ninety percent black or ninety percent white." 0 In Dayton, the figures were fifty-one of sixty-nine
schools, with ninety percent of the students in each of the fifty-one
schools being either black or white."' These showings were clearly adequate to indicate "a body of separate black schools in a substantial
part of the system," and this in turn "suffice[d] to support a finding...
of the existence of a dual system."" 2 In addition, both the Columbus
and the Dayton systems had faculties organized on the basis of3 race, a
factor the Court has accepted as indicative of a dual system."1
At this point, three things happen. The first is the creation of a
presumption that this segregation was intentional, and that it permeates
the entire system. 114 Second, this presumption shifts to the board the
burden of proving that the other segregated schools in the system are
not also the result of similar motivations." 5 Third, the court begins to
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apply the affirmative-duty standard to the board's actions. The conjunctive effect of the second and third considerations is to require the
board to prove that it has not taken actions since the date of the dual
system's creation which may be construed as "factors in causing the
existing condition of segregation."' 6 More difficult still, the board
must show that none of the decisions made by it since that possibly
a natural environment for
indeterminable time as "a factor in'' creating
7
the growth of further segregation."
The school board will almost always be to unable to rebut the presumption of a system-wide intent to discriminate, since such rebuttal
will require a showing that no actions have been taken toward the
maintenance of the very system which these actions created. Proof that
a dual system has been created will constitute proof also that the board
has failed to discharge its affirmative duty to dismantle a system which
it may have only inadvertently constructed. If it cannot meet this burden and rebut the prima facie case made out by proof of segregated
schools in a substantial part of the system, the result seems ineluctable:
judgment for the plaintiffs is "authorized and required."'1 8 Subject
only to the vague attenuation limitation, 119 Justice Rehnquist's belief
that the presumption was being made irrebuttable may be correct. But
while holding the Board accountable for the foreseeable segregative effects implicit in post-1954 actions may be a radical idea, it was not
novel. Keyes had included the foreseeability standard within the presumption of system-wide segregative intent, reasoning that actions
which "earmark" schools according to their racial composition were
"thereby causing further racial concentration within the schools."' l 0
The novel element in Columbus and Dayton was the Court's permitting
foreseeability to figure as "relevant2 evidence" in the earlier inquiry of
establishing discriminatory intent.' '
Columbus and Dayton are noteworthy because a number of Justices voiced their growing doubts as to the effectiveness of judicial efforts to desegregate the schools of the nation, and their concern that
enforcement procedures might adversely affect local government autonomy. Nevertheless, a firm majority of the Court remains dedicated
to integration, especially when supported by the decisions of the lower
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courts. For this reason alone, Columbus and Dayton are important but
not nearly so innovative as the dissenters believed.

